SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY NAPOLITANO'S VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000644

SIPDIS

NEA/ARP, NEA/RA, DHS FOR SECRETARY NAPOLITANO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY NAPOLITANO'S VISIT TO
KUWAIT

Classified By: A/DCM Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) Madame Secretary: My STAFF and I look forward to
welcoming you to Kuwait. While we understand that your
schedule has been centered around a U.S. Coast Guard event,
we have also requested a meeting for you with the Amir,
Shaykh Sabah Ahmed Al Sabah, or his designated
representative. When your predecessor visited in March 2008,
he reviewed with the GOK the state of play on several
security-related issues, including Guantanamo detainees,
Critical Infrastructure Information Sharing,
counter-terrorism efforts, and Iran and Iraq. Your
interlocutors may raise with you concerns over perceived
delays in obtaining visas and what they consider
unnecessarily harsh treatment of Kuwaitis at U.S. ports of
entry, given our strong bilateral relationship. Your visit
comes at an historic moment in Kuwait's democratic evolution;
four women, for the first time in Kuwait's history, were
elected to the NATIONAL Assembly in May elections and your
acknowledgement of this important step will be appreciated by
your hosts. At the same time, socio-economic development
remains stymied by continuing friction between the government
and fractious tribal and Islamist elements in the parliament.
Kuwait Domestic Politics
--------------

2. (C) Kuwaitis will appreciate your positive acknowledgement
of the fact that their May 16 parliamentary election elevated
-- for the first time -- four highly qualified women
candidates to office; they were disappointed that this signal
event failed to obtain a mention in the President's otherwise
well-regarded Cairo speech. Notwithstanding this important
achievement, Kuwait's political system remains mired in
tensions that reflect the emergence of tribalists/Islamists
as an important political class. This group lost no time in
interpellating or "grilling" Interior Minister Shaykh Jaber
Khalid Al Sabah, who hails from the ruling Al Sabah family,
and have threatened to grill Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser Al
Sabah as well; a no-confidence vote will be conducted July 1.
Similar efforts led to the collapse of the government and
the dissolution of parliament in March this year.
Parliamentary gridlock renders difficult the passage of
controversial items such as a comprehensive counter-terrorism
law.
GTMO Detainees
--------------

3. (C) Obtaining the release and return of four remaining
Kuwaiti GTMO detainees is a priority for the GOK, reflecting
strong public pressure. Galvanized by the President's
commitment to close GTMO by the end of the year, the GOK has
put considerable effort into developing a rehabilitation
center for religious extremists, which closely follows the
Saudi model. I toured the GOK facility on June 18 and found
a rather impressive physical plant (due for completion within
two months) backed by a program of psychological and
religious counseling aimed at restoring detainees to a state
of "normalcy" within six months. The GOK maintains that it
has the legal authority to hold the detainees for six months
prior to sentencing, clearly anticipating that some or all of
the detainees will be rehabilited within this period. The
GOK also claims confidence in its ability to monitor the
detainees effectively post-release to ensure they do not
resume extremist activities. A DOD team charged with
defending one of the GTMO detainees visited the facility on
June 8 and later gave a press conference in which they
asserted the innocence of their client. The GOK will respond
angrily and publicly if the U.S. opts to release Kuwaiti
detainees to a third country, given their understanding
(apparently from their ambassador in Washington) that a
Saudi-type rehab center was the "quid pro quo" for their
return to Kuwait.
Critical Energy Infrastructure
--------------

4. (C) There are ongoing intermittent discussions between
the USG and the GoK on ways to enhance cooperation in the
area of protecting Kuwait's critical energy infrastructure.
The USG has sent two assessment teams to Kuwait to look at
areas where Kuwait can improve protection of the Shuaiba
Industrial area (Kuwait's main oil export complex).
According to the Kuwaitis, they have already addressed many
of the concerns highlighted. The GoK has also created a
Higher Coordination Committee to better coordinate the
efforts of all of the players involved in oil field
operations and security. The GoK has not yet signed an MOU
on CEIP cooperation with the USG. Currently, the hang-up is
over USG revisions to the original draft MOU that would
require the GoK to pay expenses for USG assistance. Although
the Kuwaitis are willing to pay expenses on a reciprocal
basis, they are not willing or able to pay USG salaries
(citing certain parliamentary opposition),nor are they

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interested in pre-payment. Currently, the ball is in our
court to provide the GoK with an answer as to whether their
modifications to the MOU (addressing these concerns) are
acceptable.
CT Cooperation
--------------

5. (C) Kuwait remains deficient in developing and
implementing a CT strategy, in particular on combating
terrorism financiers and facilitators, although it has taken
significant steps to detain or support the detention of known
facilitators in the past six months. Weak legislation
remains an impediment to further progress. On March 10,
2002, the Amir signed Law No. 35/2002, which criminalized
money laundering. This law does not, however, specifically
cite terrorist financing as a crime. In January 2008, the
United Nations SECURITY COUNCIL designated three Kuwaiti
terrorist facilitators, Jaber Al-Jalahmah, Mubarak Mishkhis
Sanad Al-Bathali and Hamid Al-Ali. The U.S. domestically
designated these individuals under E.O. 13224 on December 7,

2006. Kuwait subsequently froze the assets of the three. In
2008, Kuwait approached the UN 1267 Committee for permission
to unblock the salaries of the three on humanitarian grounds.
Reportedly, Al-Bathali's daughter is also blocked from
opening an account.


