Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KYIV1845
2009-10-23 16:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:
INDUSTRIAL DNIPROPETROVSK: TYMOSHENKO'S HOME
VZCZCXRO8531 PP RUEHDBU RUEHSL DE RUEHKV #1845/01 2961656 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 231656Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY KYIV TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8657 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 001845
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: INDUSTRIAL DNIPROPETROVSK: TYMOSHENKO'S HOME
OBLAST STAYING BLUE
Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 001845
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: INDUSTRIAL DNIPROPETROVSK: TYMOSHENKO'S HOME
OBLAST STAYING BLUE
Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Dnipropetrovsk, PM Tymoshenko's home region and a
major contributor to the national economy, has traditionally
favored Yanukoyvch and his Party of Regions (PoR).
Tymoshenko's bloc (BYuT) is actively working for votes in the
region, but interlocutors assess she will fail to overcome
PoR's dominance there. Our contacts say minor candidate
Serhiy Tihipko will garner some support in the oblast, but
expect a Tymoshenko-Yanukovych matchup in the second round.
Some express concern about the possibility of fraud on the
margins, especially in the second round. End Summary.
Notable Eastern Oblast
--------------
2. (C) Despite being Tymoshenko's home oblast, Dnipropetrovsk
has been decidedly "blue" in the past several elections.
Yanukovych took 61 percent of the final 2004 presidential
vote, and PoR polled a near-majority in both the 2006 and
2007 Rada elections. A number of Ukraine's political and
economic elite, including former President Kuchma and leading
oligarchs like Ihor Kolomyyskyy and Viktor Pinchuk, have
roots there. One of just a handful of "donor" oblasts to the
national budget, Dnipropetrovsk is a major contributor to
Ukraine's economy in metallurgy, the defense industry and
banking, in addition to being a hub for rail and sea
shipping and an agricultural center.
Signs Point to Yanukoyvch
--------------
3. (C) Local experts in Dnipropetrovsk presume a
Tymoshenko-Yanukovych matchup in the second round and expect
Yanukovych to secure a comfortable victory in the oblast in
both rounds of the election. Oleksandr Smirnov, Chief of the
Dnipropetrovsk branch of the Gorshenin Institute, a national
think tank, said that the economic crisis and PoR's spot in
the national-level Rada opposition has increased its
consistently strong local support by around five percent.
Party-unaffiliated deputy mayor of Dnipropetrovsk Volodymyr
Tyurin and chief of the local branch of the NGO Committee of
Voters of Ukraine Oleksandr Sydorenko also agreed that, for
better or worse, Yanukovych would win the oblast easily.
Deputy Mayor Sees a Frustrating Choice
--------------
4. (C) Tyurin told us that, in the end, people will vote for
the candidate they personally like, regardless of campaign
slogans and platforms. He predicted that Yanukovych would
win the second round by about five to fifteen percent in the
oblast because the population -- mostly employed by local
industries -- can relate to him as a factory chief. He
predicted that Tymoshenko would capture votes from the more
highly-educated segment of the population, including those in
the defense industrial complex.
5. (C) Tyurin emphasized Dnipropetrovsk's potential for
economic development, and said that he will reluctantly
support Tymoshenko on the off-chance that she would abandon
her populism, rash ambition, and personal business interests
for the good of the country's development and European
integration. Yanukovych would not change the situation for
the better, said Tyurin, adding that Russia has the
capability to absorb the Ukrainian economy if it comes to
that.
BYuT Headquarters Energetic, Organized
--------------
6. (C) At BYuT's Dnipropetrovsk headquarters, we met with
Tymoshenko's aunt, Antonina Ulyakhina -- longtime head of
BYuT operations in the oblast -- and her deputy, Valeriy
Murlyan, who were engaged in a well-oiled effort to maximize
Tymoshenko's support. Ulyakhina said that Tymoshenko would
project a positive message in the face of what she expected
to be a vicious campaign, already apparent, she alleged, in
current "black PR" attacks such as the accusation that BYuT
MPs were involved in a pedophilia scandal at the famous Artek
youth camp in the Crimea. (Comment. BYuT appears to have
rethought this commitment to the "high road," as the party,s
website has recently resurfaced allegations that Yanukovych
was guilty of rape during his days in a youth gang in the
60s. See septel on the mud-slinging kickoff to the election
campaign. End Comment.)
