UKRAINE ASKS A GUARDED IMF TO SUPPORT A BUDGET

C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 000229 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/UMB, EEB/OMA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2019 TAGS: EFIN EREL ETRD ECON PREL XH UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE ASKS A GUARDED IMF TO SUPPORT A BUDGET DEFICIT Classified By: AMBASSADOR, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) The IMF told the Ambassador on February 1 that the GOU says it cannot run a balanced budget this year. It has asked the IMF for flexibility on this key conditionality of the $16.4 billion loan package, Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, head of the IMF mission performing the first formal review of the loan package, told the Ambassador. Ukraine now hoped to get additional financial support from the international community to reduce the need to finance the deficit via central bank borrowing. The GOU was preparing a new budget proposal for the IMF, Pazarbasioglu said, adding that any changes in the loan program would require IMF board approval. Acknowledging that a balanced budget had become difficult in the worsening economic environment, Pazarbasioglu nonetheless stated that the IMF was not yet convinced that the GOU, President Yushchenko and the Rada were actually prepared to take the difficult political steps needed to keep a budget deficit manageable. The IMF was also concerned about the inflationary impact of a deficit financed through central bank borrowing. ¶2. (C) When formulating its response to Ukraine's request, the IMF would also take into consideration what, if any, additional financial support donors might extend to Ukraine, Pazarbasioglu said. She called the World Bank's financial support to date "timid," said EU countries were not interested, and asked whether the USG would extend financial support to Ukraine. Pazarbasioglu called the current economic situation dire, but still "manageable" if things did not get worse. The NBU and GOU still needed "to get their act together" on the next steps of bank recapitalization, but the IMF was encouraged by news that a coordinator might be named to manage the difficult relationship between NBU and the Ministry of Finance. Pazarbasioglu said PM Tymoshenko chided the IMF for not weighing in heavily with Morgan Stanley after it called an outstanding loan to Ukraine. The Ambassador promised to follow up with Washington on Pazarbasioglu's request for USG budgetary support. End summary. GOU Asks IMF Approval to Run a Deficit -------------- ¶3. (C) The IMF's Ceyla Pazarbasioglu told the Ambassador on February 1 that the GOU was insisting it could not run a balanced budget this year, and was seeking IMF flexibility on this key conditionality of the $16.4 billion Stand-By Arrangement (SBA). Pazarbasioglu, who leads the IMF mission completing the first formal review of the SBA, acknowledged that economic conditions in both Ukraine, and around the world, had deteriorated since the program was adopted last October. A key assumption of the program - that the world economy would rebound in the second half of 2009 - was looking less likely, she said. ¶4. (C) However, running a deficit was one matter, but financing it was another, and raising the funds was nearly impossible in the current environment, she said. Ukraine would unlikely be able to borrow much either domestically or abroad. The domestic market was not sufficiently developed to cover the vast borrowing foreseen in the 2009 budget, and international markets would probably remain closed to Ukraine even if the world economy improved. The GOU could expect to borrow little from domestic banks, and the IMF was no longer confident that state-owned banks Ukreximbank and Oschadbank were as strong as was often claimed in Ukraine. Hence the GOU would have little option but to monetize the debt, i.e. borrow from the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU),if it were to run a sizable deficit that went beyond the borrowing (for bank recapitalization and project finance) that the IMF had foreseen in the SBA, she said. ¶5. (C) Monetizing the debt also had implications for inflation, and for the IMF's efforts to reestablish confidence in the NBU, she said. She pointed out that part of the SBA loan, when used to recapitalize banks, would also be monetized, potentially adding to inflationary pressures. The NBU, as an institution, had lost trust in both Ukraine and abroad because of its handling of the Hryvnia devaluation, and a large monetization of the debt could further undermine whatever confidence remained. IMF Board Would Need to Approve Changes in Loan Program -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Pazarbasioglu said the IMF was engaged in an ongoing discussion with the GOU on whether, and by how much, the IMF was willing to tolerate a budget deficit. The GOU was preparing a series of measures to modify the budget and reduce the deficit, and Pazarbasioglu said she hoped to reach a basic understanding with the GOU before the IMF mission left Ukraine on February 6. Any agreement to accept a budget deficit would need subsequent IMF board approval. That approval would only be forthcoming if the IMF got clear commitments from the GOU to reign in the deficit, and if the IMF were confident that President Yushchenko and the Rada would support whatever commitments the GOU made to the IMF. Pazarbasioglu added that she feared that any agreement could unravel quickly amidst the political infighting between PM Tymoshenko and Yushchenko. GOU Looks To Donors to Plug Budget Hole -------------- ¶7. (C) When framing its response to the GOU request, the IMF might also take into consideration what budgetary assistance other donors and/or governments would be willing to give Ukraine, she said. While applauding the technical assistance that the international community was providing, she indicated that no governments had provided significant budgetary support. She described the World Bank's support to date as "timid." (Note: The World Bank lent Ukraine $500 million in direct budget support in late 2008, is planning to provide up to $750 million for bank recapitalization this year, and may extend