6. (C) The USG has engaged the Kuwaiti government for over
four years on designation of the Kuwait-based Islamic NGO
Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS),including its
overseas branch offices, under EO 13224 and UNSCR 1267. The
Government of Kuwait cooperated with the USG,s investigation
of the RIHS after the September 11, 2001 attacks,
particularly the investigations into the UNSCR 1267 branches
in Pakistan and Afghanistan However since that time,
bilateral cooperation on RIHS has been extremely limited. On
June 13, 2008 the U.S. Treasury designated RIHS under E.O.
13224 as a charity that provides financial and material
support to Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and simultaneously
pursued a UNSCR 1267 designation. The GOK continues to
oppose designation of RIHS, citing the need for "actionable
evidence," as opposed to "suggestive intelligence." Absent
such evidence, the GoK is unlikely to move on RIHS, and the
dispute has complicated other CT cooperation efforts.
Kuwaiti Concerns Over U.S. Entry Requirements
-------------- -

7. (C) Although more than 96 percent of all Kuwaiti
applicants are found eligible for visa issuance, Kuwaitis
frequently express frustration over the difficulties
encountered in seeking to enter the U.S. These complaints
tend to fall into two categories: the long wait often
required to receive a visa and NSEERS requirements.
Currently, about 30 percent of male Kuwaiti visa applicants
require a SECURITY Advisory Opinion because of a possible
match to a name in the Consular Lookout and Support System
(CLASS) database. Database names are usually vague with no
identifying information such as birth date of place of birth,
explaining the high percentage. Clearing hits requires a
wait that can take from a few weeks to a year, averaging
about four months. Most frustrating to Kuwaitis is the fact
that we are unable to provide them any information on how
long the wait will be. About 20 percent of Kuwaiti men are
subject to NSEERS (special registration when entering and
exiting the U.S.). The registration process upon arrival in
the U.S. takes an average of two hours, causing many Kuwaitis
to miss connecting flights and inconveniencing accompanying
family members as the males navigate the process. Many
Kuwaitis have complained of the difficulties in locating the
special registration offices; some have complained they were
assured by U.S. airport officials that the program had been
discontinued and then are taken to secondary inspection when
they return to the U.S. later because they have violated
NSEERS rules.
Iraq/Iran
--------------

8. (C) Relations with Iraq is a continuing SECURITY
preoccupation for the GOK. They may raise with you their
concerns over what they view as Iraq's ongoing efforts to
wriggle out of its Chapter VII obligations, insisting that
they need continued UN backing until key bilateral issues are
resolved. While there are several important bilateral issues
outstanding -- including compensation, debt, and the return
of missing persons and archives -- Kuwait is principally
concerned with getting Iraq to acknowledge publicly and
unequivocally its acceptance of the bilateral border
recognized by UNSCR 833. The U.S. is working with the UN to
ensure that this issue is resolved in a way that protects
Kuwait's interests while recognizing the new realities of a
post-Saddam Iraq.

9. (C) The GOK is watching with concern post-election
developments in Iran, but has avoided manifesting these

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concerns publicly. Overall, the Kuwaitis regard Iran as a
real threat to their SECURITY and are equally leery of U.S.
approaches that they perceive veer to either "appeasement" or
"confrontation." They worry that overly-muscular diplomacy
-- to say nothing of military action -- could heighten the
danger to Kuwait's oil-based economy or provoke attacks on
U.S. military facilities here. The GOK generally urges
dialogue with Iran as a means to advance regional stability
and also promotes close cooperation with the Russians and
Europeans as a way to convince Iran to back off its nuclear
ambitions.
Afghanistan/Pakistan
--------------

10. (C) The GOK is concerned about widening chaos in the
Afghanistan/Pakistan region but these concerns have not
caused it to open wide its purse. The GOK has made limited
donations to humanitarian and infrastructural programs in
both countries. Pledges of USD 49 million to Pakistan for
earthquake relief have been held up by SECURITY concerns that
have prevented GOK officials from traveling there to sign
papers. The GOK provided Pakistan with about USD 7.8 million
in humanitarian assistance last year through the Red
Crescent.




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For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
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JONES