UKRAINE-EU SUMMIT OUTLOOK: NOT WHAT YUSHCHENKO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 001894 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV UP EU SUBJECT: UKRAINE-EU SUMMIT OUTLOOK: NOT WHAT YUSHCHENKO WANTED REF: A. KYIV 1761 ¶B. KYIV 1843 Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary, Reason 1.4 (b,d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The December 4 Ukraine EU-Summit will not deliver what President Yushchenko had long hoped it would: an Association Agreement. This is a surprise to no one, except possibly Yushchenko himself. Significant issues between Ukraine and the EU remain unresolved including a membership perspective, concrete benchmarks leading to a visa free regime, and a Free Trade Agreement. Deliverables for the Summit are likely to include a Europol Agreement and announcement of progress toward Ukraine joining the European Energy Community. The Summit will take place in Kyiv in the middle of the presidential election campaign, but not give much if any boost to Yushchenko, whose candidacy is floundering in any case. Modest deliverables may prompt some disillusionment in Ukraine about the prospects for EU integration and could undermine the will for reforms. End Summary. Yushchenko's Last Hurrah -------------- ¶2. (C) On October 13, President Yushchenko surprised observers -- and his own MFA and Presidential Secretariat -- by publicly proposing that the EU decouple its Free Trade Agreement (FTA) talks with Ukraine from the broader EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA). This would, he claimed, allow for signature of an Association Agreement in time for the December 4 EU-Ukraine Summit in Kyiv. The MFA and Presidential Administration immediately began to walk back from Yushchenko's statement. Presidential Secretariat Foreign Policy Directorate Deputy Bohdan Yaremenko told us that the remarks had represented Yushchenko's own, unvetted, views. Yushchenko's advisors, Yaremenko said, began working right away to get the President to accept that inclusion of the FTA agreement within the Association Agreement remained an essential condition for the EU. For the President to suggest otherwise at this late date would only set the Summit up for certain failure, Yaremenko observed. ¶3. (C) Yushchenko has not repeated his comments. Deputy FM Yeliseyev confirmed to the Charge (ref A) that MFA fully understood that the FTA was integral to the Association Agreement. He added that the FTA negotiations, and thus the Association Agreement, would take a "long time" to wrap up. Yeliseyev said that he had explained this to new FM Poroshenko and that Poroshenko agreed on the approach that the quality of an agreement, not timing of the signing, was paramount. Yaremenko surmised that Yushchenko's last minute proposal to decouple FTA from the AA stemmed from the fact that he believes so strongly in Ukraine's destiny in Europe, that he could not bring himself to accept that the Association Agreement would not happen during his tenure. Yaramenko added that Yushchenko is at times in his "own world." Summit Deliverables -- and Problem Areas -------------- ¶4. (C) We reviewed summit deliverables with MFA Deputy Director for EU Relations Andriy Pravednyk. Items include: a Road Map for the ongoing Visa-Free Dialogue (in particular, spelling out perspective for Ukrainian participation in the Schengen area),signature of a Europol-Ukraine agreement on the exchange of basic data, announcement of Ukrainian readiness to join the European Energy Community, and signature of an "Association Agenda" which would lay out the way forward on negotiations for the Association Agreement. Ukraine also expects a traditional Joint Statement. ¶5. (C) MFA contacts contend that progress on the political and security dimension of the Association Agreement has been good. However, four areas related to the Agreement remain unresolved: EU membership perspective for Ukraine; the terms and specific objectives of the Visa-Free Dialogue process; precise language on the EU's commitment to Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty; and a definition of the period of the Association Agreement itself, which Ukraine would like to limit in order to indicate a possible horizon for membership. ¶6. (C) Pravednyk complained that negotiations have been complicated by an apparent lack of authority on the Commission side of the table, and said that EU negotiator Hugues Mingarelli has repeatedly indicated many of the KYIV 00001894 002 OF 002 problematic issues must be taken up at higher political levels. Pravednyk said he did not believe the Summit would be capable of negotiating outcomes. ¶7. (C) Razumkov Center Director, Valeriy Chaliy, told us October 29 that while the Summit would not bring historic announcements, it would represent progress. Closer cooperation with the EU in such areas as energy and border security is meaningful, even if not sensational. As for the delay in the Association Agreement, Chaliy said that the EU was bargaining hard and that Ukraine had to bargain hard as well. It was not in Ukraine's interest to get hung up on artificial deadlines. Chaliy endorsed the idea that the quality of the agreement, not the timing, is paramount. Membership Perspective and Territorial Integrity -------------- --- ¶8. (C) Regarding membership perspective, Pravednyk emphasized that Ukraine seeks to have some indication in the Association Agreement itself, even if it were a promise of membership without a date, such as the 2008 NATO Bucharest statement. Such a perspective, though long term, would be key to reviving the interest of average Ukrainians in making the effort necessary to reform to EU standards, he said. On territorial integrity and sovereignty, Ukraine seeks specific language spelling out consultative mechanisms or procedures in the event of a threat or an abrogation of Ukraine's territorial integrity. Pravednyk admitted this is a specific response to events in Georgia in 2008. He referred to the lack of practical terms of the Budapest memorandum, which contained similar "guarantees" of Ukrainian sovereignty, but no practical process to cope with crises if and when they actually take place. Visa Free Dialogue -------------- ¶9. (C) Turning to the Visa Free Dialogue, Pravednyk described the process as "an endless talk fest." Ukraine, he said, is eager to issue a joint statement at the Summit that would provide a roadmap of achievable goals for the Dialogue's four working groups (security of documents and biometrics; public security and order; international cooperation; and illegal immigration and readmission.) The working groups have met regularly, he said, since ministerial-level kick off meetings earlier this year; each is due to meet again before the end of November. However, without a plan of action, there is, according to Pravednyk, a tendency to talk in circles and little tangible progress. ¶10. (C) In Pravednyk's opinion, the problem is that there is no European consensus on whether Ukrainian participation in Schengen is the true goal. Thus, the Visa Free Dialogue needs the imprimatur of the Summit, or of the European Council (or at a minimum, at the EU Ministerial level) in order to agree to make any real progress. He noted that to his knowledge, these issues were not on the October GAERC (EU Foreign Ministers) agenda, and November would likely be too late to prepare new language for the December 4 Summit. Summing up Ukraine's fundamental chicken and egg problem, Pravednyk noted that it is hard to get Rada and GoU attention to needed reforms to support progress toward Schengen, when the EU is unwilling to hold out the possibility in the first place. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Yushchenko's earlier unwillingness to accept that the Association Agreement would not happen this year reflected his penchant for declarations over the nitty gritty work required to move the process forward. There is a risk that the public will see modest deliverables at the Summit and conclude that Ukraine will never get membership. That could undermine the climate for the legislation and reforms that would go along with conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement. PETTIT