IMF COMPROMISE WOULD LEAVE SEVERE UKRAINE BUDGET

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000360 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/UMB, EEB/OMA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2019 TAGS: EFIN EREL ETRD PGOV PREL XH UP SUBJECT: IMF COMPROMISE WOULD LEAVE SEVERE UKRAINE BUDGET GAP REF: A. KYIV 288 ¶B. KYIV 265 ¶C. KYIV 349 Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Ukraine faces a glaring budget gap this year, even if it meets all IMF conditionalities and introduces severe budget discipline. The GOU has thus far failed to complete "prior actions" articulated by the IMF, necessary before the Fund can pay out the next tranche of its $16.4 billion Stand-By Arrangement (SBA). Unfulfilled measures for cutting the budget deficit may be the largest impediment to the return of the IMF mission team, though the local IMF representative remains confident that the GOU will eventually move to enact minimal reforms. ¶2. (C) The IMF estimates that Ukraine will need $2.6 billion in external budget support in 2009, funds that can only come from international donors as long as the world's capital markets remain frozen. We continue to weigh in with the GOU leadership on the need to meet IMF conditionalities, and we encourage Washington to be prepared to work with EU partners, the IMF, and the World Bank to give Ukraine financial support, but only if Ukraine fulfills IMF prior actions and World Bank structural reforms. Ukraine's political leadership must demonstrate unity and a greater willingness to do everything in its power to tackle the crisis, which is growing more serious by the day. End summary. IMF Sanctions a "Compromise" on Budget -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In order to return to Ukraine to complete the first review of its $16.4 billion SBA, the IMF has stipulated GOU action on reducing the budget deficit, ensuring central bank independence, improving crisis coordination, and devising a mechanism for bank restructuring. It has also sought a joint declaration by PM Tymoshenko, President Yushchenko, and Speaker Lytvyn on their readiness to implement tough economic reforms. ¶4. (SBU) Among these IMF "prior actions," budget politics are proving the most complex. According to the IMF, the 2009 budget passed by the GOU faces a UAH 50 billion deficit ($6.49 billion or 5 percent of GDP). While Lytvyn has referred to IMF figures as authoritative, PM Tymoshenko told the Ambassador on February 17 that the budget deficit will be much smaller than the IMF has estimated, equivalent to only 3 percent of GDP. (Note: She suggested the cost of bank recapitalization would add another 3 percent of GDP to overall GOU expenditures in 2009, equaling a total fiscal gap of 6 percent or $7.8 billion. End note.) ¶5. (SBU) Ukraine's economic circumstances have worsened considerably since the SBA was signed, causing the Fund to relax its original balanced budget conditionality and introduce a "compromise" budget plan. In this plan, IMF officials tell us they expect the GOU to cut spending and/or increase revenues to generate an expected savings equal to at least UAH 20 billion ($2.6 billion or 2 percent of GDP). That would still leave a gap of UAH 30 billion, or 3 percent of GDP. Of this gap, the IMF hopes that Ukraine would receive roughly $2.6 billion of external financing, equal to 2 percent of GDP. This entire compromise package would then leave a residual financing need equivalent to one percent of 2009 GDP (roughly UAH 10 billion or $1.3 billion),a figure the IMF expects Ukraine can finance domestically, even under the current circumstances. With credit markets closed to Ukraine, the IMF concludes that any external financing would take the form of lending from sovereign and multilateral donors. Measures for the Deficit -------------- ¶6. (SBU) According to the IMF's Kyiv-based resident representative Max Alier and the World Bank's Kyiv-based senior economist Pablo Saavedra, the GOU has been given a wide ranging "menu" of potential measures to cut the budget deficit. From this menu (including value-added tax reforms, pension targeting, and reductions in energy subsidies),the GOU has told the IMF it will make limited amendments to the state pension scheme, while also imposing higher excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol. The IMF concedes the GOU's proposal would only implement a portion of the IMF and World Bank's total menu, as the GOU appears ready to resist any further KYIV 00000360 002 OF 003 measures that it feels are politically unfeasible in the run-up to 2010 presidential elections. ¶7. (SBU) Of the two measures selected by the GOU to cut the budget deficit, a proposal to increase excise taxes on alcohol and cigarettes has not yet been tabled in the Rada by the GOU. The pension bill is further along in parliament. Rada MPs are currently deliberating over legislation (bill number 3556) that would reduce expenditures by pegging pensions to 2007 wage levels, instead of to 2008 levels, which would reduce pension outlays significantly, since nominal wages have increased substantially in recent years. MPs have also debated technical tweaks to the pension bill that would increase payroll taxes and bolster the overall Pension Fund, 30 percent of which is to be financed by the 2009 budget (Ref A). External Financing -------------- ¶8. (SBU) To date, only $500 million, via a World Bank Development Policy Loan (DPL),has been offered by international donors to help Ukraine finance its budget deficit this year. No