TYMOSHENKO'S UPHILL BATTLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 002138 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV UP SUBJECT: TYMOSHENKO'S UPHILL BATTLE Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary for reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) PM Yuliya Tymoshenko continues to lag behind Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych in opinion polls for the January/February Presidential election -- and the gap, ten points or more, may be widening. President Yushchenko's daily attacks on Tymoshenko are hurting her with her base in Western Ukraine. Tymoshenko is trying to ignore Yushchenko's barrage and focus instead on attracting disaffected "Orange" voters who might be motivated to vote against Yanukovych if not for her. Tymoshenko's legendary campaign skills, thus far not much in evidence, will be tested to the maximum in the coming weeks. Tymoshenko has traditionally been a strong finisher, but that was in opposition. A possible budgetary crisis in January and February, stemming, in part, from lack of release of the IMF's fourth tranche, could, her advisors believe, sink her chances. End Summary. Gap May be Widening -------------- ¶2. (U) An IFES poll (funded by USAID and considered among the most reliable) from 21-30 November shows Yanukovych with 31.2% in the first round against Tymoshenko's 19.1%. The gap between them widened since IFES' last poll. In round two, the poll gives Yanukovych 42% and Tymoshenko 28%. Again, Yanukovych's margin over Tymoshenko is up five percent from the preceding poll. Of those polled, 74% said Ukraine is now on "the path to instability." Only 24% say Ukraine is a democracy. Tymoshenko's negative rating is 67%; Yanukovych's is 55%. A separate November poll by Taylor Nelson Soffes (TNS) Ukraine shows Tymoshenko 9.9 points behind Yanukovych in the first round and 10.8 points behind him in the second round. Yushchenko Helping Yanukovych -------------- ¶3. (C) Tymoshenko advisors and BYuT politicians with whom we have spoken in recent days do not dispute that Tymoshenko is not closing the gap. They see Tymoshenko in trouble. With only five weeks remaining before the first round of voting on January 17, she is losing ground. Many attribute this to the relentless daily barrage of criticism directed at her from President Yushchenko which is damaging her in Western Ukraine. He rails at her as a "catastrophe," a dupe of Putin, an authoritarian, a dismal manager, and as a corrupt liar. Tymoshenko campaign manager Oleh Medvedev told us that Yushchenko is, formally or de facto, in league with Yanukovych. His primary goal, Medvedev stressed, is to destroy Tymoshenko -- and hope he can cut a deal with a victorious Yanukovych. Tymoshenko does not want to respond to Yushchenko's attacks, because to do so reinforces the image of squabbling Orange politicians which is so unappealing to voters, Medvedev said. Noted Political Analyst Oleksiy Haran told us, reflecting the view of many, that Yushchenko's attacks will prompt disaffected former Orange voters to stay home. The turnout, or lack thereof, of disaffected Orange voters will be decisive, he said. 10 Is The Magic Number -------------- ¶4. (C) Haran, PENTA's Volodymyr Fesenko, and other analysts have focused on the number "ten" as a threshold. If Tymoshenko trails Yanukovych by more than 10% in the first round of the presidential elections, it could have an adverse psychological impact on her supporters and other undecided "Orange" voters, who will conclude that the race is lost and stay home for the second round. If it is less than 10%, she can seek to energize "Orange" voters by emphasizing that victory is within reach and campaigning aggressively with an anti-Yanukovych message. Tymoshenko campaign advisors tell us that, to feel comfortable, they want the gap with Yanukovych to be 4-5% after the first round. ¶5. (C) Tymoshenko Bloc MP Andriy Shevchenko told us that Yushchenko and Front of Change candidate Arseniy Yatsenyuk will likely not support any candidate in the second round (and Yatsenyuk has even said he may tell his voters to stay home that day). However, Shevchenko still believes that traditional "Orange" voters will ultimately support Tymoshenko over Yanukovych, enabling her to win in the second round. He maintained that the fear of the latter's presidency is more compelling to these voters than their disappointment with Tymoshenko. Hidden Vote? KYIV 00002138 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶6. (C) In previous campaigns public opinion polls have given Tymoshenko 5-7% percent less than her results on election day -- a phenomenon often referred to as Tymoshenko's "hidden vote." Deputy PM Nemyria's Chief of Staff, Igor Zhovkva, drew comfort from Tymoshenko's charisma and past campaign prowess. Like many of her supporters, he is counting on a surge at the end of round two to bring her over the top. Other analysts note, however, that in