GROWING SOCIAL AND SECTARIAN DIVISIONS SPARK

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KUWAIT 000925

SIPDIS

NEA/ARP, NEA/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV KU
SUBJECT: GROWING SOCIAL AND SECTARIAN DIVISIONS SPARK
QUESTIONS ABOUT SOCIAL CONTRACT WITH AL SABAH

REF: A. KUWAIT 903

B. KUWAIT 876

C. KUWAIT 812

D. KUWAIT 504

E. KUWAIT 623

F. KUWAIT 244

G. KUWAIT 793

Classified By: Political Counselor Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and
d


1. (S) As Kuwait emerges from the Ramadan quiet season and
prepares for the October re-convening of the National
Assembly (Parliament),Kuwaitis are expressing widespread
dissatisfaction over the quality of the country's leadership,
malaise over social tensions and frustration with a perceived
drop in the quality of the country's social and material
infrastructure; many are also concerned by a perceived
increase in sectarian tensions and tribalist agendas.
Potshots exchanged in the press over the summer by
Kuwait's various factions suggest no let-up in the social and
political divide between those who view themselves as a
progressive elite, Islamists, tribalists, and even the ruling
family. Concerned by the public mood, the Amir delivered a
Ramadan speech on September 13 somewhat plaintively appealing
for unity and media self-restraint and urging citizens to
guard against tribal and sectarian divisions. Recent Embassy
Ramadan-season soundings of Kuwaiti opinion-leaders suggest
that:

-- Panic over H1N1, the GOK's perceived mishandling of a
massive sewage spill, and shock over a disastrous wedding
fire have further eroded an already low public confidence
that Kuwait's political leadership can cooperate to prevent
or effectively manage crises. Factionalism and non-national
loyalties have as a consequence become more openly apparent
-- and in some cases are likely being stoked by competing
elements within the Al Sabah family who are jockeying for
position. Conservative Sunnis claim the Amir is pandering to
Shi,a parliamentarians who may be more moderate and pliable;
many Shi,a in turn worry about alleged under the table
ruling family patronage of Salafists.

-- Criticism of the Amir -- albeit muted because it remains
technically illegal -- has increased, with observers of all
stripes faulting him for retaining a weak PM, placing family
above national interests, and for turning a blind eye to
pervasive corruption.

-- Largely absent from the media tumult between empowered and
assertive Islamist and tribal politicians (many MPs) and
liberal commentators (many from the professional classes --
Kuwait University professors and ex-ministers) have been the
prominent leaders and scions of the country's main-line
business families (both Sunni and Shi'a),who while well
aware of the dangers of continued political gridlock have
nonetheless chosen not to place their huge influence on one
side or the other lest their broader business interests be
affected.

-- The oft-maligned Prime Minister, along with several other
cabinet members may be targeted for questioning ("grilling")
in upcoming parliamentary sessions. The Amir has instructed
the ministers "to not be afraid" to answer their detractors,
but has promised them no safety net.

-- Despite parliamentary elections in May that brought in a
number of more moderate parliamentarians (including four
women),some of the most outspoken critics of the government
were returned, leading most Kuwaitis to expect that the Fall
parliamentary season will be a volatile one, with few
positive outcomes.

End summary.

Public Confidence at Low Ebb
--------------


2. (S) During the long hot month of Kuwait's Ramadan season,
Kuwaitis have gathered in their diwaniyyas to reflect on and
debate their country's condition and its future. Extensive
Embassy discussions with Kuwaitis ranging across the
political spectrum have revealed a pervasive sense of
dissatisfaction with their country's political leadership and
lack of a mobilizing social vision. A series of summertime
crises -- panic over H1N1 deaths (ref A),a catastrophic
sewage spill in an urban district (ref B),and a tragic
wedding party fire that claimed dozens of lives (ref C) --
have heightened many Kuwaitis' sense of malaise and led them

KUWAIT 00000925 002 OF 005


to worry that there's no capable hand on the country's
tiller. At the same time, many Kuwaitis perceive a hardening
of sectarian and tribal differences as Kuwait's various
social groupings -- manipulated to some degree by competing
factions within the ruling family -- maneuver for increased
power and influence.


