UKRAINE'S 1ST YEAR AS A WTO MEMBER: NOT MUCH OF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KYIV 001027 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR EUR/UMB, EB/TPP/BTA, EB/TPP/MTA STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR FOR CWILSON, CKLEIN AND PBURKHEAD COMMERCE FOR CLUCYK GENEVA FOR USTR E.O.: 12958: N/A TAGS: ETRD ECON WTRO PGOV UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE'S 1ST YEAR AS A WTO MEMBER: NOT MUCH OF A HONEYMOON PERIOD REFS: A) STATE 44733 B) KYIV 777 C) KYIV 497 D) KYIV 349 E) 2008 KYIV 1875 F) 2008 KYIV 915 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Ukraine recently marked the end of a tumultuous first year as a member of the WTO. Although the terms of Ukraine's accession were very favorable for WTO members, Ukraine made several missteps in implementing some its accession commitments. Of most concern was a partial rollback of tariff commitments, and Ukraine still needs to clean up some technical barriers to trade and sanitary/phytosanitary measures that discriminate against imports. The GOU has also failed to live up to some bilateral commitments to us on meat trade and on biotechnology. In addition, Ukraine has earned some notoriety for its tough negotiating tactics with prospective WTO members. Ukraine's trade statistics reveal no sea change since WTO accession, although WTO membership does seem to have bolstered total trade and helped diversify Ukraine's trade away from CIS countries. Despite the various problems, accession has been good for Ukraine, and continued dialogue bodes well for our trade relationship. End Summary. Blissful Matrimony -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Ukraine joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) on May 16, 2008, after some 14 years of difficult negotiations (ref F). WTO members seem to agree that the terms of Ukraine's accession were quite favorable, and USTR has noted that Ukraine's tariffs and rules commitments were "some of the best ever offered by an acceding country" (ref A). And even before joining the WTO, Ukraine had a fairly open economy, with total trade in goods equaling 77 percent of GDP in 2007 (exports 35 percent, imports 42 percent). Accession to the WTO promised to push Ukraine to eliminate most remaining trade barriers and to provide the country better market access to capitalize on its enormous export potential. Rain on Wedding Day - Ratification Problems -------------- ¶3. (U) Implementation of accession commitments wobbled from Ukraine's first day as a WTO member, however. The GOU mishandled the ratification process, failing to ensure the passage of five laws promised as part of negotiations before accession (ref F). Unable to secure parliamentary support, the GOU used sub-legislative instruments to try to ensure compliance with WTO commitments, with some success. In the meantime, it has managed to pass some laws, but a year on, Ukraine has still not adopted necessary legislation to bring its standardization regime for agricultural imports and its taxation system for agricultural producers into full WTO compliance. Infidelity - Tariffs -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Ukraine has also wavered on its tariff commitments. Lawmakers, facing severe pressure from domestic interests, particularly agricultural producers and the automobile industry, first tried to delay the tariff reductions for several months, creating uncertainty for importers. Then, in February/March, parliament succeeded in pushing through a 13 percent import tariff surcharge on a wide range of goods, bringing tariffs back above Ukraine's WTO commitments (ref D). The effort was spearheaded by Serhiy Teriokhin, a savvy, influential, and independent-minded MP from PM Tymoshenko's own bloc. President Yushchenko also played a critical role, as everyone -- including the President's own staff -- thought he would veto the law. The GOU subsequently managed to revoke the surcharge for most goods using a loophole provided in the law (ref C),but the surcharge remains in effect for automobiles and refrigerators. KYIV 00001027 002 OF 004 ¶5. (U) Ukraine has also taken some draconian measures related to customs valuation. In contrast to the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation, which mandates that the transaction value should usually be used for customs valuation purposes, Ukrainian Customs has frequently demanded importers to accept higher prices. While intended to cut down on customs valuation fraud, this practice has also negatively impacted legitimate trade. Constant Bickering - Agricultural Trade -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Like many countries, Ukraine remains least committed to the principles of free trade when agricultural products are involved. Agricultural producers have undue influence on government policy, and several high-level officials -- including Minister of Agriculture Yuriy Melnyk -- have commercial ties to the agricultural sector. At the same time, prices for basic food products are politically sensitive in Ukraine, and the GOU routinely intervenes in the market to keep certain prices artificially low. For example, Ukraine has employed export bans or restrictions on agricultural goods, particularly grains, to keep domestic prices artificially low. Ukraine canceled the most recent incarnation of these export restrictions shortly after joining the WTO in 2008 -- thanks to a banner harvest and falling world prices -- but the GOU would likely seek to re-impose such measures should agricultural commodity prices again spike. ¶7. (SBU) Ukraine's system of technical regulations, despite changes bringing it closer to conformity with the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), remains a significant obstacle to trade and investment. Based on the old Soviet system, the Ukrainian technical regulations system is characterized by burdensome, ex ante control and widespread compulsory standards, and it differs markedly from systems in western Europe. Moreover, Ukraine's oversight system for human and animal health measures is complex and nontransparent, involving overlapping authority by the Veterinary Service, Sanitary Service, and the State Standards Committee. Several legislative amendments passed as part of the WTO accession process made progress but did not solve entirely the problem of overlapping authority. Ukrainian practice in these areas has created powerful bureaucratic interests that want the system, which provides not only government jobs and authority but also tremendous rent- seeking opportunities, to remain as is. Volodymyr Baluta, Head of the Ministry of Economy's WTO Department, told Econoff on June 2 that the Ministry was pushing the State Standards Committee to issue its own order cancelling mandatory certification of food products, but the State Standards Committee was still resisting. Ukraine Doesn't Like Our Cooking - Bilat Ag Problems -------------- -------------- ¶8. (U) A bilateral