SCENESETTER FOR THE AMIR OF KUWAIT'S AUGUST 3

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 000738 SIPDIS NEA/ARP, NEA/RA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER CVIS ECON IR IZ KU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE AMIR OF KUWAIT'S AUGUST 3 VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES: KEEPING THE FAITH WITH A KEY REGIONAL PARTNER Classified By: The Ambassador for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (C) The President's August 3 MEETING with Kuwaiti Amir Shaykh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al Sabah offers an opportunity to reaffirm the importance we attach to our bilateral relationship at a time when the U.S. drawdown from Iraq, efforts to move Iraq out from under Chapter VII sanctions, and concern about our intentions towards Iran leave the Kuwaiti leadership feeling less certain of that commitment. Applauding bilateral strengths -- Kuwait's vibrant democratic tradition and robust support for OIF and the large U.S. military presence here -- and acknowledging recent Kuwaiti efforts in other areas (e.g. stepped up counter-terrorism activity, construction of a rehab center for Islamist extremists and potentially Guantanamo returnees),will facilitate more receptive GoK engagement on our key agenda items. In the absence of fully empowered interlocutors elsewhere within the GoK, the Amir's visit is a chance to lay out our desired way forward on Iraq's emergence from Chapter VII sanctions, our expectations regarding conditions for the return of some or all of Kuwait's four Guantanamo detainees (as this is something for which the Amir is likely to ask), to broach the issue of the nature and focus of the military presence we seek here in the medium-term, and to discuss the role Kuwait can play in supporting our Iran and Middle East peace strategies. Applaud Strengths -------------- ¶2. (C) Democracy: Kuwait boasts a proud democratic tradition of more than fifty years and is, by any measure, one of the most democratic states in the Middle East. Elections in May brought four U.S.-educated women into the 50-member parliament, which is the scene of free, open and often boisterous debate that genuinely reflects public opinion. While the Amir and close relatives in the large Al Sabah family exercise extensive authority, Kuwait's ruling family was chosen to lead more than two centuries ago by fellow tribal and clan groups -- a reality not lost today upon either the Al Sabah or ordinary Kuwaiti citizens and a fact that diminishes the distance between the two in a way not found elsewhere in the Gulf. Nonetheless, this commendable political freedom has recently resulted in considerable political statis -- a function of indecisive government leadership and a parliament more bent on opposing government to leverage patronage than on working with it. May elections brought in a more cooperative legislature, but the political system remains stuck in a no man's land between traditional autocracy and a fully democratic parliamentary model. We should encourage the Amir to stay the course on democracy -- i.e. laying out a compelling vision and program, then working with parliament to secure it, rather than yielding to the temptation to rule by decree -- and to use improved executive-legislative ties to pass comprehensive and overdue legislation to deal with terrorism, trafficking in persons, and economic reform (the latter necessary to improve Kuwait's business reputation after cancellation or postponement this year of several high-profile projects involving Dow, Fluor, Chevron and other U.S. firms). ¶3. (C) Security Cooperation: Kuwaitis remain deeply grateful to the U.S. for leading Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and for our ouster of Saddam via Operation Iraqi Freedom -- even as concerns about Iraq's future stability and intentions remain. As a reflection of that gratitude, Kuwait has provided approximately USD 1.2 billion in annual material and logistical support for OIF, a contribution that exceeds that of all other allies combined. Our bilateral military relationship remains strong, with over USD 8.1 billion in foreign military sales cases for Kuwait currently in the pipeline. As OIF winds down, the GOK will likely seek a reduced U.S. military presence on its soil (perhaps along pre-OIF lines); should we seek a larger presence to support regional and AF/PAK operations, the Amir's visit will be an opportunity to lay that groundwork. Acknowledge Limited Progress in Key Areas -------------- ¶4. (C) Counter-Terrorism: Even in the absence of a comprehensive CT law, we judge that Kuwait has taken greater steps in the past six months to detain, monitor, and support the detention of known terrorist facilitators. Kuwait's Interior Minister, Shaykh Jaber Khalid Al Sabah, told the Ambassador July 7 that he has been given the mandate to discipline and refocus his ministry given a general acceptance and recognition of the global nature of the terrorist threat; he mentioned an ongoing enhanced surveillance program as one manifestation of this effort. On terrorist financing issues, the GoK has not supported designation of the Kuwait-based NGO Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS) citing the need for "actionable evidence" as opposed to "suggestive intelligence." The Amir may raise this issue, as RIHS enjoys broad public support as a charitable entity and few Kuwaitis believe the NGO has done anything wrong. We should use the Amir's visit to acknowledge some progress on broader CT issues and urge even greater effort along this track -- to include passage of comprehensive