KYIV 00001845 002 OF 003
PoR Chugging Along
--------------
7. (C) PoR's local campaign operation was less well-appointed
than BYuT's, but the workers were busy nonetheless. MP Oleh
Tsaryev, chief of PoR's regional headquarters, did not seem
very plugged in to local affairs, offering only superficial
comments echoing PoR's general platform, with a focus on
Russian-language rights for eastern and southern Ukrainians.
Tsaryev maintained, unconvincingly, that local citizens are
actually using Yanukovych's advertised hotline and are
expressing concerns about municipal issues such as heating
and land distribution. (Note: Murlyan said BYuT had
verified that the hotline is not actually in service at the
local level.)
8. (C) Tsaryev said that Yanukovych wants to unite the
country and would rely on one message to do it: stability and
professionalism in government. He argued that the current
leadership's unresponsiveness on issues such as language
rights left PoR constituents looking to Russia for support.
He added, however, that while PoR's electoral base has a
natural affinity with Russia, PoR businessmen are not
interested in thoroughgoing economic integration with
Ukraine,s large eastern neighbor. (Comment. Tsaryev implied
that PoR businessmen would resist such integration with
Russia because they are looking westward for investment
opportunities and competing with Russian businessmen in
Ukraine could edge them out of their own market. End
Comment.)
Tymoshenko Most Likely to Commit Fraud?
--------------
9. (C) Our interlocutors said that if fraud is to occur in
Dnipropetrovsk, it would happen in the second round at
Tymoshenko's behest. Sydorenko did not expect much fraud in
the first round, but said that if the race looks very close,
Tymoshenko may have to resort to fraudulent tactics even at
that early stage. Our contacts said the real pressure would
come in the second round, and Tymoshenko would be looking to
her local staff to "produce certain results." Sydorenko is
most worried about falsifications during transportation of
ballots and protocols from polling stations to district
election commissions, alleging that BYuT has improved its
capability to manipulate ballots at this stage after clumsy
attempts in the past. Sydorenko also expects a full range of
other fraud tactics, such as ballot-stuffing and bribery of
voters and commissioners. However, Tyurin estimated that
fraud would not exceed three percent of the vote, and
predicted it might be closer to one or two percent.
Tihipko Will Be a Factor
--------------
10. (SBU) Sydorenko opined that presidential candidate Serhiy
Tihipko -- who hails from Dnipropetrovsk and is widely
considered to be a "technical" candidate (a stalking horse
for someone else, designed to draw votes away from a leading
candidate) for Tymoshenko -- may garner a significant amount
of votes in the first round. Ulyakhina made no mention of
"technical" candidacies, but asserted that Tihipko's business
and political background in the oblast would ensure him some
support, and estimated he would be the fourth most popular
candidate there (assuming Arseniy Yatsenyuk would take
third).
Differing Views of New Rada Election Possibility
-------------- ---
11. (C) Most contacts said the decision to call new Rada
elections would depend on the results of the second round of
the presidential vote. If the victor wins by a small margin,
some foresaw an internal shift within the existing deputies
for another iteration of a "situational majority" in which
business-connected MPs from the losing faction opt to defect
to the winning team. Sydorenko did not expect a new Rada
election, noting that the parties have no ideology apart from
their business interests and will simply make adjustments
according to the election result. Tyurin also commented that
Ukrainian political parties are nothing more than closed
joint stock companies and make decisions accordingly.
Smirnov, on the other hand, saw a high chance of a new Rada
election, based on concessions in exchange for smaller
parties' support for a certain candidate in the second round.
Tsaryev, perhaps presuming a wide margin of victory for
Yanukovych, said PoR would support new Rada elections
regardless.
Comment
--------------
KYIV 00001845 003 OF 003
12. (C) Dnipropetrovsk will, in all likelihood, give
Yanukovych a comfortable plurality, even if Tymoshenko's
(and Tihipko,s) home-town status nibbles at the margins of
the PoR vote. On the potential for fraud, given the
dominance of Party of Regions locally, they seem better
positioned to engage in it (if it happens) than BYuT,
although our interlocutors seemed, surprisingly, to think
otherwise.
