Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KYIV1433
2009-08-20 15:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:
UKRAINE - RUSSIA: RELATIVE CALM PREVAILS
VZCZCXRO7333 RR RUEHDBU RUEHSL DE RUEHKV #1433/01 2321516 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 201516Z AUG 09 FM AMEMBASSY KYIV TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8301 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 001433
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2019
TAGS: PREL UP RU
SUBJECT: UKRAINE - RUSSIA: RELATIVE CALM PREVAILS
REF: KYIV 1322
Summary
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 001433
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2019
TAGS: PREL UP RU
SUBJECT: UKRAINE - RUSSIA: RELATIVE CALM PREVAILS
REF: KYIV 1322
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Ukrainian President Yushchenko's calm response to
complaints conveyed in an August 10 letter from Russian
President Medvedev (ref) has been met by general approval in
Ukraine. Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko's eventual
response was also measured in tone, and echoed Yushchenko in
strongly defending Ukraine's sovereign rights. Since then,
bilateral contacts have quietly continued, including a
meeting of the Acting Minister of Defense with his Russian
counterpart on August 18 and a Tymoshenko-Putin phone call on
August 19 to discuss economic cooperation and a possible
early September meeting in Poland, at the invitation of
Polish President Donald Tusk. End Summary.
Yushchenko's Reply
--------------
2. (C) Those hoping for an emotional diatribe from
Yushchenko were disappointed by his eventual reaction,
conveyed in a written response to Medvedev three days later,
on August 13. His calm, reasonable response underscored
Ukraine's sovereign right to determine its own alliances, as
well as its own internal and foreign policies. The letter
chastised Medvedev as unconstructive, particularly in his
decision not to send an Ambassador to Kyiv. Ukrainian
reaction to Yushchenko's letter has ranged from overall
satisfaction with the tone to mild dissatisfaction with its
failure to offer proactive suggestions on how relations could
be improved.
Tymoshenko
--------------
3. (C) While most other Ukrainian politicians reacted to
Medvedev's incoming letter by quickly distancing themselves
from Yushchenko (ref),Prime Minister Tymoshenko's statement,
released on August 14, echoed Yushchenko's. Rather than
blame the President for problems with Russia or distancing
herself from his policies, Tymoshenko noted that she, as
Prime Minister, also tries to contribute to strong bilateral
relations. In strong terms, she defended Ukraine's right to
"independently, without external interference, define its
external and internal policy." Her statement concludes with
a dig at Medvedev's unwillingness to work with Ukraine's
current leadership: "Any pause in the development of
cooperation between Ukraine and Russia is unacceptable."
Lytvyn the Conciliator?
--------------
4. (C) Presidential candidates Yanukovich -- widely
perceived to have done himself some discredit by a hasty
embrace of the Medvedev letter -- and Yatsenyuk have not
commented further after their initial criticism of the
current bad state of relations. By contrast, Rada Speaker
Lytvyn has continued to press forward with his style of
parliamentary diplomacy, pushing hard for a meeting of the
Ukraine-Russia Inter-Parliamentary Commission in early
September.
5. (C) In an interview with Ekho Moskvy radio on August 18,
Lytvyn took pains to reach out to the Russian audience,
agreeing that relations cannot improve if foreign policy is
determined by the President of Ukraine (note: according to
the Ukrainian constitution, this is the case). Lytvyn stated
that Ukraine should not focus on "controversial moments" in
its shared history with Russia, that Ukraine should remain in
the CIS, that Russia has a special leadership role in the
CIS, that the new law authorizing the Russian president to
use force to protect Russian citizens abroad may not be "a
priori" aggressive, that arms sales to Georgia should be
reexamined, and that he does not see direct Russian influence
in Ukrainian electoral politics.
Public Opinion
--------------
6. (C) Ukrainian think tank Razumkov Center conducted a
telephone poll of at least 600 people each in the cities of
Kyiv, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Donetsk, and Simferopol between
September 12 and 16. Respondents were asked whether they
were aware of Medvedev's address to Yushchenko, whether they
supported Medvedev's claims, what they thought of Medvedev's
decision to delay the dispatch of a new ambassador to Kyiv,
whether Medvedev was disrespectful to Yushchenko or to
Ukraine on the whole (or both),whether Medvedev's motive was
to interfere with elections, and whether Russia currently
represents a threat to Ukraine.
7. (C) Results of the polling revealed a predictable
geographic split in people's views, with most in the West and
in Kyiv reacting negatively to the letter and ascribing
KYIV 00001433 002 OF 002
negative motives to Medvedev. With regard to the potential
threat posed to Ukraine by Russia, most respondents did not
perceive a threat (with the exception of Lviv, where the
split was slightly skewed toward seeing a threat). Most
interesting of all, however, was the high percentage or
respondents who said they were unaware of Medvedev's letter
in the first place.
Comment
--------------
8. (C) The letter from Medvedev seems to have been perceived
by many Ukrainians as an emotional statement of well-known
differences. Ukrainians by and large do not seem to view
Russia as an existential threat. While many were not pleased
with the emotional tone taken in Medvedev's message,
Ukrainians may be currently more absorbed with Ukraine's own
internal problems and the upcoming elections than with
problems in the bilateral relationship with Russia.
