A YANUKOVYCH FOREIGN POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 002054


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP RS
SUBJECT: A YANUKOVYCH FOREIGN POLICY

Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d).



1. (C) If Regions Party leader, and Orange Revolution foil,
Viktor Yanukovych wins the January/February 2010 Presidential
election, main elements of his foreign policy would include:

--A reset in relations with Russia, generally deferring to
Russia's red lines;
--Non-bloc status and an end to Ukraine's NATO membership
aspirations, but some continued engagement with NATO;
--Relations with EU on "equal terms;"
--Openness to renegotiate extension of the Russian Black Sea
Fleet lease in Sevastopol past 2017;
--Cooling of relations with Saakashvili's Georgia, but
probably no near-term recognition of South Ossetia or
Abkhazia;
--Pragmatic relations with the U.S. End Summary.

Geography is Destiny
--------------


2. (C) Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych's central
foreign policy tenets are non-bloc status for Ukraine and a
reset in Ukraine's relations with Russia. Anatoliy Orel, a
senior advisor to Yanukovych, former two-time Ukrainian
Ambassador to Italy, and General Director of the Center for
International and Comparative Studies told us that Yanukovych
would stress pragmatism in foreign relations. This would
apply, above all, to relations with Russia. Orel condemned
the "black and white approach" to foreign policy of the
Yushchenko era, with the West seen as good and Russia as
evil. This dichotomy does not work for Ukraine.


3. (C) In fact, Orel stressed, Ukrainian policymakers can not
ignore Ukraine's geography. Ukraine has to take the views of
Russia very seriously. Hostile relations with Russia are
not in Ukraine's interest. This does not mean, Orel
continued, that a Yanukovych-led foreign policy would give in
to Russia in all areas. There will be areas of
disagreement. But Yanukovych will manage the relationship to
minimize the frictions. This would improve the regional
climate and, Orel contended, complement the U.S. reset with
Russia.


4. (C) Regions MP (and former Ambassador) Leonid Kozhara told
us Regions has designated him as shadow Foreign Minister and
head of foreign relations for the campaign. Kozhara, a close
associate of Orel, also repeated to us that Ukraine should
defer to central Russian interests when defining its foreign
policy priorities.

Getting the Best Deal
--------------


5. (C) Businesslike dealings will be the hallmark of
Yanukovych's approach to Russia, Orel asserted. By contrast,
when Borys Tarasyuk became Foreign Minister, Orel said he had
the Foreign Ministry draw up a long list of bilateral issues
with Russia that needed resolution. Tarasyuk then reordered
the list, putting the thorniest issues -- such as border
demarcation and the Black Sea Fleet -- at the top. This
ensured there would be no progress. Yanukovych would address
easier issues first and build on success. He would be
driven, not by ideology, but by getting the best deal he can
for Ukraine, Orel asserted.


6. (C) Orel maintained that Russia did not want to resolve
border demarcation issues. Russia is concerned about the
Kerch Strait/Azov Sea being open to NATO ships and thus wants
to keep the border unresolved. Ukraine should recognize this
fact and seek something from Russia in return. Similarly
Ukraine should open the Russian Black Sea Fleet lease to
renegotiation. Ukraine can get a much better lease deal out
of Russia and should do so to protect the 20,000 jobs that
Orel said depended on the Fleet. Kozhara echoed this to us
as well.

NATO
--------------


7. (C) NATO membership "makes no sense" for Ukraine, Orel
asserted. The public is overwhelmingly against it.
Furthermore, NATO is less attractive because of Afghanistan,
which Orel predicts will end in Vietnam-like failure for the
Alliance. And it needlessly complicates relations with
Russia. Yanukovych has made clear in public remarks as
recently as November 22 that he favors cooperation with NATO,
but that he will not seek membership. Orel and Kozhara
noted to us that under Kuchma (for whom both worked) Ukraine
had improved cooperation with NATO in far more practical ways
that Yushchenko ever had.

EU
--


8. (C) Oligarch Borys Kolesnykov, co-chairman of Yanukovych's
campaign, expressed to Charge November 24 his misgivings
about Ukraine's relations with the EU. Membership remains a
strategic goal but in fact, he asserted, the EU will never
fully open its markets to Ukraine or admit Ukraine as a
member. Regions favors closer relations with the EU, but
only on a reciprocal basis. Ukraine should not make
unilateral concessions. Ukraine can work on practical
issues, such as the Free Trade Area and Visa liberalization,
but not hold out hope for membership.


9. (C) Regions economic chief (and former Deputy PM) Mykola
Azarov told Embassy November 23 that economic reform in
Ukraine should come from within and need not be driven by
harmonization with the EU. Orel also believes Europe will
never allow Ukraine in as a full member because Ukrainian
agriculture and some Ukrainian industry would undercut prices
in Europe. Furthermore, he said, it is demeaning to seek to
comply with a complicated list of acquis while Ukraine does
not even have a formal membership perspective.


10. (C) Orel added that Ukraine should back away from the
Eastern Partnership. This was an EU, Polish-driven effort to
create a cordon around Russia. Ukraine did not need the
Eastern Partnership, which irritates Russia. Rather, Ukraine
should deal with the EU on a bilateral (Ukraine-EU) basis and
not as part of the Eastern Partnership.

Cooling Relations with Georgia
--------------


11. (C) Orel and Kozhara told us that a Yanukovych
government would move to cool relations with the Saakashvili
government. Ukraine would cease arms sales to Georgia, which
have provoked Russian ire. While Yanukovych spoke in favor
of recognition of the "independence" of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia in August 2008, Orel and Kozhara said that this was
unlikely. Orel said that recognition of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia would send the wrong signal; Yanukovych would appear
to be going too far to appease Russia. Oligarch Kolesnykov
also did not expect any recognition soon, but maintained that
there was a legal basis for the Abkhazian separatist claim.


12. (C) Orel and Kozhara looked with disfavor on GUAM,
implying that a Regions government might reevaluate its
participation in the organization. In addition, Yanukovych
has publicly supported Russian President Medvedev's still
undefined "new European security architecture" initiative.


Comment
--------------


13. (C) Election of Yanukovych would mark a fundamental shift
away from Yushchenko's advocacy of Euroatlantic integration
as the best way for Ukraine to anchor its sovereignty.
Instead, the emphasis will be on lowering the temperature
with Russia, multi-vectoralism (tilting to Russia),and
economic matters. A Yanukovych foreign policy would defer
to Russia on many key foreign policy issues, but could be
expected to stand up for the business interests of the
party's Donbass/Donetsk core. Yanukovych would be open to
pragmatic cooperation with the U.S. However, the U.S. and
Europe would have more leverage with Tymoshenko, who
identifies European integration as the central vector of her
foreign policy and who aspires, far more than Yanukovych, to
be accepted in Europe.


PETTIT