PETTIT
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: INDUSTRIAL DNIPROPETROVSK: TYMOSHENKO'S HOME
OBLAST STAYING BLUE
Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Dnipropetrovsk, PM Tymoshenko's home region and a
major contributor to the national economy, has traditionally
favored Yanukoyvch and his Party of Regions (PoR).
Tymoshenko's bloc (BYuT) is actively working for votes in the
region, but interlocutors assess she will fail to overcome
PoR's dominance there. Our contacts say minor candidate
Serhiy Tihipko will garner some support in the oblast, but
expect a Tymoshenko-Yanukovych matchup in the second round.
Some express concern about the possibility of fraud on the
margins, especially in the second round. End Summary.
Notable Eastern Oblast
--------------
2. (C) Despite being Tymoshenko's home oblast, Dnipropetrovsk
has been decidedly "blue" in the past several elections.
Yanukovych took 61 percent of the final 2004 presidential
vote, and PoR polled a near-majority in both the 2006 and
2007 Rada elections. A number of Ukraine's political and
economic elite, including former President Kuchma and leading
oligarchs like Ihor Kolomyyskyy and Viktor Pinchuk, have
roots there. One of just a handful of "donor" oblasts to the
national budget, Dnipropetrovsk is a major contributor to
Ukraine's economy in metallurgy, the defense industry and
banking, in addition to being a hub for rail and sea
shipping and an agricultural center.
Signs Point to Yanukoyvch
--------------
3. (C) Local experts in Dnipropetrovsk presume a
Tymoshenko-Yanukovych matchup in the second round and expect
Yanukovych to secure a comfortable victory in the oblast in
both rounds of the election. Oleksandr Smirnov, Chief of the
Dnipropetrovsk branch of the Gorshenin Institute, a national
think tank, said that the economic crisis and PoR's spot in
the national-level Rada opposition has increased its
consistently strong local support by around five percent.
Party-unaffiliated deputy mayor of Dnipropetrovsk Volodymyr
Tyurin and chief of the local branch of the NGO Committee of
Voters of Ukraine Oleksandr Sydorenko also agreed that, for
better or worse, Yanukovych would win the oblast easily.
Deputy Mayor Sees a Frustrating Choice
--------------
4. (C) Tyurin told us that, in the end, people will vote for
the candidate they personally like, regardless of campaign
slogans and platforms. He predicted that Yanukovych would
win the second round by about five to fifteen percent in the
oblast because the population -- mostly employed by local
industries -- can relate to him as a factory chief. He
predicted that Tymoshenko would capture votes from the more
highly-educated segment of the population, including those in
the defense industrial complex.
5. (C) Tyurin emphasized Dnipropetrovsk's potential for
economic development, and said that he will reluctantly
support Tymoshenko on the off-chance that she would abandon
her populism, rash ambition, and personal business interests
for the good of the country's development and European
integration. Yanukovych would not change the situation for
the better, said Tyurin, adding that Russia has the
capability to absorb the Ukrainian economy if it comes to
that.
BYuT Headquarters Energetic, Organized
--------------
6. (C) At BYuT's Dnipropetrovsk headquarters, we met with
Tymoshenko's aunt, Antonina Ulyakhina -- longtime head of
BYuT operations in the oblast -- and her deputy, Valeriy
Murlyan, who were engaged in a well-oiled effort to maximize
Tymoshenko's support. Ulyakhina said that Tymoshenko would
project a positive message in the face of what she expected
to be a vicious campaign, already apparent, she alleged, in
current "black PR" attacks such as the accusation that BYuT
MPs were involved in a pedophilia scandal at the famous Artek
youth camp in the Crimea. (Comment. BYuT appears to have
rethought this commitment to the "high road," as the party,s
website has recently resurfaced allegations that Yanukovych
was guilty of rape during his days in a youth gang in the
60s. See septel on the mud-slinging kickoff to the election
campaign. End Comment.)