other donors or bilateral lenders have come forth to cover the remaining $2.1 billion the IMF says Ukraine will need. The World Bank DPL is scheduled for disbursement in summer 2009, and it comes with strings (known as "structural measures") attached: The GOU must a) pass a public procurement law, b) increase support for the poorest of Ukraine's citizens through a World Bank-approved pension targeting mechanism, c) place a floor on infrastructure funding, and d) pass legislation to improve Ukraine's business environment. ¶9. (SBU) PM Tymoshenko has appealed to the World Bank to move up the disbursement date of the DPL. However, according to Saavedra, World Bank President Robert Zoellick told Tymoshenko on February 20 that the $500 million DPL would only be disbursed in mid-2009, and only if the GOU adhered to IMF conditionalities and implemented World Bank-proposed measures. Tymoshenko reportedly requested additional budget support beyond the World Bank's current pledge. Zoellick responded by saying that needed structural measures are still unmet by the GOU, so it is too early to talk about any further loan program. World Bank officials have stated that they welcome using the DPL as a "platform" for other donors. ¶10. (C) Even the Russian bilateral loan (Ref B) now looks to be in trouble. The IMF's Alier commented to us that the Russians will not lend money to Ukraine, because they have huge problems at home and Ukraine will not accept Russian political conditionalities. At the rate Russia is burning foreign exchange to prop up the ruble, it will be out of reserves in less than a year, Alier said. ¶11. (C) Separately, Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official Andriy Nadzhos told Econoff that although the "zero option" (on Soviet-era assets and liabilities -- see below) was the only conditionality formally on the table from Moscow, he suspected Russia would gain significant political leverage and "greater access to economic assets" if a deal were to go through. Nadzhos had learned from contacts at Ukraine's Justice Ministry that the bilateral loan deal was being held up on the Russian side. Apparently, Ukraine's Justice Ministry has requested from Moscow records of total Soviet-era assets abroad before it agrees to revert control of these assets to Russia in exchange for Moscow paying vestigial Soviet-era debts. Ukraine seeks to verify whether its share of Soviet-era external property exceeds Ukraine's proportion of Soviet-era debt. Moscow has thus far refused to provide the requested information. ¶12. (C) In lieu of a bolstered World Bank program or Russian bilateral support, the IMF has increasingly weighed in with Kyiv-based G7 ambassadors to help Ukraine cope with its 2009 budget deficit. IMF chief envoy Ceyla Pazarbasioglu has told the Ambassador and his G-7 colleagues on numerous occasions that Ukraine cannot cover its budget deficit without external financing. She has also given her blessing for PM Tymoshenko and President Yushchenko to reach out to foreign countries for additional support. ¶13. (C) If the remaining $2.1 billion is not forthcoming from bilateral or multilateral donors, the IMF will expect Ukraine to take further difficult fiscal measures to rein in the budget deficit. Besides the IMF and World Bank-proposed KYIV 00000360 003 OF 003 menu options for cutting spending and/or increasing revenues, Alier told us that "monetizing debt is the most unacceptable option, given that inflation would immediately take off." On the IMF Coming Back -------------- ¶14. (C) Alier said he expects that the IMF mission, previously slated to return this week, will eventually come back, but he cautioned that Ukraine still needs to take concrete steps before that will happen. He pointed out that the pension bill had not been voted upon, the excise bill had not been forwarded by the GOU, bank recapitalization and restructuring measures remained in draft form at the National Bank, and a mandatory joint declaration (by PM Tymoshenko, President Yushchenko, and Speaker Lytvyn) was mired in acrimonious politics. (Note: On February 20, Yushchenko signed a 13 percent import tariff into law, in what appears to be a violation of WTO rules and IMF continuing performance criteria (Ref C). As of February 24, Alier told us he still had not received official comment from IMF headquarters on the tariff law, which may further complicate Ukraine's IMF program. End note.) Comment -------------- ¶15. (C) Although it appears Ukraine's IMF program will remain stuck in the coming days, we continue to expect Ukraine's leaders to take joint actions that have been expressed as mandatory preconditions for further international donor engagement. In the event Ukraine shows it will move to implement IMF prior actions and World Bank structural reforms, the USG should team up with the EU, IMF, and the World Bank to establish an emergency loan facility for Eastern Europe that will allow Ukraine and other threatened countries to meet external financing and budget obligations. We encourage continued outreach with European partners to develop a joint response to Ukraine's economic crisis, recognizing that failing banks, falling currencies, and possible large-scale defaults in Eastern Europe are an imminent threat to the European banking and business communities. EBRD President Thomas Mirow told the Ambassador on February 16 that the issue of a regional response may be raised at the next ECOFIN meeting on March 10. USG views on a regional plan will be useful prior to that meeting. End comment. TAYLOR