TYMOSHENKO ASKS FOR USG ASSISTANCE TO ADDRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KYIV 000228 DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/UMB, EEB/OMA NSC FOR STERLING AND KVIEN EEB/ESC/IEC FOR SGALLOGLY AND LWRIGHT DOE FOR LEKIMOF, CCALIENDO, RBOUDREAU USDOC FOR 4231/ITA/OEENIS/NISD/CLUCYK E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2019 TAGS: EFIN ENRG EU PGOV PREL PU UP SUBJECT: TYMOSHENKO ASKS FOR USG ASSISTANCE TO ADDRESS CRISIS Classified By: Ambassador William Taylor. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary and action request: Prime Minister Tymoshenko during a February 2 meeting with the Ambassador asked for both economic and political support as she grapples with Ukraine,s current crisis. She asked specifically for: 1) a USG bilateral budget support loan to help Ukraine address its budget deficit; 2) an MCC-like assistance program to counteract Russian influence in Crimea; 3) USG diplomatic support for an agreement the GOU seeks with the EU to bolster,s Nafothaz,s financial prospects; 4) an assessment by U.S. experts of the gas price formula in the recent Ukraine-Russia agreement; 5) participation by U.S. firms in transportation, energy, and environmental projects; 6) a U.S. organized initiative to ask President Yushchenko to refrain from interference in the GOU,s work; and 7) an invitation to Washington for high level meetings. She may raise some of these proposals if she meets with the Vice President in Munich this weekend. Embassy Kyiv would welcome Washington reaction and guidance concerning Tymoshenko,s requests. ¶2. (C) Tymoshenko outlined plans to address the various aspects of Ukraine,s large budget deficit, especially those flowing from the GOU,s over-extended pension commitments and Naftohaz,s debt-ridden balance sheet. Tymoshenko expressed a wish to reduce Ukraine,s reliance on Russian gas supplies, noted that Russia had lost more than Ukraine from the recent gas dispute, and outlined PM Putin,s motivations during the gas standoff. Stating that despite what has been said of her, she would not sell out Ukraine,s interests to Russia, and that she is a strong supporter of Ukraine,s European and Euro-Atlantic integrations. She also lamented the &harm8 President Yushchenko,s actions have done to Ukraine, and assessed that his attacks against her have effectively ended his political career and so damaged her position that opposition leader Yanukovych must now be counted as the favorite in the next Presidential election. End Summary. Three Budget Problems -------------- ¶3. (C) Tymoshenko noted conditions will not allow Ukraine to borrow in international credit markets to cover its projected 2009 government budget deficit of UAH 40 billion (USD 5 billion). Ukraine hopes to address the deficit in part with support from other governments, but letters to the U.S., Japan, China, EU, Saudi Arabia, and Russia asking for loans have gone unanswered, except for Russia which is ready to consider the GOU request. Tymoshenko added another USD 5 billion for bank recapitalization will be required, but the IMF will not count such funds in deciding whether Ukraine had met the IMF,s balanced budget condition. Tymoshenko plans to bring up the possibility of USG bilateral budget support when she meets with Vice President Biden this week in Munich. ¶4. (C) Tymoshenko added pensions are also a budget problem. One approach would be to stop pension benefits to those who continue to work and to increase the retirement age. This would have been difficult in 2005, but now &in the midst of a Presidential campaign which has already begun8 is impossible politically. The GOU instead will consider two schemes to address the pension shortfall. Citizens working abroad and the self-employed in Ukraine (e.g. small merchants and some farmers) do not take part in the state pension plan. The GOU is considering allowing such persons to contribute to and receive future pensions from the GOU. Projections are Ukrainians working abroad might contribute some $3 billion annually, while the self-employed contributions might total $2.4 billion per year. Tymoshenko cautioned that these plans have not yet been vetted by the IMF. Naftohaz,s Budget Situation -------------- ¶5. (C) Naftohaz,s budget deficit, which Tymoshenko put at UAH 16 billion, is the third hole in the 2009 budget. This deficit could be addressed in part by doubling gas rates, but most households would not pay the higher rates, and centralized gas and heating systems make