SCENESETTER FOR AA/S FELTMAN VISIT TO KUWAIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000631 SIPDIS NEA/ARP, NEA/RA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV IZ IR KU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AA/S FELTMAN VISIT TO KUWAIT Classified By: A/DCM Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (C) Dear AA/S Feltman, my staff and I look forward to welcoming you to Kuwait. Your arrival comes at an interesting moment, with a newly elected National Assembly already testing the government's resolve through the "grilling" of a senior Al Sabah minister. Your visit will provide an excellent opportunity to applaud Kuwait's election of four women to parliament, thank the GOK for its ongoing generous support of OIF, and review the state of play in Iraq, Iran and the MEPP, including support for the Palestinian Authority and the situation with Syria. Your interlocutors may raise with you the status of Kuwait's four remaining Guantanamo detainees, in light of the President's decision to close that facility. Time permitting, you might urge support for stabilization and humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan/Pakistan and solicit Kuwaiti concerns about delays in its FMS program. If the White House has agreed to a date by the time of your arrival, you might also elicit the Amir's priorities in seeking a July meeting with POTUS. Kuwaiti Domestic Politics -------------- ¶2. (C) Kuwaitis will appreciate your positive acknowledgement of the fact that their May 16 parliamentary election put -- for the first time -- four highly qualified women candidates in office; Kuwaitis were disappointed that this signal event failed to obtain a mention in the President's otherwise well-regarded Cairo speech. Nothwithstanding this important achievement, fundamental tensions remain and Kuwait's political system is locked in a legislative stalemate that reflects the political emergence of tribalists as a boisterous counterpart to the old mercantile class that long dominated Kuwaiti politics. The tribalists lost little time in grilling the Interior Minister, who faces a no-confidence vote on July 1. While tribalist/Islamist influence has not directly impacted our bilateral relationship with Kuwait, this demographic's continued strength in parliament is likely to render more difficult the government's efforts to pass comprehensive CT legislation and could, as well, limit the GOK's flexibility on Iraqi financial issues. Relations With Iraq -------------- ¶3. (C) The GOK is deeply troubled by Iraq's efforts to wriggle out of its Chapter VII obligations, insisting that they need continued UN backing until the key bilateral issues are resolved. While the GOK has several concerns -- including UN Compensation Commission claims, outstanding bilateral debt, and a Kuwait Airways judgment against the GOI and Iraq Airways -- maintaining the UNSCR 833 guarantee on the inviolability of the border is paramount. Recent efforts led by UNSRSG Staffan de Mistura to reduce Iraq's heavy war reparations burden in return for PM Maliki's "acceptance" of UNSCR 833 has resurfaced Kuwaiti anxiety over Maliki's true intentions, and the readiness of the UN (and U.S.) to hew firmly to the agreed land boundary will be viewed as an important sign of our commitment to Kuwait's sovereignty and security. The GOK has hinted at flexibility in negotiating some of the compensation issues with Iraq if the border issue is resolved satisfactorily. Remaining compensation claims include USD 17 billion in loans stemming from the Iran-Iraq war and USD 27 billion in UNCC awards (including USD 3 billion in environmental compensation claims and USD 24 billion in additional UNCC awards). While it appeared earlier that the Amir may have privately agreed to settle a USD 1.3 billion judgment against the GOI related to Kuwait Airways for USD 300 million, a parliamentary backlash against public statements by the Iraqis caused the GOK to backtrack. ¶4. (C) On a more positive note, Iraq recently showed increased willingness to cooperate with Tripartite Commission efforts to locate and return the remains of Kuwaiti missing persons from the 1990 invasion. Meanwhile, Kuwait continues to sell fuel oil to Iraq for use in power plants and has committed to send money to help the Iraqis deal with environmental remediation. Iran -------------- ¶5. (C) The GOK is watching with concern post-election developments in Iran, but has avoided manifesting these concerns publicly. Overall, the Kuwaitis regard Iran as a real threat to their security and are equally leery of U.S. approaches that they perceive veer to either "appeasement" or "confrontation." They worry that over-muscular diplomacy, to say nothing of military action, will only heighten the danger to Kuwait's oil-based economy and could provoke Iranian attacks on U.S. military facilities here. The GOK frequently urges interlocutors to emphasize dialogue with Iran as a means to advance regional stability and has urged close cooperation with the Russians and Europeans to convince Iran to back away from its nuclear ambitions to avert putting the region at risk of a conflict. As a small, relatively weak KUWAIT 00000631 002 OF 003 country, Kuwait looks to the U.S. as its protector, but also works energetically to consolidate ties with Saudi Arabi and the GCC States, which it views as a Sunni-domninated counter-weight to expanding Iranian influence, as evidenced by a growing Hizbollah presence throughout the region. MEPP -------------- ¶6. (C) The GOK has been a generally helpful interlocutor on Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts, backing the Palestine Authority and President Abbas, the Quartet Principles and the Arab Peace Plan; it routinely advocates moderation in Arab League discussions. While the GOK backs the PA vice Hamas, some Kuwaiti MPs voiced their support for HAMAS during Israel's December incursion into Gaza. GOK interlocutors have told us they were deeply inspired by the President's recent Cairo speech and feel this will inject new vigor into GOK and other AL support for the peace process and the Arab Peace Initiative. GOK pledged support to the Palestinians has been generous. Present GOK Palestinian aid commitments include USD 220 million remaining from a USD 300 million Paris Donors Conference pledge from 2007, a