CHERKASY: WOULD-BE SWING OBLAST LEANS TOWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 001784 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL UP SUBJECT: CHERKASY: WOULD-BE SWING OBLAST LEANS TOWARD TYMOSHENKO Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary for reasons 1.4 (B) & ( D). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Cherkasy, an oblast located in the center of Ukraine, has yet to be fully drawn into the presidential campaign. However, local experts speculate that Cherkasy voters will support Prime Minister Tymoshenko -- as they have in the past two Rada elections. Local observers express concerns that either frontrunner -- Tymoshenko or Party of Regions (PoR) leader Yanukovych -- could tighten up on freedom of speech once in power. Some suspect Tymoshenko of politicizing police forces in preparation for the election. Central Ukraine can be seen, to some degree, as Ukraine's Ohio. The presidential candidate who prevails there stands a strong chance of being the ultimate winner. End Summary. The Center -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Cherkasy oblast is located along the Dnipro River in the heart of Ukraine's central region, which historically does not feature the strong political preferences of the east and west. The Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) won a plurality in Cherkasy in both the 2006 and 2007 Rada elections, and a majority supported Yushchenko throughout the 2004 presidential election. Interlocutors predicted Tymoshenko would lead the oblast in the presidential election and do not expect a close race in what could otherwise be a swing oblast. About three percent of Ukraine's population lives in Cherkasy oblast, where the economy is based mostly on agribusiness and non-metallic mineral reserves. Mayor Sees Tymoshenko Election as "Tragedy" -------------- ¶3. (C) On October 9, we met with several local figures including Cherkasy city mayor Serhiy Odarych, who does not affiliate with any major party and took the darkest view of the current political environment. A sign outside Odarych's office declared it a "corruption-free zone" and stated, "we do not accept bribes here." Odarych told us that while the Ukrainian system provides a framework for democracy, threats to freedom remain because "no democratic parties exist." ¶4. (C) Both Odarych and editor-in-chief of local newspaper Vechirni Cherkasy Stanislav Zhurylo underlined the danger of having parties that were so dependent on the persona of the leader, noting in particular that BYuT would cease to exist without Tymoshenko. Replacing Yanukovych is at least up for discussion in PoR, whereas such a discussion would never happen in BYuT, said Odarych. He opined that the current personality-based politics are a part of Ukraine's transition to democracy, and that it would take three or four more election cycles to dispense with personality-based parties and consolidate democracy. ¶5. (C) Odarych accused Tymoshenko of taking ten steps backward in the democratic process, and said it would be a "tragedy" if she were elected president. In contrast, Odarych named PoR as Ukraine's "most democratic" party because its internal competition prevents any one force from becoming too powerful. He said the single biggest threat to Ukrainian democracy, however, would be a BYuT-PoR union because of its nexus of business and political control. Tymoshenko Politicizing Law Enforcement? -------------- ¶6. (C) Mayor Odarych asserted that Tymoshenko, via her ally Minister of Interior Affairs Yuriy Lutsenko, is attempting to bring law enforcement into the political process. Odarych claimed that Cherkasy police are reporting to central authorities about who is staying overnight at various locales, and surmised that these reports are being used to aid in Tymoshenko's election preparations. (Comment. Odarych gave the impression that the reports focus on the political visits and activities of BYuT party rivals, although he did not make it explicit. End Comment.) Deputy chairman of the Cherkasy chapter of the election watchdog Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU) Serhiy Pasichnyk also noted that Cherkasy police forces have recently become more active in the oblast, calling it a signal of Tymoshenko's intent to increase control. Tymoshenko May End Up Ahead... -------------- ¶7. (C) Zhurylo told us that campaigning has so far been KYIV 00001784 002 OF 002 limited to billboard advertising, partially due to a lack of public engagement on the election. Zhurylo noted Tymoshenko's ability to inspire people and speculated that Tymoshenko would reinvigorate her support among Cherkasy residents once she begins her campaign in earnest and visits the oblast. Zhurylo opined that Cherkasy residents do not believe her current slogan, "she is working," but they probably are sympathetic to the idea that she is being prevented from working and will vote for her as the lesser of two evils. BYuT MP and deputy Rada speaker Mykola Tomenko hails from Cherkasy and is very popular there, noted Zhurylo, who expects Tymoshenko to try to use Tomenko's local popularity to her advantage. BYuT's Outreach to Grassroots -------------- ¶8. (C) Zhurylo revealed to us that Tymoshenko is launching an initiative intended to work as an all-Ukrainian community council that helps BYuT to be more responsive to the public as well as purge problem members, and that the council would be unveiled at the national level between October 20-24 in Kyiv. According to Zhurylo, BYuT is reaching out to political activists like him across the country - regardless of whether they are in the BYuT camp - to join the council and serve as advisors who help to make the party more accountable by keeping it abreast of local concerns. ...And Leave Yanukovych Behind -------------- ¶9. (C) Interlocutors estimated that Yanukovych trails Tymoshenko in the oblast by around ten percent. Zhurylo said that Yanukovych's visit to Cherkasy on September 17 was poorly attended - which could have resulted from a reported scheduling mixup - and failed to attract new support for the party. Most attendees were already PoR supporters who arrived with flags in hand. Zhurylo surmised that political infighting at the local level had rendered some of PoR's regional representatives more cooperative than usual on some issues, but Pasichnyk told us that PoR was in the process of reorganizing its Cherkasy branch by bringing in new management from Donetsk and Kyiv. Potential Threats to Freedom of Press -------------- ¶10. (C) Several contacts told us that the next Ukrainian administration may attempt to assert more control over the press, which is widely seen as open and competitive since the Orange Revolution. Zhurylo said that Yushchenko has been an ineffective president, but he did not meddle in the media business. As proof that freedom of speech is currently protected, Zhurylo said he hardly ever gets calls from the governor with instructions on what to publish. When he does get calls, the message is not "do not publish," but rather, "please include our perspective in your article." ¶11. (C) Odarych cited Tymoshenko's recent attempt to ban advertising critical of her government, calling it a warning of the types of tactics one should expect of her if elected president. Both Pasichnyk and Zhurylo expected the introduction of limited media controls under a Tymoshenko or Yanukovych presidency; Zhurylo commented that neither would be able to resist inserting some controls because "it's in each of their natures to tell the media what to do and how to exist." Pasichnyk also expected new limits on freedom of assembly and small business development under a Tymoshenko or Yanukovych presidency. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) East and West Ukraine are each clear in their presidential preferences regarding a potential Tymoshenko-Yanukovych matchup in a second round. Central Ukraine is something of a Ukrainian Ohio -- it could go either way. Whichever candidate prevails in Central Ukraine will likely become the next president. Concerns about the potential for a more heavy-handed approach by Tymoshenko or Yanukovych to the media or police may be overdrawn, but are worth keeping an eye on. PETTIT