counterterrorism and terrorist financing laws and even more bilateral cooperation in combating the terrorist threat. Provision by the USG of the "actionable evidence" requested on RIHS could also usefully spur forward movement on that front. ¶5. (C) Guantanamo Detainees: Obtaining the return of Kuwait's four remaining Guantanamo detainees is a sensitive political issue in Kuwait and will be high on the Amir's agenda. Galvanized by the President's commitment to close GTMO by the end of this year, the GOK has put considerable effort into developing a rehabilitation center for religious extremists, which closely follows the SAUDI model. The Ambassador toured the GOK facility on June 18 and found a rather impressive physical plant (due for completion within two months) backed by a program of psychological and religious counseling aimed at restoring detainees to a state of "normalcy" within six months. The GOK maintains that it has the legal authority to hold the detainees for six months prior to sentencing, clearly anticipating that some or all of the detainees will be rehabilitated within this period. The GOK also claims confidence in its ability to monitor the detainees effectively post-release to ensure they do not resume terrorist activities. Laying out clearly and frankly to the Amir our views on what it will take to achieve the desired return of some or all of Kuwait,s detainees will help the Amir both in terms of setting the right course and in managing expectations. Frank Dialogue on Iraq and Iran: Kuwait's Twin Existential Concerns -------------- -- ¶6. (C) Iraq: Nervous about the consequences of the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq and efforts to see Iraq emerge from Chapter VII sanctions, the Amir will seek a clear manifestation of continued USG commitment to Kuwait's long-term security. We recommend reiterating to the Amir our appreciation for Kuwait's support for OIF and our commitment to maintain a close security relationship for the foreseeable future -- our changing profile in Iraq does not mean that we will abandon our friendship or our support for Kuwait's security. The Amir should be apprised in detail of our policy approach on Chapter VII. Emphasis on the inviolability of UNSCR 833, the goal of helping draw Iraq back as a fully functioning member of the international community, and the importance of laying the groundwork now for improved Kuwait-Iraq relations in future will be helpful in persuading him to accept what will be a tough sell domestically. ¶7. (C) Iran: The GoK has kept a low public profile on the recent disturbances in Iran, reflecting a traditional Kuwaiti posture of attempting to avoid inciting its larger and more aggressive neighbors. The Kuwaitis nonetheless do regard Iran as a threat, but Kuwait is as much worried by the possibility of destabilizing military action against Tehran as it is of what it fears may result should our diplomatic engagement be overly eager. Reflecting this ambivalence, Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser Mohammed -- who spent twelve years as ambassador to Tehran -- recently told NEA AA/S Feltman that, while dialogue on Iran's nuclear program was the only option, he did not believe any amount of persuasion would convince Iran to accept international supervision. The Amir will welcome a dialogue that clarifies USG intentions and red-lines, while soliciting Kuwaiti views on how best to engage Tehran. Other Agenda Items -------------- ¶8. (C) Middle East Peace Process: Kuwaitis were deeply inspired by the President's Cairo speech but may perceive what they see as that signal of greater USG "fairness" as now placing more of a burden on ISRAEL to end settlement activity and remove barriers to movement -- steps to which the Arab states could then be expected to respond. The GoK has been a generally helpful, but not leading, interlocutor on Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts, backing the Palestine Authority and President Abbas, the Quartet Principles and the Arab Peace Plan and routinely advocating moderation in Arab League discussions. Kuwait has provided considerable humanitarian and developmental assistance to the Palestinian people; the GoK has stressed that it does not fund HAMAS, but is equally unwilling to provide direct budgetary support for the PA (in part due to accountability concerns). Kuwait has frequently urged U.S. normalization with Syria as a means of weaning it away from Iran and into the moderate "peace camp" and in that context is supportive of recent US engagement with Damascus. The Amir would appreciate a fuller elucidation of the U.S. approach on the peace process -- to include the role Kuwait can play. ¶9. (C) Amir's Economic Vision/US Entry Requirements: The Amir hosted the first-ever Arab Economic Summit in January in an attempt to promote a regional approach to the financial crisis; he would be gratified by acknowledgement of his vision in this regard (which he sees as a key element of his legacy) -- we may wish to suggest how future efforts could be coordinated to support broader US economic goals. Although he is not likely to raise the issue, the Amir has heard reports that some Kuwaitis face long visa clearance delays and burdensome NSEERS entry/exit registration requirements; he would welcome any information about US plans to streamline such procedures. ********************************************* ********* For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: visit Kuwait's Classified Website at: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it ********************************************* ********* JONES