3. (S) In an August incident that played itself out in the
press and which revealed an unexpected degree of Shia-Sunni
tension, associates of a Kuwaiti Shia cleric (Sayed Mohammed
Al-Mohri) criticized one of Kuwait's most respected Sunni
scholars (Ibn Taymiya). Subsequently, a Salafi weekly
magazine published a cartoon of a white shark wearing a black
turban, which many Shia took to be an offensive caricature of
Al-Mohri. The magazine denied that the caricature was
intended to represent Al-Mohri, stating that it represented,
instead, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard navy. Following a
volley of angry back and forth press commentary between
members of the two religious communities, Minister of Oil and
Communication Shaykh Ahmed Abdullah Al Sabah (acting on
behalf of the absent Amir) called on editors of all Kuwait's
media to avoid instigating sectarianism.


4. (S) While the issue submerged, diwaniyya conversations
suggest lingering distrust between the two communities.
Sectarian tensions were further exacerbated by the arrest by
the local security service of a number of Kuwaiti
Salafist/Takfirist extremists planning attacks on US and
Kuwaiti interests, which prompted a short but sharp period of
introspection and finger-pointing as Kuwaiti commentators
variously blamed the government for promoting Sunni religious
extremism in the schools and mosques, parents for not
exercising more oversight over the upbringing of their
children, and again the government for not doing more to
prevent the intrusion of unIslamic values and policies which
led to a back-lash by some in society.

Ministers Operating without a Net
--------------


5. (S) High on the list of Kuwaiti concerns is the
expectation that the upcoming parliamentary season will do
little to push the country in a positive direction. Despite
early hopes of some liberals that an era of greater
cooperation between the legislative and executive branches
might have emerged from the May elections (ref D) in which
four women broke the parliamentary gender barrier, continuing
political posturing by MPs over the summer has led most
Kuwaitis to doubt that the current crop of MPs will rise
above self-serving agendas to act in the interests of Kuwait.
There is a widespread expectation on all sides that the
Islamist/tribalist opposition will continue to mount attacks
on the the Prime Minister and several of his ministers with
"irresponsible" (in the view of the elite liberal class)
demands that the government absorb private consumer debt and
expand healthcare services abroad for Kuwaitis.


6. (S) Notably absent from the agenda, in the view of many
Kuwaiti "progressives" will be long overdue dialogue on
labor reforms, TIP, counterterrorism, and healthcare and
education reform. In a climate that promises to be
contentious, Amir Shaykh Sabah Al-Ahmed Al Sabah, nodding to
the Minister of Interior's successful staving off of grilling
attacks in June (ref E),has publicly encouraged cabinet
members to "not be afraid of grilling." This admonition is
intended to spark the ministers' senses of ownership in their
portfolios, but leaves open the question of whether the
government will provide them a safety net. Fearing
scapegoatism, ministers have historically proved disinclined
to embark on initiatives that might subject them to public or
parliamentary scrutiny. It remains an open question whether
the Amir's remarks will encourage Prime Minister Shaykh
Nasser Al-Mohammed Al Sabah himself to face his detractors;
he has avoided such an encounter in his last six attempts to
run the government.

Rx: Strong Dose of Leadership
--------------


7. (S) Embassy's interlocutors have been virtually unanimous
in attributing at least part of the blame on the country's
present woes to the weak leadership of the PM, a man whom
most Kuwaitis view as a decent man, but one lacking in steel
or vision. In what is a relatively new phenomenon, however,
some Kuwaitis are taking the added step of putting some blame
for the country's sense of drift on the shoulders of the
Amir. Since open criticism of the Amir continues to be
illegal, such reflections are muted and often expressed only
in private, but the sense of public frustration over the

KUWAIT 00000925 003 OF 005


Amir's decision to retain his
ineffectual nephew Shaykh Nasser in the PM slot hangs in the
air. Adding to many Kuwaitis' frustration is the belief that
even if Shaykh Nasser were to stand down, the ruling Al Sabah
family has few viable alternative candidates and some more
perceptive observers note that political gridlock is
exacerbated by the competing factions within the ruling
family -- principally among the Amir, the PM, Deputy Prime
Minister Shaykh Ahmed Al-Fahad Al Sabah, and the Amir's
half-brother Shaykh Misha'al (with a sprinkling of overt and
covert financial and political manipulation by the Amir's two
surviving sons, Nasser and the shadowy Hamad). While many
Kuwaiti thinkers would like to see a competent and dynamic
non-ruling family member appointed to the PM role, they
realize that Al Sabah opposition and long tradition render
such an outcome unlikely anytime soon.