additional budget support at the end of the year, the World Bank's Lalit Raina told us.) Pazarbasioglu and IMF residential rep Max Alier said the GOU had already asked numerous governments for direct financial support. Pazarbasioglu asked the Ambassador whether the USG would be willing to provide support as well. The Ambassador confirmed that Deputy PM Turchinov had asked him directly for support last week, and said he would broach the request with Washington. Pazarbasioglu ruled out a modification of the SBA. The IMF would not increase the total package, nor would it accelerate disbursements scheduled for later this year or in 2010, she said. "Black Holes" in Pension Fund, Naftohaz -------------- ¶8. (C) Pazarbasioglu said deficits in the pension fund and at Naftohaz were the "two black holes" in the budget. Pension spending equal to 15 percent of GDP was not sustainable, she said. She said neither Tymoshenko nor Yushchenko was apparently willing to take the politically difficult steps to reign in the budget deficit, and she expressed exasperation that both Tymoshenko and Yushchenko never missed an opportunity to attack each another. Hence both were reticent to act out of fear of being undermined by their political opponent. The IMF would thus insist on assurances that the Rada and Yushchenko would support any additional agreements that the GOU struck with the IMF. ¶9. (C) Pazarbasioglu suggested the GOU might limit wage and pension increases to less than the rate of inflation, or increase domestic energy tariffs faster than had been foreseen in the SBA. (Note: PM Tymoshenko shared the GOU's plans with the Ambassador on February 2. Post will report septel.) All budget amendments would require Rada approval. Hence parliamentary buy-in, and a commitment by the President not to attack an arrangement with the IMF, were critical, she said. She added that the IMF may also take into consideration true structural changes that point to a serious intent to reform the economy, even if they do not save much money this year. As an example, she cited badly needed reforms to the pension system, such as changes in the retirement age or an improved targeting of benefits. Situation Dire, But "Manageable" -------------- ¶10. (C) Although the economic situation had deteriorated substantially since October, it was still manageable if things did not get worse, Pazarbasioglu said. Ukraine should meet its sovereign debt obligations without a problem, but the IMF was receiving more reports that the non-banking corporate sector might default of much of its debt. The IMF was trying to get a better understanding of the non-bank corporate debt, she said. Fulfilling Conditionalities To Date -------------- ¶11. (C) Pazarbasioglu confirmed that the IMF was satisfied that the NBU maintained reserves above the $26.7 billion floor foreseen for December 31. She gave the NBU good marks for the quality and timing of the recently completed diagnostics of the country's 17 largest banks. The NBU board now needed to act and make recommendations for individual recapitalizations. The ball would then be in the MOF's court, which "still needs to get its act together," as little had been done to create a mechanism for state-funded recapitalization. ¶12. (C) Pazarbasioglu criticized the poor cooperation between the NBU and MOF, although she was encouraged that the GOU, NBU and Rada might install an overall coordinator for the recap and resolution process. Former NBU Governor and current Swedbank chairman Sergey Tyhypko was being named as a possible candidate for the position, she said. She expressed concern at the continued absence of NBU Governor Stelmakh, "because it's not clear who actually is in charge at the NBU." Tymoshenko Chides IMF Over Morgan Stanley -------------- ¶13. (C) Pazarbasioglu acknowledged that the IMF has participated in discussions with the GOU, its advisors and Morgan Stanley over the GOU guarantee for the $465 million loan to Ukravtodor. The IMF's Monetary and Capital Markets Department led the discussions, which alerted all parties to the implications that default could have for the SBA. Should Ukraine default, an IMF board would need to approve the continuation of the program. The board would do so if Ukraine was making a serious effort to address the arrears, she said. ¶14. (C) She said the IMF had cautioned the GOU about the need to respect foreign debt obligations. The IMF was worried about the number of cross-triggers in many of Ukraine's sovereign debt borrowings. Because of the expected monetization pressures emanating from the budget deficit, it was unlikely that Ukraine could, in addition, monetize the entire foreign debt that would suddenly come due in the wake of a default, Pazarbasioglu said. She recounted her discussions with Tymoshenko, who was furious that Morgan Stanley called its loan after Ukraine was downgraded. Tymoshenko criticized the IMF for not reigning in Morgan Stanley, reasoning as follows: "The IMF gave Ukraine a loan, the U.S. is a major shareholder in the IMF, and now a U.S. company is trying to drive Ukraine into default." Comment -------------- ¶15. (C) Tymoshenko's aforementioned comment notwithstanding, Pazarbasioglu said the Prime Minister had finally begun to understand the true scope of the economic problems facing Ukraine. Last October this was not the case, Pazarbasioglu said, when the IMF had the impression that Tymoshenko did not understand, or want to understand, the full extent of the crisis. Pazarbasioglu gave Yushchenko better marks, saying that the President had grasped the challenges facing Ukraine from the outset. Nonetheless, such joint understanding of the gravity of the situation has not made Yushchenko and Tymoshenko place their rivalries aside to address the crisis, as demonstrated this past weekend, when both politicians hit the airwaves to make the other responsible for the country's problems. As Pazarbasioglu pointed out, the political discord is making it difficult for the IMF to be flexible in the face of a worsening economic situation, for it is losing confidence that Ukraine's political leaders have the will to support the tough actions that are needed for Ukraine to overcome the crisis with IMF support. End comment. TAYLOR