it difficult to cut off individual consumers. Tymoshenko noted such increase would be akin to &throwing a burning match into a tank of gasoline8. Instead, Tymoshenko will meet on February 7 with German Chancellor Merkel to discuss whether Europeans might pay for the technical gas used to move gas from Russia to the EU. Were the EU to agree, half of Naftohaz,s deficit would be eliminated and its pipeline system could be maintained in a normal state. Tymoshenko urged the USG to support Ukraine in its talks on this subject with key EU leaders, especially Merkel and Sarkozy, and believes such an agreement would do away with Russia,s &monopoly of gas transit8 with Ukraine and lead to future gas contracts between Ukraine and EU companies. ¶6. (C) The other half of Naftohaz,s 2009 budget is attributable to short-term loans which are coming due. Tymoshenko argued that Naftohaz hopes to find a &bank pool8 that would allow it to convert this short-term debt into long-term, ten-year debt, thus allowing the state owned energy company to overcome the difficulties it will face in 2009 and 2010. Tymoshenko stated she will want to discuss this possibility of restructuring Naftohaz,s debts "at the very highest levels8. ¶7. (C) The Prime Minister added that she keeps hearing about a &consortium with Russia,8 presumably the suggestion that Russia and others take an interest in Ukraine,s gas pipelines system. Tymoshenko claimed she would never allow such a consortium to be set up, regardless of its packaging. Business Opportunities for U.S. Firms -------------- - ¶8. (C) Tymoshenko claimed that Ukraine hopes to reduce its dependence on Russian gas by one half. The GOU is developing a two-year program that will diversify its sources of energy, including renewables. The program will result in a dramatic reduction in Kyoto Protocol greenhouse gas emissions, and Ukraine will then become a seller of "as8 to interested firms. The GOU is starting a small scale pilot project in this regard with a Japanese firm, but believes eventually Ukraine might have &2 billion greenhouse gas units8 to sell. Tymoshenko would welcome participation by U.S. firms in its emission program, either by providing technology to reduce emissions or as buyers of "as8. ¶9. (C) Tymoshenko also would welcome the participation of U.S. firms in transportation and energy infrastructure projects in Ukraine. She envisions U.S. firms as general contractors for the projects, which could be financed by U.S. banks. The GOU would provide sovereign guarantees for long-term debt to finance the projects, which would be undertaken on sound, commercial principles. The GOU has already had discussions with China and Japan regarding such projects, but Tymoshenko wants to see U.S. firms more fully integrated into Ukraine,s economy. Tymoshenko on Russia-Ukraine Gas Crisis -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) The Prime Minister noted that despite what might be said about her &pro-Russia moods,, she remains a strong advocate of Ukraine,s European and Euro-Atlantic integration. She swore that she would never make a commitment, not even a short-term compromise, which would be contrary to Ukraine,s national interests. She does not understand why Europe abandoned Ukraine during the recent gas crisis and did not publicly indicate that Ukraine had not stolen gas. ¶11. (C) In terms of the gas negotiations themselves, Tymoshenko characterized her role as &calming the situation8. The contract formula for setting the gas price is a new approach, and Tymoshenko indicated she would welcome U.S. experts assessing the formula and advising whether it should be revised, which Tymoshenko implied could be as early as 2010. Tymoshenko wishes the EU had been more forthcoming in revealing the terms of its gas agreements with Russia, which would have assisted the Ukrainian side in the negotiations. Poland had provided information regarding its contract, and Ukraine had been able to negotiate a price that is only 74 percent of the price Poland pays. Overall, according to GOU calculations, it achieved a &fifteen percent discount8 in the negotiations with Russia. Tymoshenko claimed that only Belarus pays less than Ukraine, but she &hadn,t given away a single square centimeter of Ukraine8 to reach a deal. She also noted as a success the elimination of the intermediary RUE, which was not just a corrupt organization, but one which spent money on political schemes. Putin,s Motivation -------------- ¶12. (C) Tymoshenko stated that multi-faceted