Number One Out for Number One?
--------------


8. (S) In a quiet way, some Kuwaitis have begun to mutter
that Kuwait's senior leadership is self-centered, as well as
lacking in vision. By all accounts, the current Amir has
proven to be something of a disappointment weighed against
the expectations of someone reputed for his decisiveness over
a nearly 40 year term as Foreign Minister. In conversation
with Poloff, a respected Islamist academic recently
contrasted the image of the previous Amir, Shaykh Jaber
Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al Sabah, with that of his younger
half-brother and current Amir, Shaykh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber
Al Sabah. Our interlocutor noted that Shaykh Jaber, as Amir,
reportedly lowered his "Amiri appropriations" salary from 11
to eight million KD/per year, whereas Shaykh Sabah, when he
ascended to power in 2006, raised his Amiri appropriations
from 11 to 50 million KD/year. (Note: In what some observers
have suggested is a slight to Shaykh Sabah, Kuwaitis are
increasingly festooning their car windows with images of the
deceased but still venerated Shaykh Jaber. End note.) Such
rare criticisms of the Amir are heard much more frequently
about the PM, whose detractors are expected to try to grill
him in the coming months over his office's large and
less-than-transparent expenditures. Interestingly, given the
political alliance and "social compact" forged decades ago
between the Al Sabah and the Islamists and tribalists (ref
F),it is these conservative elements who are at the
forefront of corruption allegations against the GOK. While
conservatives regularly assert that Kuwaiti leadership is
corrupt, liberals generally focus their criticism on the fact
that it is simply weak. (Note: In a rare assertion of
authority, the Amir last month instructed the PM to sharply
curtail his foreign travel given the numerous pressing issues
at home. End note.)

National Loyalty only Skin Deep
--------------


9. (S) Many Kuwaiti observers view the present fractures in
Kuwaiti political and social life as stemming from the
failure of the mid-20th century social compact between the Al
Sabah and the demographically growing Bedouin or tribal
communities, which was intended to offset the political
influence of the downtown merchant families (ref F). In
exchange for tribalist support, the GOK offered them
nationality and jobs in the police and army; the trend
continues today with the government staffing the
bureaucracies of several ministries with large numbers of
tribals, many of whom are assessed by Kuwaiti liberals as
having only limited qualifications. In the view of many
observers, however, the tribals failed to respond to the
ruling family's largesse with loyalty or with a sense of
commitment to Kuwait as a nation. Instead, the tribes have
increasingly focused their energies on expanding tribal
political power with the aim of advancing specific tribal
agendas, functioning as de facto political parties for the
benefit of tribal members. While, as several observers
suggested, Islam provides an important backdrop for the
tribes and forms a core part of their identity, most of them
are motivated more by a desire to enhance their particular
niche in society than by a desire to spread fundamentalist
Islam. When it has served their purposes, however,
tribalists have not hesitated to ally themselves
with fundamentalists, including Salafists and Islamists, such
as the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM-Kuwaiti Muslim
Brotherhood) to advance their own interests.

Tipping the Balance: Strategizing for the future
-------------- --------------


10. (S) While many Kuwaiti liberals hoped that the results

KUWAIT 00000925 004 OF 005


of the May parliamentary elections presaged a more
progressive period in Kuwaiti politics, many of those same
interlocutors perceive a hardening and retrenching of
Islamist and tribalist attitudes over the summer. For some,
the May parliamentary setbacks of the "conservatives"
resulted from infighting among these groups, rather than a
significant shift towards a more liberal worldview among
Kuwaiti voters. Indeed, the Islamist ICM recently elected a
new Secretary General (former MP Dr. Nasser Al Sane) and
claims it is regrouping along the lines of a modern political
party. Islamists, including ICM and Salafi brethren, as well
as tribalists, their natural allies (when expedient),will
likely remain the GOK's primary opposition in the upcoming
season. This reality has led some Islamists, such as Nasser
Al-Sane, to assert privately that the government is pandering
to the 9 Shi'a MPs as a more moderate, cooperative force --
with a prominent Shi'a former MP recently telling DCM that in
his view the Shi,a have never had it so good in Kuwait.


