Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KYIV1727
2009-10-05 15:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

YATSENYUK: LOSING MOMENTUM IN PRESIDENTIAL BID

Tags:  PGOV PREL UP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1998
PP RUEHDBU RUEHSL
DE RUEHKV #1727/01 2781547
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051547Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8533
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 001727 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: YATSENYUK: LOSING MOMENTUM IN PRESIDENTIAL BID

REF: KYIV 00437

Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary for reasons 1.4(b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 001727

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: YATSENYUK: LOSING MOMENTUM IN PRESIDENTIAL BID

REF: KYIV 00437

Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary for reasons 1.4(b,d)


1. (C) Summary. Presidential contender Arseniy Yatsenyuk,
who saw a surge in popular support in the spring, now appears
to be losing ground in the pre-election environment in
Ukraine. Latest public opinion polls move him squarely to
third place from the statistical tie he held for second place
with Tymoshenko through the spring and summer months. His
"unorthodox" campaign, which features camouflage colors and
consists of billboards and military-style tents staffed by
unengaged citizens that dot the streets of major cities, so
far seems to lack resonance among the public. Whether or not
Yatsenyuk enters the second round, his Front of Change (FC)
plans to run in the next parliamentary election. End Summary.

"Unorthodox" Campaign Falling Flat
--------------


2. (C) On September 29 we met with Yatsenyuk's Front of
Change (FC) deputy head of council and campaign co-manager
Andriy Pyshny and head of FC international relations section
Oleksandr Shcherba. Neither was able to offer more specific
details on Yatsenyuk's vague campaign promises or future
plans if elected president, only underscoring that there will
be dirty tricks throughout and Yatsenyuk will focus on
"Project Ukraine" intended to unite a divided
electorate.


3. (C) Pyshny and Shcherba echoed Yatsenyuk's public warnings
that the upcoming presidential election is Ukraine's "last
chance" for democracy, and indicated that the campaign's
"unhappy" colors are intended to convey that the country is
on the verge of destruction. The "artful" design is intended
to appeal to young voters, while the slogans--which convey
Yatsenyuk's four central tenets (new industrialization,
effective local government, healthy and educated people, and
a capable army)--are intended to resonate among voters over

50. Ihor Kohut of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives
told us on September 30 that he understood Yatsenyuk's tent
campaign was actually designed for Former Defense Minister
and presidential candidate Anatoliy Hrytsenko, but was
apparently transferred to Yatsenyuk when it became clear that
Hrytsenko did not have the resources to pay for the materials.


4. (C) When asked about voter and campaign mobilization,
Pyshny claimed that FC's internet site was the starting point
and that enthusiastic volunteers from this group were manning
the tents. In contrast, tent workers have confirmed to us
that they are being paid for their campaign work. We have
also found that tent workers around Kyiv and Kherson, for
example, cannot articulate if or why Yatsenyuk is the best
candidate and are sometimes observed sleeping in the tents.



5. (C) Shcherba claimed that FC has strong support in western
Ukraine but is also targeting voters in the more densely
populated east. In a separate conversation in mid-September,
Shcherba told us that Yatsenyuk had reached an electoral
plateau in western Ukraine and would attempt to expand his
support by targeting eastern Ukraine. Neither interlocutor
was able to expound on how they plan to tailor their message
across demographics beyond saying that "Project Ukraine"
means that getting the vote out in "Ivano-Frankivsk is just
as important as (in) Alchevsk" (i.e., in the far west as well
as the far east of the country).


6. (C) Political expert Kohut, along with Ihor Zhdanov,
director of the Open Policy Center, and Ilko Kucheriv,
director of the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, told us
that the nationalistic taglines and military aura of
Yatsenyuk's campaign do not seem to fit his actual persona,
and assess his chances at making it to the second round as
low. Results of a recent poll by the Ukrainian Democratic
Circle -- which is linked to a BYuT MP, but shows Tymoshenko
losing in the second round to Yanukovych--indicate a
significant downturn for Yatsenyuk, who garners 10.8 percent
in the first round against Tymoshenko and Yanukovych, who
earn 20.8 and 28.9 percent, respectively.

Yatsenyuk Expects a Dirty Campaign
--------------


7. (C) Pyshny repeated several times that Yatsenyuk is
expecting the campaign to be nasty, and raised concerns that
Ukrainian media is increasingly unwilling to appear critical
toward the government. (Comment: We have not detected any
clamping down on media freedoms. End Comment.) Pyshny
claimed that literature offered from the campaign tents may
end up being the only way for Yatsenyuk to communicate with
voters.

KYIV 00001727 002 OF 002



Favors Pragmatism with Russia...and Campaign Advice?
-------------- --------------


8. (C) When asked how Yatsenyuk would approach the
Ukraine-Russia relationship, Pyshny resolutely replied, "with
pragmatism." He said that the energy relationship would be
the priority, adding that the current gas contract had made
Ukraine a "slave" to Russia. Pyshny was unable to follow up
with any details on Yatsenyuk's plans to pursue an energy
consortium or redress problems with the gas contract, only
remarking that there are no easy solutions in the gas
relationship.


9. (C) In June, according to local media, Yatsenyuk replaced
his Ukrainian-led electoral team with Russian advisors
associated with Yanukovych's 2004 campaign. The Russian team
is led by Vladimir Granovskiy, who worked under Party of
Regions MP Andriy Klyuyev on Yanukovych's team in 2004,
according to Ukrayinska Pravda. In response to a question on
campaign advisors, however, Pyshny remained vague and said
that Yatsenyuk relied on a wide network of political contacts
and advisors and insisted that Yatsenyuk is in charge of his
own decision-making.

FC Will Become an Official Party
--------------


10. (C) Pyshny explained that FC will become a formal
political party in October and will participate in upcoming
local council elections as well as an early Rada election if
it is held. When asked how FC would approach the requirement
that a party be registered for a minimum of one year in
advance of participating in elections, Pyshny said this was
simply a "legal formality" that would not stand in the way of
FC's ability to compete in elections. Pyshny stressed that
FC would register as a party out of electoral necessity but
would strive to remain a grassroots civic organization in
practice.

Funding
--------------


11. (C) Various political observers have told us--and press
commentary speculate--that Yatsenyuk's funding may dry up.
There is speculation that oligarch Viktor Pinchuk (son-in-law
of former President Kuchma) may be waning in his support for
Yatsenyuk.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Comments from Yatsenyuk's campaign leaders and
workers, as well as Kyiv's political experts, belie a chronic
lack of substance behind his "unorthodox" campaign materials
and lackluster 'volunteers.' FC members do not show any
capability to deepen the message or expand their organization
to effectively compete with the campaign machines of
Yatsenyuk's principal rivals. Yatsenyuk's previous hope to
overtake Tymoshenko and stand as the new generation "Orange"
candidate against Yanukovych in the second round is
faltering. As the official campaign prepares to get
underway, he lacks endorsements, organization, and a clear
message; and, unless something changes, his funding may dry
up.
PETTIT