the days of her hidden vote, Tymoshenko was running in the opposition. Such a bump may be less likely for a sitting PM at a time of economic crisis. Medvedev affirmed that Tymoshenko's biggest problem is that she takes much of the blame, unfairly in his view, for the economic downturn. While the economy is slowly improving, Medvedev was not at all confident that voters would be "feeling much better" by election day. Appeal to the West; Make Friends with the East -------------- - ¶7. (C) Tymoshenko has differentiated herself from Yanukovych by courting European Union leaders while at the same time showing that she is someone with whom Russia, and particularly Putin, can deal. Tymoshenko's recent attendance at the European Popular Party's conference in Germany underlined her European aspiration. Political analyst Fesenko said that it is clear Tymoshenko desires to be received in Paris and Berlin far more than in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, while Yanukovych would feel more comfortable with CIS counterparts. ¶8. (C) While seeking to appeal to her pro-European base in the West and Center, Tymoshenko is also trying to challenge Yanukovych's base of support in the East. Shevchenko told us that he and fellow BYuT MP Nataliya Korolevska are spending a considerable amount of time in the eastern cities of Donetsk and Luhansk (of which Korolevska is a native) trying to sway undecided voters and those disenchanted with Regions. Korolevska's "New Donbas" campaign outlined a number of economic reforms targeting the industrial and mining sectors in this region to attract the support of enterprise owners (and their employees' votes, which often track the owners' political orientation). Putin Factor -------------- ¶9. (C) There are conflicting views about how Tymoshenko's businesslike relations with Putin play for her politically. Regions party contacts admitted that they were surprised by the warm tone of Putin's remarks about Tymoshenko when they met in Yalta recently. Zhovkva asserted that it would help her in the East and South, changing the perception of many there that Yanukovych is the only candidate who can improve relations with Russia. However, Medvedev told us that Putin's effusive tone may have turned off more voters in the West than in gained in the East. It also gave Yushchenko an opening to hammer away at Tymoshenko as being Putin's proxy. Can She Do It? -------------- ¶10. (C) MP Roman Zvarych, a Tymoshenko ally, told us that he has "never seen her this tired, this rundown." Given the growing gap between her and front-runner Yanukovych combined with her physical fatigue, Zvarych had his doubts that she can come from behind once again to win the election. The problem of incumbency was evident in the backlash against Tymoshenko for her handling of the swine flu outbreak in November. Media personalities and her opponents criticized her for overreacting and trying to use a national tragedy for political gain. IMF Impasse -------------- ¶11. (C) Tymoshenko campaign advisors have stressed to us that Tymoshenko regards the IMF's unwillingness to disburse a fourth tranche as something that can sink her campaign. She faces the prospect, they underlined, of a budget crisis in January and February -- in the midst of elections -- that would force her to choose between paying the gas bill to Russia and paying state salaries and pensions. Analyst Haran commented to us December 14 that, in not disbursing the fourth tranche, the IMF was effectively handing the election to Yanukovych. If she were to win.... -------------- KYIV 00002138 003 OF 003 ¶12. (C) If Tymoshenko can come from behind and win the presidency in the second round, both Zhovkva and Fesenko told us she should be able to pull enough MPs from the Party of Regions into her coalition to maintain a stable voting bloc. She would not seek early parliamentary elections. This would give her eighteen months, Zhovkva said, to push through economic and political reforms before facing the voters in parliamentary elections. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) The conventional wisdom had been that, in the end and despite polling to the contrary, Tymoshenko would parlay her energy, drive and superior campaign skills to consolidate the anti-Yanukovych vote and emerge victorious in the second round. The burden of incumbency at a time of severe economic crisis, combined with Yushchenko's success in undermining her base is, however, taking its toll. With little more than five weeks to go before the first round, Tymoshenko faces an uphill climb. She will need to avoid a budget collapse and deploy all of her legendary campaign magic -- thus far little in evidence -- to turn things around. Yanukovych, by contrast, is sitting on his lead -- a strategy which, so far, is working for him. Tymoshenko is not waiting until the second round to crank up the anti-Yanukovych message. It will be her main message in rounds one and two. TEFFT