STRAINS WITH ROMANIA "SURPRISE" UKRAINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000605

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UP RO
SUBJECT: STRAINS WITH ROMANIA "SURPRISE" UKRAINE

REF: 2008 KYIV 1454

Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

Summary
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1. (C) Ukrainian officials express surprise at recent
strains in Ukrainian-Romanian relations. They blame Romania
for making "unacceptable" last-minute demands on a
trans-border travel agreement that resulted in the abrupt
cancellation of a visit by President Basescu in February.
They also voice consternation at Romania's much-publicized
expulsion of two Romanian defense attaches (which Ukraine
reciprocated). Many Ukrainian observers suspect that Basescu
is posturing against Ukraine for domestic political advantage
in advance of Presidential elections. Some contend (but
produce no evidence) that Russia is somehow fanning bilateral
tensions. End Summary.

Scuttled Presidential Visit
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2. (C) Ukrainian officials point to the abrupt cancellation
of the visit of President Basescu, which had been scheduled
for February 23, as a barometer of strains in bilateral
relations. Bohdan Yaremenko, Deputy Head of the Foreign
Policy section of the Presidential Secretariat confirmed to
us that Basescu's cancellation surprised the GOU.
Arrangements were well advanced when, ten days before the
visit, the Romanian side demanded "new and unacceptable
conditions" for an agreement on trans-border travel. The
agreement was to have been a centerpiece deliverable the
meeting of the Ukraine-Romania Presidential Commission (the
second meeting of this forum; the first was in October 2007
during a Yushchenko visit to Romania). Yaremenko added that,
not only had the Romanians forced the visit's cancellation,
they also deliberated for five days over a one-sentence joint
statement announcing it. MFA Director General for Central
Europe Sergey Mishchenko told us that it was clear that the
Romanians had been putting up obstacles and had wanted to
kill the visit.

Defense Attaches Expelled
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3. (C) On March 4, Romania announced the expulsion of two
Ukrainian defense attaches. Yaremenko told us that as far
as he knew, the attaches had done nothing wrong. Whatever
the case, he argued that Romania should have dealt with the
matter quietly. Rada Defense Committee Chairman (and former
Minister of Defense) Anatoliy Hrytsenko termed it an
"unfriendly act" and called for reciprocal expulsions (which
took place on March 5). Ihor Smeshko, former head of the
Ukrainian Security Service, termed the press coverage
surrounding the expulsion "extraordinary."


4. (C) Yaremenko suspected -- as did former FM Boris Tarasyuk
and other Ukrainian officials and observers with whom we
spoke -- that President Basescu, with upcoming presidential
elections in mind, was looking to score political points by
taking a tough line on Ukraine. Yaremenko admitted that the
expulsion, like the cancellation of the Basescu visit, caught
Ukraine "totally by surprise." He said the GOU was "looking
at options" for how to deal with Romania.

"Greater Romania"
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5. (C) Political analyst Oleksey Haran told us that
Ukrainians were worried about Romanian activities in and
designs on the Bukovina region, which includes parts of
western Ukraine. Indeed, the Romanian diplomat and attache
expelled in the tit for tat expulsions were serving in the
Consulate in Chernivtsi Oblast, on the Romanian border, where
Romania has been accused of agitating among ethnic Romanian
civic organizations.


6. (C) Analyst Natalya Bilotsir from the US-Ukraine
foundation told us that, at lower political levels and
academic levels, Romania is pushing Ukraine to reclassify
Romanian and Moldovan minority groups in Ukraine into one
"Romanian Speaking" minority group. She said that there are
currently 250,000 self-identified Moldovans in Ukraine, and
only 100,000 self-identified Romanians. Combining the two
groups would result in a "Romanian Speaking" minority that
outnumbered all other minority groups in Ukraine except
Russians.


7. (C) Yaremenko told us that the GOU was concerned that the
current Romanian government seeks to follow a "Greater
Romania" policy. This did not involve territorial ambitions,

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but it did involve asserting Romania into the affairs of
neighboring regions where there are Romanian minorities.
MFA DG Mishchenko told us that EU rules on minorities gave
Romania more prerogatives where there were more ethnic
Romanians. Hence their desire to inflate the number.
Mishchenko asserted that there are 141 Romanian language
schools in Ukraine but only one Ukrainian language school in
Romania - even though there are 70,000 Ukrainians living
there.


Snake Island Decision
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8. (SBU) On February 3, the UN International Court of Justice
(ICJ) unanimously ruled that Snake Island was a Ukrainian
island, but that the surrounding sea shelf would be split
between Romania and Ukraine at a line between their
respective claims, with Ukraine gaining a 12 nautical mile
exclusion zone around the island itself. Both the GOU and
the Romanian government have said they would accept the
court's decision as final, and both have portrayed the
decision as a victory for their respective sides. Ukrainian
political analyst Haran told us that it was unclear who won
in the ICJ decision, but that opponents of Ukrainian western
integration were pushing the idea that Ukraine lost. The
Presidential Secretariat's Yaramenko confirmed to us that
while the GOU "does not like" the court's decision, it would
abide by it.

Not Much Help
--------------


9. (C) Serhiy Horopakha, MFA desk officer for Romania, told
us that, despite hopes that Romania would assist Ukraine in
its preparations for NATO membership, Romania had done
little. Analyst Bilotsir contended that the bilateral
relationship was "neither close, nor strategic." She said
that Bucharest's approach to Ukraine had changed once Romania
gained EU membership. After that, Romanian counterparts
became "overbearing," she contended.

Rumors of a Russian Hand
--------------


10. (C) Yaremenko told us that some in the GOU suspected
Russia might be trying to stoke tensions between Romania and
Ukraine to diminish Ukraine as a candidate for the NATO and
EU. Prominent political analysts Volodymyr Fesenko and
Haran also told us they suspected that Russia was behind the
tensions, particularly regarding the Ukrainian Defense
Attaches. While none of our contacts had evidence to back up
such suspicions, press commentary alleged that the Ukrainian
attaches might have been working for Moscow.


Comment
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11. (C) Ukraine's current testy relationship with Romania
stands in contrast to the productive relationship Romania has
forged with Poland. While historical baggage with Poland was
heavy, common interests propelled the relationship forward.
The same should be true with Romania. The ICJ's decision on
the Snake Island dispute should remove that as a point of
contention. As elections cycles move forward in both
countries, opportunities should arise to press the re-start
button on bilateral relations.
TAYLOR