Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KYIV1040
2009-06-18 16:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:
UKRAINIAN MFA VIEWS ON CORFU -- AND CONCERNS ABOUT
P 181610Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY KYIV TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7981 INFO CIS COLLECTIVE EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 001040
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2019
TAGS: OSCE PREL NATO PGOV ECON ETTC UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN MFA VIEWS ON CORFU -- AND CONCERNS ABOUT
POST-START
REF: STATE 59226
Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
------
C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 001040
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2019
TAGS: OSCE PREL NATO PGOV ECON ETTC UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN MFA VIEWS ON CORFU -- AND CONCERNS ABOUT
POST-START
REF: STATE 59226
Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) The Ukrainian MFA agrees with U.S. views on the
benefits of a "constructive dialogue" on European Security at
the OSCE Corfu informal Ministerial. However, the MFA
Security Department Director took the opportunity of our
discussion about Corfu to reiterate concerns about Ukraine
being shut out of the post-START process and left without
security guarantees. End Summary.
Corfu
--------------
2. (C) Polcouns met with Oleksandr Nikonenko, Director of the
MFA Arms Control and Military Cooperation Department, June 16
to seek support (ref) for using the OSCE informal Ministerial
in Corfu to launch a constructive dialogue on ways to enhance
European Security. Nikonenko endorsed the U.S. approach,
raising no objections. He added that the dialogue was a good
idea since Medvedev's statements on European Security were
vague. Nikonenko confirmed that Acting FM Khandogiy would
attend the Ministerial.
3. (C) Embassy also discussed our position on Corfu with
Maryna Mikhailenko, Counselor and Head of the International
Relations Division of the MFA's Political Directorate.
Mikhailenko said that the GoU position on the Russian
proposal for European security was still in formation -- as,
in fact, is the proposal itself. She commented that there is
not enough substance to the proposal for Ukraine to react to,
and went on to stress that Ukraine is quite satisfied with
existing European security dialogues and mechanisms,
specifically, the OSCE, EU, and NATO. She noted that these
organizations have comprehensive principles which Ukraine
shares, and also well-established mechanisms for dialogue and
conflict resolution.
4. (C) Mikhailenko agreed that some aspects of existing
institutions could be improved, and observed that the
security dimension suffers from lack of trust and lack of
efficiency. Russia itself, she said frankly, bears
responsibility for creating this situation, and she commented
that it is not clear how European countries should regard the
Russian proposal for new mechanisms that are redundant and
whose principles Russia appears to have violated. Ukraine
welcomes the opportunity to hold an open-ended discussion,
and sees the OSCE as the correct place to have such a
dialogue.
GUAM and Corfu
--------------
5. (C) Mikhailenko also raised a problem with the
organization of the Ministerial. She said that both the
Ukrainian Ambassadors to Greece and to the OSCE had raised
with the Greek MFA and the CIO the question of an invitation
for GUAM to attend Corfu. Mikhailenko said that Ukraine,
like the U.S., believes there are economic dimensions to
security in Europe that should be part of the discussion.
GUAM is a relevant multilateral actor for a significant
region of Europe, and GUAM's members each are party to a
"frozen conflict". Mikhailenko said Ukraine's request for an
invitation for GUAM appears to have been rebuffed, yet both
the CIS and CSTO have been invited to attend. Mikhailenko
said that the Ukrainian Ambassadors in Athens and Vienna were
informed by their Greek interlocutors that the invitations to
the CIS and CSTO were extended personally by the CIO, and
because they are "security" related organizations. The GoU
does not find it appropriate that some regional organizations
be included and others excluded, but does not intend to
pursue the matter further.
Post-START
--------------
6. (C) Director Nikonenko took the opportunity of our
discussion on European Security to reiterate Ukraine's
concerns about being "excluded" from the post-START process.
He contended that neither Belarus nor Kazakhstan sought to
participate in post-START talks but that Ukraine still did.
Ukraine would like the U.S. to change its decision to conduct
the post-START talks bilaterally. If it can not, Ukraine
seeks security guarantees from the U.S. to compensate for
Ukraine's exclusion. The guarantees would replace the
assurances contained in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum
(endorsed by all nuclear powers),which accompanied Ukraine's
decision to give up nuclear weapons.
7. (C) Nikonenko said it was clear that there was no
near-term prospect for NATO membership for Ukraine.
Nonetheless, Ukraine needs a security "anchor" -- a "new
umbrella." There is also no doubt Russia seeks to restore
its influence and is working to bring Ukraine under its sway.
To combat this, Ukraine needs a security guarantee from the
U.S. Such a guarantee could be open to others, as was the
Budapest Memorandum. Nikonenko maintained that Ukraine
could not remain indefinitely between CSTO and NATO; a
security guarantee from the U.S. would, however, "buy time."
Nikonenko clamed that there would be broad support in Ukraine
for such guarantees (though he admitted that public opinion
was against NATO membership).
8. (C) Acting FM Khandogiy would welcome the chance to
discuss this with Secretary Clinton if a bilateral meeting
could be arranged in Corfu, Nikonenko said. If that is not
possible, the GoU would seek other opportunities to discuss
its concerns with the U.S. We replied that at the U.S. was
open to discussion with Ukraine on security issues and that
we would pass the request along.
Comment
--------------
9. (C) The plea for U.S. security guarantees takes place
less than a week after the Rada failed to pass legislation
needed for "Sea Breeze" and other military exercises
involving foreign forces in Ukraine to proceed. On one hand
the MFA seeks U.S. security guarantees; on the other, the
specter of military exercises with the U.S. and other NATO
partners is so politically toxic that the Rada runs away from
it. The desire for a security guarantee from the U.S.
reflects the views of President Yushchenko and the MFA (one
of only two Ministries which answer to him). However there
is little indication of a broader consensus in Ukraine behind
the idea -- or any notable public discussion of it.