agreement with Ukraine negotiated as part of our March 2006 WTO bilateral Market Access Agreement addresses the terms of U.S. meat exports to Ukraine. The lack of a functioning protocol on pork or on live swine for breeding continues to limit U.S. exports. Ukrainian veterinary authorities conducted a system audit of the U.S. system in 2007 but call for further audits, and in the meantime insist on individual plant inspections of U.S. producers. In addition, the Veterinary Service recently banned all U.S. pork due to H1N1 influenza fears and kept the ban in place even after GOU authorities recognized that the disease was not transmitted through consumption of pork (ref B). In such cases, a combination of protectionist motives -- pushed by domestic producers -- and bureaucratic interests -- from the agencies that benefit from greater restrictions -- is to blame. ¶9. (SBU) Ukraine has also dragged its feet on establishing an approval process for agricultural biotechnology products. The absence of an approval process has resulted in unpredictable sales conditions KYIV 00001027 003 OF 004 for corn products, soybeans, and meal. Ukraine agreed to open its market to the products of biotechnology in our 2006 WTO bilateral Market Access Agreement, and Parliament did passed a law establishing the framework for the creation, testing, and use of products of biotechnology in 2007. The GOU has failed to issue the necessary implementing regulations to open the market, however, and has shown little sign of progress over the last year. At the same time, the GOU has issued regulations requiring labeling of biotech in foods, without the necessary first step of establishing a registry and approvals system. Here, too, bureaucratic intransigence is to blame, but Ukrainian officials are also responding to public opinion, which is largely anti- biotech. Ukraine as the Difficult Mother-in-Law - New Accessions -------------- -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Ukraine has ruffled some feathers in its negotiations with prospective WTO members. Montenegro blames Ukraine for stalling its accession and has criticized Ukraine's negotiating tactics as unprofessional (ref A). While Ukraine may have been within its rights, its actions on the Montenegro accession have clearly won no new friends. Reports from Belgrade indicate that Ukraine may play a similar role on Serbia's accession. Ukraine's motives for playing hardball with prospective members are not entirely clear, although they do seem to emanate from GOU trade negotiators, and not from the political level. ¶11. (SBU) Ukraine's handling of Russia's accession, undoubtedly the most important for Ukraine, has been less controversial. Although some GOU officials have hinted that Ukraine would or should seek major concessions from Russia, political leaders have stressed their support for the Russian accession, and the GOU has not made any formal demands of Russia as yet. Ukraine's lead trade negotiator Valeriy Pyatnytskiy has told us that he hopes to expand certain aspects of the Russia-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement, however, and Ukraine could jump more vigorously into negotiations with Russia closer to the end of the accession process. Yevhen Burkat, head of the MFA's department of international economic relations, told us on June 11 that the GOU was shocked upon hearing Russian PM Putin's recent announcement that Russia would put its WTO negotiations on hold to pursue a customs union with Kazakhstan and Belarus. Burkat said the GOU was still attempting to understand whether it should take Putin's statement seriously, and to determine the impact the customs union would have on Ukraine's trade relations with each of the three involved countries. Married Life not so Different from Bachelor Life -------------- --- ¶12. (U) Most analysts agree that WTO accession did not lead to seismic changes in Ukraine, either good or bad. Pavlo Sultansky, director of the MFA's Economic Department, told the press in February, "We have actually been living according to WTO requirements for the last 10 years, and entering it has not changed our economy." Executive Director of the Ukrainian Association of Ferroalloy Producers Sergey Kudryavtsev, referring to widespread restrictions on Ukrainian steel imports put in place before Ukraine achieved market economy status, noted accurately in an interview in late 2008 that "restrictions imposed against our products in most countries (Note: including the EU) were withdrawn prior to the entry of Ukraine into the WTO, and in the United States are still not removed." ¶13. (U) Total trade has grown since WTO accession -- up from 77 percent of GDP in 2007 to 86 percent of GDP in 2008 -- although Ukraine's economic crisis, which has caused a major weakening of the national currency and a severe contraction of GDP, may have more to do with the change than WTO accession. ¶14. (U) There has also been a small but noticeable reorientation of Ukraine's trade since WTO accession. KYIV 00001027 004 OF 004 Trade with CIS countries between June 2008 and March 2009 (the most recent data available for the post-WTO accession period),compared to the same period in the previous year, fell from 39.6 percent of total trade to 37.2 percent. The difference was made up not by expanded trade with Europe, but rather with Asia (from 18.8 percent to 20.5 percent of total trade),Africa (from 3.1 percent to 3.9 percent of total trade),and the Americas (from 4.7 percent to 5.4 percent of total trade). WTO accession therefore appears to be serving as a kind of counterweight to Ukraine's free trade agreements and historical economic ties with CIS countries, increasing Ukraine's trade with more far-flung nations and diversifying Ukraine's trade. Comment: A Marriage Worth Saving -------------- ¶15. (U) Despite the multitude of trade-related problems that have colored Ukraine's first year as a WTO member, no one could argue that accession was a mistake. Ukraine is suffering woefully from the economic crisis, but WTO membership has bolstered and diversified foreign trade, which should help ease the pain. Accession also allowed Ukraine to launch Free Trade Agreement negotiations with the EU (ref E),the conclusion of which would dramatically reorient Ukraine's trade toward Europe and likely have a larger, more positive impact on the Ukrainian economy. And while the GOU could and should have handled accession implementation better, we are benefiting from increased transparency in Ukraine's trade regime as a result of accession. The next year promises to be no easier than the last, as the GOU will continue to face calls for increased protectionism as a response to the economic crisis. Continued dialogue and targeted assistance, both bilaterally and multilaterally, will help us make progress, and this is indeed a relationship worth investing in. End comment. Note: All statistics are from the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. End note. PETTIT