Tymoshenko's balanced response to Medvedev is likely to play
well both with her traditional electoral base in the West,
and with potential voters in the East, who look forward to a
new pragmatic approach that would do less to irritate Moscow.
PETTIT
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2019
TAGS: PREL UP RU
SUBJECT: UKRAINE - RUSSIA: RELATIVE CALM PREVAILS
REF: KYIV 1322
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Ukrainian President Yushchenko's calm response to
complaints conveyed in an August 10 letter from Russian
President Medvedev (ref) has been met by general approval in
Ukraine. Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko's eventual
response was also measured in tone, and echoed Yushchenko in
strongly defending Ukraine's sovereign rights. Since then,
bilateral contacts have quietly continued, including a
meeting of the Acting Minister of Defense with his Russian
counterpart on August 18 and a Tymoshenko-Putin phone call on
August 19 to discuss economic cooperation and a possible
early September meeting in Poland, at the invitation of
Polish President Donald Tusk. End Summary.
Yushchenko's Reply
--------------
2. (C) Those hoping for an emotional diatribe from
Yushchenko were disappointed by his eventual reaction,
conveyed in a written response to Medvedev three days later,
on August 13. His calm, reasonable response underscored
Ukraine's sovereign right to determine its own alliances, as
well as its own internal and foreign policies. The letter
chastised Medvedev as unconstructive, particularly in his
decision not to send an Ambassador to Kyiv. Ukrainian
reaction to Yushchenko's letter has ranged from overall
satisfaction with the tone to mild dissatisfaction with its
failure to offer proactive suggestions on how relations could
be improved.
Tymoshenko
--------------
3. (C) While most other Ukrainian politicians reacted to
Medvedev's incoming letter by quickly distancing themselves
from Yushchenko (ref),Prime Minister Tymoshenko's statement,
released on August 14, echoed Yushchenko's. Rather than
blame the President for problems with Russia or distancing
herself from his policies, Tymoshenko noted that she, as
Prime Minister, also tries to contribute to strong bilateral
relations. In strong terms, she defended Ukraine's right to
"independently, without external interference, define its
external and internal policy." Her statement concludes with
a dig at Medvedev's unwillingness to work with Ukraine's
current leadership: "Any pause in the development of
cooperation between Ukraine and Russia is unacceptable."
Lytvyn the Conciliator?
--------------
4. (C) Presidential candidates Yanukovich -- widely
perceived to have done himself some discredit by a hasty
embrace of the Medvedev letter -- and Yatsenyuk have not
commented further after their initial criticism of the
current bad state of relations. By contrast, Rada Speaker
Lytvyn has continued to press forward with his style of
parliamentary diplomacy, pushing hard for a meeting of the
Ukraine-Russia Inter-Parliamentary Commission in early
September.
5. (C) In an interview with Ekho Moskvy radio on August 18,
Lytvyn took pains to reach out to the Russian audience,
agreeing that relations cannot improve if foreign policy is
determined by the President of Ukraine (note: according to
the Ukrainian constitution, this is the case). Lytvyn stated
that Ukraine should not focus on "controversial moments" in
its shared history with Russia, that Ukraine should remain in
the CIS, that Russia has a special leadership role in the
CIS, that the new law authorizing the Russian president to
use force to protect Russian citizens abroad may not be "a
priori" aggressive, that arms sales to Georgia should be
reexamined, and that he does not see direct Russian influence
in Ukrainian electoral politics.
Public Opinion
--------------
6. (C) Ukrainian think tank Razumkov Center conducted a
telephone poll of at least 600 people each in the cities of
Kyiv, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Donetsk, and Simferopol between
September 12 and 16. Respondents were asked whether they
were aware of Medvedev's address to Yushchenko, whether they
supported Medvedev's claims, what they thought of Medvedev's
decision to delay the dispatch of a new ambassador to Kyiv,
whether Medvedev was disrespectful to Yushchenko or to
Ukraine on the whole (or both),whether Medvedev's motive was
to interfere with elections, and whether Russia currently
represents a threat to Ukraine.
7. (C) Results of the polling revealed a predictable
geographic split in people's views, with most in the West and
in Kyiv reacting negatively to the letter and ascribing
KYIV 00001433 002 OF 002
negative motives to Medvedev. With regard to the potential
threat posed to Ukraine by Russia, most respondents did not
perceive a threat (with the exception of Lviv, where the
split was slightly skewed toward seeing a threat). Most
interesting of all, however, was the high percentage or
respondents who said they were unaware of Medvedev's letter
in the first place.
Comment
--------------
8. (C) The letter from Medvedev seems to have been perceived
by many Ukrainians as an emotional statement of well-known
differences. Ukrainians by and large do not seem to view
Russia as an existential threat. While many were not pleased
with the emotional tone taken in Medvedev's message,
Ukrainians may be currently more absorbed with Ukraine's own
internal problems and the upcoming elections than with
problems in the bilateral relationship with Russia.
Tymoshenko's balanced response to Medvedev is likely to play
well both with her traditional electoral base in the West,
and with potential voters in the East, who look forward to a
new pragmatic approach that would do less to irritate Moscow.
PETTIT