motivations underpinned Russian Prime Minister Putin,s actions during the gas crisis. In particular, he wanted: 1) to show Europe, especially those who have supported the U.S. missile defense initiative, that Europe is dependent on Russia; 2) he wanted to build support for the Nord and South Stream gas pipelines; and 3) he wanted to take revenge on Ukraine for its policy during the conflict in Georgia, including provoking sentiment against the current Ukrainian government. Tymoshenko assessed that Putin had not achieved any of his goals, and that he realized such in the days following Russia,s January 7 gas cutoff. While the gas crisis had harmed both Ukraine and Russia, the bigger loss was suffered by Russia. Russian Influence in Crimea -------------- ¶13. (C) Tymoshenko expressed concern that Russia, via the Moscow mayor and the companies he owns and influences, is investing &billions of dollars8 each year in Crimea. Ukraine cannot compete with Russia in this regard, and the attitudes of the residents of Crimea are becoming more pro-Russia and more anti-Ukraine each year. Tymoshenko called for a Millennium Challenge Corporation-like program to invest in Ukraine to counteract Russia,s activities. The Ukrainian Political Situation -------------- ¶14. (C) Calling her relations with President Yushchenko a &SOS situation8, Tymoshenko asked that the Ambassador organize a meeting with President Yushchenko at the highest possible level &so that he would stop ruining the country and interfering with the National Bank of Ukraine and the government,s work8. She expressed concern about Yushchenko's attempt to have to the SBU and Prosecutor,s Office begin criminal prosecutions again her and Naftohaz officials for their involvement in the gas negotiations. She also did not discount the possibility that the President might attempt to impose &martial law8 in the event of a financial default or social unrest. The Prime Minister added that the President,s political life was coming to an end and that he needed to stop having a negative effect on the country,s life. Tymoshenko vowed further that she would no longer respond to the President,s accusations against her. ¶15. (C) Tymoshenko argued that President Yushchenko,s negative actions, which had first started in mid-2005, had effectively ended his political career and with regard to the Tymoshenko Bloc had &killed us by half8. Opposition and Regions Party head Yanukovych had benefited by the conflict between the two former orange coalition allies, and Tymoshenko assessed Yanukovych,s chances of beating her in a Presidential election at 70 percent if the situation develops as it appears to be doing. Tymoshenko indicated that she wants to protect against such a scenario, but that if Yanukovych should win, the &strategy of the democratic team8 would be lost and might be regained only in two generations. Interest in a Visit to the United States -------------- --- 16.(C) Tymoshenko also expressed interest in an invitation to the United States to meet with U.S. government officials to discuss how the USG might support her government in the challenges it faces. (Note: Deputy Prime Minster Nemyrya told the Ambassador after the meeting that he wants to go to the U.S. in a few weeks to prepare Tymoshenko,s visit. Nemyrya indicated that during such trip he hopes to finally resolve the long-standing OPIC issue, and that the Economy and Defense Ministries had been directed to find a solution to the problem. End note.) Comment -------------- ¶17. (C) Ukraine,s economic crisis has put Tymoshenko in a tough spot. The Prime Minister,s perception is that straightforward measures like decreased pension benefits and gas price increases that would allow the GOU to meet the IMF,s conditions on a &balanced budget8 would be politically unpalatable to large numbers of Ukrainians. In that light, many of the measures the Prime Minister proposed seek to delay the hard steps that need to taken or to have others bear at least part of the associated financial burden. ¶18. (C) Nonetheless, Tymoshenko,s government is attempting to play what at this point is a very bad economic hand. The President,s political attacks and lack of support for his former coalition partner have made the Prime Minister,s task all the more difficult. The crisis Ukraine faces is real and severe, and we should give serious consideration to which of Tymoshenko,s proposals we might support and to what other U.S. support might be available to assist Ukraine. End Comment. TAYLOR