11. (S) Few Kuwaiti analysts view the May election as having
inspired the country's various political and social factions
to work towards a common goal. Instead, Sunnis, Shi'a,
liberals, conservatives, Hadhar (settled),Bedouin, ruling
family members and members of the press have carried out over
the summer a continuing round of public and private
skirmishes and maneuvers. In the view of many Kuwaiti
analysts, loss of confidence in the country's leadership has
exacerbated the tendency of Kuwait's various factions to dig
in and strategize how best to advance their particular
interests. While most Kuwaiti political analysts perceive
the government's inability to bring the factions to brook as
a sign of its ineptness, at least a few believe the Amir has
subtly but deliberately encouraged parliamentary infighting
(by simultaneously backing the PM and some of his rivals in
the ruling family, particularly Deputy PM Shaykh Ahmad
Al-Fahad Al Sabah) as a means to prejudice citizens against
the parliament and sustain their dependence on the ruling
family. Some believe, however, that this rivalry is
temporarily on hold and that Shaykh Ahmad Al-Fahad will play
a useful role in advancing the GOK's long moribund
development agenda in the upcoming Session (though his recent
designation as chief government whip for the implementation
of the GOK's parliamentary agenda is something of a
double-edged sword in that he will grow in stature -- but
only if he succeeds in what many see as an almost impossible
task).

Divergent World Views
--------------


12. (S) Embassy conversations with policy analysts and
political activists from a variety of Kuwait's political
"tendencies" reveal a few overriding present preoccupations:
Islamists, by and large, viewed the government as weak and
corrupt and worry that the GOK's "pandering" to liberal,
Shi,a and tribal elements has resulted in the
non-transparent staffing of key ministries, permitting the
infiltration of "misguided ideologies" that threaten Islam.
Self-identified liberals agree in part, stating that the
GOK's long-term "jobs-for-loyalty" social compact with
demographically growing Islamist and tribalist groups has
resulted in the staffing of several ministries -- including
Education, Awqaf, Planning and even Foreign Affairs -- with
poorly qualified Islamists/tribals, resulting in a decline in
the GOK's ability to provide services. Liberals view as
particularly corrosive to Kuwait's social fabric a perceived
dominance by Islamists of the country's educational system,
an outcome they believe has resulted in a generation of
Kuwaitis who are much more Islamist in view than the previous
generation, and are poorly educated, unprepared to compete in
the modern world, and ready to turn a blind eye to the
presence in Kuwait of dangerous elements. Liberals --
including many Shi'a -- blame the Islamists for promoting an
intolerant version of Islam and criticize the government and
ruling family for supinely giving the Islamists a free hand
with the misguided and non-productive aim of securing
Islamist loyalty and support.

Comment: Keeping the Dhow Afloat in the Storm
--------------


13. (S) Embassy's summertime conversations suggest a
widespread sentiment shared by liberals and conservatives
alike that Kuwaitis are dissatisfied with what they deem is
weak, incompetent leadership. In charting the course for the
future, the Amir must decide whether to continue his
paternalistic consensus-oriented and passive-aggressive
approach to leadership -- which many Kuwaitis view as the
road to ruin -- or take on a "tough love" tack that involves

KUWAIT 00000925 005 OF 005


making some difficult, non-consensual decisions, which would
break with long-established precedent in this small society
of but 1.1 million citizens. Bailing out the waterlogged
Kuwaiti dhow and getting it to sail on a faster and smoother
course could require relinquishing a degree of ruling family
influence and, perhaps, jettisoning ballast like the PM. But
this would necessitate a firm governmental hand on the tiller
-- currently not in evidence -- and better captaining would
not necessarily calm the tensions between Islamists, tribals
and liberals. Given the social and political storm clouds
that have been gathering over the summer, the GOK could be
heading into choppy seas this fall. However, with so many
prominent and influential business families choosing to
remain on the sidelines of the fractious national debate, it
appears the smart money is betting this fall's likely
political squall won't turn into a storm. End comment.

********************************************* *********
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
********************************************* *********
JONES