Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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09KUWAIT831 | 2009-08-23 07:33:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kuwait |
VZCZCXRO9052 PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR DE RUEHKU #0831/01 2350733 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 230733Z AUG 09 FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3843 INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000831 |
1. (C) Summary: In separate meetings with CDA and Econcouns, two senior Kuwaiti oil officials asserted that Kuwait could sustainably produce 3 million barrels per day of crude oil, but acknowledged that exceeding that level without international assistance would be difficult. The Amir's oil advisor said that he thought Project Kuwait had the Prime Minister's interest and would be "back on the table.8 He also expressed guarded optimism that the new parliament would be able to amend some key economic laws, despite the opposition of the "usual" parties. End Summary. Capacity at 3 million barrels per day -------------------------- 2. (C) Kuwait Petroleum Corporation Managing Director for International Marketing Abdulatif Al-Houti said that Kuwait's sustainable production capacity had reached 3 million barrels per day (mmb/d), although it was only producing in line with its 2.2 mmb/d OPEC quota. Kuwait exports between 1.3-1.5 mmb/d of crude, almost entirely on long-term contracts, and refines around 900,000 b/d. Currently, Kuwait exports about 200,000 barrels per day of crude to China. Although China wants more crude, Kuwait is unable to increase its exports to China substantially, given the term structure of its current exports. With the expertise of the oil majors, Al-Houti said that over time Kuwait could expand to produce up to 4 mmb/d ) a prudent investment given rocketing domestic consumption for electricity generation ) but said an absence of government leadership and vision, combined with stiff parliamentary opposition to the kind of production-sharing arrangements needed to secure IOC technology and field management expertise, meant that this goal, while worthy, remained remote. 3. (SBU) Both Al-Houti and Amiri Oil Advisor Khaled Al-Fulaij stressed the need for international oil company (IOC) participation to develop Kuwait's oil production capacity further. Al-Fulaij said that he thought Kuwait's long-delayed initiative to develop its northern oil fields (Project Kuwait) could be "back on the table." According to Al-Fulaij, Project Kuwait had the Prime Minister's interest and, as a practical matter, Kuwait's technical resources were insufficient to dramatically increase oil production. KOC was looking to have 80 rigs (including 7 exploration rigs) operational in the 2013 timeframe, which would be a major challenge to manage. Al-Fulaij said that KOC intended to hire 1000 new employees, but questioned the availability of that number of qualified new recruits. As Al-Fulaij saw it, the only solution would be to bring in the IOCs with their significant management infrastructure. He reiterated that concessions or production sharing agreements were "off the table." He thought, however, that the enhanced technical services agreement model would work. Advice to Exxon: Set up a Company -------------------------- 4. (SBU) Al-Fulaij said that he had met with Exxon representatives to discuss the company's lengthy negotiations over the Ratqa oil field (ref b). He suggested that Exxon establish a shareholding company to run the downstream joint venture (24.5% Exxon owned, 24.5% KOC owned, and 51% publicly traded). This ownership structure would turn the JV into a Kuwaiti "investment" under Central Tender Committee (CTC) and State Audit Bureau rules, significantly reducing bureaucratic interference. Exxon would operate upstream under an Enhanced Technical Services Agreement with KOC. Al-Fulaij added that he had briefed Al-Rushaid about his conversation and received generally positive feedback: "we can look at that." Change the Laws -------------------------- 5. (C) Al-Fulaij acknowledged that Kuwait needed legal reform in order to better attract foreign business, specifically citing the tender law and the build operate transfer (BOT) law. He noted that the CTC did not have the technical expertise it needed to evaluate complicated technical projects and tended to deal with its ignorance by retendering projects. On a positive note, the head of the CTC recognized the problem and had approached Al-Fulaij seeking oil sector KUWAIT 00000831 002 OF 002 experts to provide technical advice. So far, Al-Fulaij said, he hadn't been able to find anyone, but he would keep looking. He expressed optimism that the current parliament would be able to pass needed legislation, given the changes in its composition. The same old 11-12 people (specifically Ahmed Saadoun) were likely to block progress, but the government only needed 32 people to pass legislation and he thought that number was doable. Comment -------------------------- 6. (C) Most Kuwaiti oil sector officials acknowledge the need to bring in IOC expertise to maintain their aging fields and to develop new fields (ref a). It is still too early to tell whether Al-Fulaij's optimistic view of parliament (or of the government for that matter) will be borne out by actual progress on the ground. Absent a changed environment, Kuwaiti constitutional limitations on concessions, out of date tendering regulations, and heavy political interest in the oil sector make for a difficult business environment. End Comment. ********************************************* ********* For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: visit Kuwait's Classified Website at: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it ********************************************* ********* WILLIAMS |