KYIV 00001845 002 OF 003
PoR Chugging Along
--------------
7. (C) PoR's local campaign operation was less well-appointed
than BYuT's, but the workers were busy nonetheless. MP Oleh
Tsaryev, chief of PoR's regional headquarters, did not seem
very plugged in to local affairs, offering only superficial
comments echoing PoR's general platform, with a focus on
Russian-language rights for eastern and southern Ukrainians.
Tsaryev maintained, unconvincingly, that local citizens are
actually using Yanukovych's advertised hotline and are
expressing concerns about municipal issues such as heating
and land distribution. (Note: Murlyan said BYuT had
verified that the hotline is not actually in service at the
local level.)
8. (C) Tsaryev said that Yanukovych wants to unite the
country and would rely on one message to do it: stability and
professionalism in government. He argued that the current
leadership's unresponsiveness on issues such as language
rights left PoR constituents looking to Russia for support.
He added, however, that while PoR's electoral base has a
natural affinity with Russia, PoR businessmen are not
interested in thoroughgoing economic integration with
Ukraine,s large eastern neighbor. (Comment. Tsaryev implied
that PoR businessmen would resist such integration with
Russia because they are looking westward for investment
opportunities and competing with Russian businessmen in
Ukraine could edge them out of their own market. End
Comment.)
Tymoshenko Most Likely to Commit Fraud?
--------------
9. (C) Our interlocutors said that if fraud is to occur in
Dnipropetrovsk, it would happen in the second round at
Tymoshenko's behest. Sydorenko did not expect much fraud in
the first round, but said that if the race looks very close,
Tymoshenko may have to resort to fraudulent tactics even at
that early stage. Our contacts said the real pressure would
come in the second round, and Tymoshenko would be looking to
her local staff to "produce certain results." Sydorenko is
most worried about falsifications during transportation of
ballots and protocols from polling stations to district
election commissions, alleging that BYuT has improved its
capability to manipulate ballots at this stage after clumsy
attempts in the past. Sydorenko also expects a full range of
other fraud tactics, such as ballot-stuffing and bribery of
voters and commissioners. However, Tyurin estimated that
fraud would not exceed three percent of the vote, and
predicted it might be closer to one or two percent.
Tihipko Will Be a Factor
--------------
10. (SBU) Sydorenko opined that presidential candidate Serhiy
Tihipko -- who hails from Dnipropetrovsk and is widely
considered to be a "technical" candidate (a stalking horse
for someone else, designed to draw votes away from a leading
candidate) for Tymoshenko -- may garner a significant amount
of votes in the first round. Ulyakhina made no mention of
"technical" candidacies, but asserted that Tihipko's business
and political background in the oblast would ensure him some
support, and estimated he would be the fourth most popular
candidate there (assuming Arseniy Yatsenyuk would take
third).
Differing Views of New Rada Election Possibility
-------------- ---
11. (C) Most contacts said the decision to call new Rada
elections would depend on the results of the second round of
the presidential vote. If the victor wins by a small margin,
some foresaw an internal shift within the existing deputies
for another iteration of a "situational majority" in which
business-connected MPs from the losing faction opt to defect
to the winning team. Sydorenko did not expect a new Rada
election, noting that the parties have no ideology apart from
their business interests and will simply make adjustments
according to the election result. Tyurin also commented that
Ukrainian political parties are nothing more than closed
joint stock companies and make decisions accordingly.
Smirnov, on the other hand, saw a high chance of a new Rada
election, based on concessions in exchange for smaller
parties' support for a certain candidate in the second round.
Tsaryev, perhaps presuming a wide margin of victory for
Yanukovych, said PoR would support new Rada elections
regardless.
Comment
--------------
KYIV 00001845 003 OF 003
12. (C) Dnipropetrovsk will, in all likelihood, give
Yanukovych a comfortable plurality, even if Tymoshenko's
(and Tihipko,s) home-town status nibbles at the margins of
the PoR vote. On the potential for fraud, given the
dominance of Party of Regions locally, they seem better
positioned to engage in it (if it happens) than BYuT,
although our interlocutors seemed, surprisingly, to think
otherwise.
PETTIT