PETTIT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2019
TAGS: OSCE PREL NATO PGOV ECON ETTC UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN MFA VIEWS ON CORFU -- AND CONCERNS ABOUT
POST-START
REF: STATE 59226
Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) The Ukrainian MFA agrees with U.S. views on the
benefits of a "constructive dialogue" on European Security at
the OSCE Corfu informal Ministerial. However, the MFA
Security Department Director took the opportunity of our
discussion about Corfu to reiterate concerns about Ukraine
being shut out of the post-START process and left without
security guarantees. End Summary.
Corfu
--------------
2. (C) Polcouns met with Oleksandr Nikonenko, Director of the
MFA Arms Control and Military Cooperation Department, June 16
to seek support (ref) for using the OSCE informal Ministerial
in Corfu to launch a constructive dialogue on ways to enhance
European Security. Nikonenko endorsed the U.S. approach,
raising no objections. He added that the dialogue was a good
idea since Medvedev's statements on European Security were
vague. Nikonenko confirmed that Acting FM Khandogiy would
attend the Ministerial.
3. (C) Embassy also discussed our position on Corfu with
Maryna Mikhailenko, Counselor and Head of the International
Relations Division of the MFA's Political Directorate.
Mikhailenko said that the GoU position on the Russian
proposal for European security was still in formation -- as,
in fact, is the proposal itself. She commented that there is
not enough substance to the proposal for Ukraine to react to,
and went on to stress that Ukraine is quite satisfied with
existing European security dialogues and mechanisms,
specifically, the OSCE, EU, and NATO. She noted that these
organizations have comprehensive principles which Ukraine
shares, and also well-established mechanisms for dialogue and
conflict resolution.
4. (C) Mikhailenko agreed that some aspects of existing
institutions could be improved, and observed that the
security dimension suffers from lack of trust and lack of
efficiency. Russia itself, she said frankly, bears
responsibility for creating this situation, and she commented
that it is not clear how European countries should regard the
Russian proposal for new mechanisms that are redundant and
whose principles Russia appears to have violated. Ukraine
welcomes the opportunity to hold an open-ended discussion,
and sees the OSCE as the correct place to have such a
dialogue.
GUAM and Corfu
--------------
5. (C) Mikhailenko also raised a problem with the
organization of the Ministerial. She said that both the
Ukrainian Ambassadors to Greece and to the OSCE had raised
with the Greek MFA and the CIO the question of an invitation
for GUAM to attend Corfu. Mikhailenko said that Ukraine,
like the U.S., believes there are economic dimensions to
security in Europe that should be part of the discussion.
GUAM is a relevant multilateral actor for a significant
region of Europe, and GUAM's members each are party to a
"frozen conflict". Mikhailenko said Ukraine's request for an
invitation for GUAM appears to have been rebuffed, yet both
the CIS and CSTO have been invited to attend. Mikhailenko
said that the Ukrainian Ambassadors in Athens and Vienna were
informed by their Greek interlocutors that the invitations to
the CIS and CSTO were extended personally by the CIO, and
because they are "security" related organizations. The GoU
does not find it appropriate that some regional organizations
be included and others excluded, but does not intend to
pursue the matter further.
Post-START
--------------
6. (C) Director Nikonenko took the opportunity of our
discussion on European Security to reiterate Ukraine's
concerns about being "excluded" from the post-START process.
He contended that neither Belarus nor Kazakhstan sought to
participate in post-START talks but that Ukraine still did.
Ukraine would like the U.S. to change its decision to conduct
the post-START talks bilaterally. If it can not, Ukraine
seeks security guarantees from the U.S. to compensate for
Ukraine's exclusion. The guarantees would replace the
assurances contained in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum
(endorsed by all nuclear powers),which accompanied Ukraine's
decision to give up nuclear weapons.
7. (C) Nikonenko said it was clear that there was no
near-term prospect for NATO membership for Ukraine.
Nonetheless, Ukraine needs a security "anchor" -- a "new
umbrella." There is also no doubt Russia seeks to restore
its influence and is working to bring Ukraine under its sway.
To combat this, Ukraine needs a security guarantee from the
U.S. Such a guarantee could be open to others, as was the
Budapest Memorandum. Nikonenko maintained that Ukraine
could not remain indefinitely between CSTO and NATO; a
security guarantee from the U.S. would, however, "buy time."
Nikonenko clamed that there would be broad support in Ukraine
for such guarantees (though he admitted that public opinion
was against NATO membership).
8. (C) Acting FM Khandogiy would welcome the chance to
discuss this with Secretary Clinton if a bilateral meeting
could be arranged in Corfu, Nikonenko said. If that is not
possible, the GoU would seek other opportunities to discuss
its concerns with the U.S. We replied that at the U.S. was
open to discussion with Ukraine on security issues and that
we would pass the request along.
Comment
--------------
9. (C) The plea for U.S. security guarantees takes place
less than a week after the Rada failed to pass legislation
needed for "Sea Breeze" and other military exercises
involving foreign forces in Ukraine to proceed. On one hand
the MFA seeks U.S. security guarantees; on the other, the
specter of military exercises with the U.S. and other NATO
partners is so politically toxic that the Rada runs away from
it. The desire for a security guarantee from the U.S.
reflects the views of President Yushchenko and the MFA (one
of only two Ministries which answer to him). However there
is little indication of a broader consensus in Ukraine behind
the idea -- or any notable public discussion of it.
PETTIT