USD 34 million UNRWA pledge from the January 2009 Arab Economic Summit, and USD 200 million from the March 2009 Sharm Al-Sheikh donors conference. GOK officials have stressed they will not fund Hamas; they have have also strongly expressed their preference not to provide budgetary support to the PA. They frequently have urged U.S. normalization of relations with Syria as a means of weaning it away from Iran and into the moderate "peace camp." GTMO Detainees -------------- ¶7. (C) Obtaining the return of the four remaining Kuwaiti Guantanamo detainees has been raised at every senior bilateral meeting in recent years, reflecting strong public pressure on the GOK. Galvanized by the President's commitment to close GTMO by the end of the year, the GOK has put considerable effort into developing a rehabilitation center for religious extremists, which closely follows the Saudi model. I toured the GOK facility on June 18 and found a rather impressive physical plant (due for completion within two months) backed by a program of psychological and religious counseling aimed at restoring detainees to a state of "normalcy" within six months. The GOK maintains that it has the legal authority to hold the detainees for six months prior to sentencing, clearly anticipating that some or all of the detainees will be rehabilitated within this period. The GOK also claims confidence in its ability to monitor the detainees effectively post-release to ensure they do not resume extremist activities. A DOD team charged with defending one of the GTMO detainees visited the facility on June 8 and later gave a press conference in which they asserted the innocence of their client. The GOK will respond angrily and publicly if the U.S. opts to release Kuwaiti detainees to a third country, given their understanding (apparently from their ambassador in Washington) that a Saudi-type rehab center was the "quid pro quo" for their return to Kuwait. Afghanistan/Pakistan -------------- ¶8. (C) While the GOK has expressed its concern about widening chaos in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region (the PM characterized Pakistan as an "anarchic state ruled by a weak president" in a January meeting with VP-elect Biden),it has not rushed to unzip its purse. For Afghanistan, the GOK disbursed USD 15 million for road building from a USD 30 million pledge made at the 2002 Tokyo Donors Conference and deposited the other USD 15 million in to the UN trust fund; in 2008 it provided about USD 460,000 in humanitarian aid, including food and medical equipment. The Kuwait Fund no longer provides loans to Afghanistan due to arrearages on USD 22 million loan from 1977. Our approaches requesting support to sustain and expand the Afghan National Army have resulted only in promises that the GOK would study the issue. On Pakistan, the GOK pledged around USD 49 million for Pakistan support at the 2009 Tokyo Donors Conference, but the GOK subequently told us that the donation referred to funds previously allocated for earthquake relief from the Kuwait Fund. The money is presently tied up due to security concerns that have prevented GOK officials from traveling to Pakistan to sign papers. The GOK provided Pakistan with about USD 7.8 million in humanitarian assistance last year through the Red Crescent. Embassy has raised with the GOK the possibility of assistance for IDPs, so far without result. FM Sales -------------- ¶9. (C) The GOK is frustrated over the amount of time it takes to process FMS sales through the U.S. bureaucracy; their ire is focused particularly on the glacially slow initial approval process. Currently, completion of two major FMS KUWAIT 00000631 003 OF 003 packages worth a total of about USD two billion (sale of KC-130J aircraft and upgrades of 250 Kuwaiti-owned Desert Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicles),are stalled. The packet for the KC-130J aircraft is now in the State Department in a pre-consultative phase pending submission for Congressional Notification. The Desert Warrior vehicle case was submitted for Congressional Notification in February, but the process has not yet been completed. Our OMCK shares the GOK's frustration over the amount of time that these cases have been pending and believes that it is essential to obtain movement on these items soon to demonstrate to the GOK our continued interest in them as an FMS partner and ally. OMCK's position is that State needs to prod Congress to speed up the CN process on these items. TIP --- ¶10. (C) The GOK has expressed displeasure at finding itself, once again, in Tier III following the recent release of our annual TIP report. At heart, however, and despite its protestations that the report does not reflect Kuwait's recent efforts to step up the fight against TIP the GOK knows (and privately acknowledges) that it has some homework to do. We have encouraged the GOK to focus on the following areas to improve its performance: passage of a comprehensive TIP law; building a large shelter for victims; step up prosecutions on TIP-type offenses; and training a cadre of law enforcement officials and social workers on TIP issues. While the GOK may be able to meet these requirements over time, there is no likelihood it will be able to take sufficient action within sixty days in order to qualify for a Tier II watchlist. Possible Meeting With POTUS -------------- ¶11. (C) We continue to await Washington's response to the Amir's request for a meeting with POTUS in late July. We understand the Amir wishes to engage on his economic vision for the broader Near East region, as outlined during the ill-fated Arab Economic Summit hosted by Kuwait in January (and nearly derailed by internal AL squabbling over approaches to the MEPP and Iran). He may also seek assurances of our continued commitment to Kuwait's sovereignty and security in light of Iraq's Chapter VII efforts and the planned USG military withdrawal by August 2011, and share Kuwait's concerns over Iranian behavior. He will almost certainly raise the return of Kuwait's four remaining GTMO detainees. ********************************************* ********* For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: visit Kuwait's Classified Website at: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it ********************************************* ********* JONES