SCENESETTER FOR AA/S FELTMAN VISIT TO KUWAIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000631

SIPDIS

NEA/ARP, NEA/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV IZ IR KU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AA/S FELTMAN VISIT TO KUWAIT

Classified By: A/DCM Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) Dear AA/S Feltman, my staff and I look forward to
welcoming you to Kuwait. Your arrival comes at an interesting
moment, with a newly elected National Assembly already
testing the government's resolve through the "grilling" of a
senior Al Sabah minister. Your visit will provide an
excellent opportunity to applaud Kuwait's election of four
women to parliament, thank the GOK for its ongoing generous
support of OIF, and review the state of play in Iraq, Iran
and the MEPP, including support for the Palestinian Authority
and the situation with Syria. Your interlocutors may raise
with you the status of Kuwait's four remaining Guantanamo
detainees, in light of the President's decision to close that
facility. Time permitting, you might urge support for
stabilization and humanitarian efforts in
Afghanistan/Pakistan and solicit Kuwaiti concerns about
delays in its FMS program. If the White House has agreed to
a date by the time of your arrival, you might also elicit the
Amir's priorities in seeking a July meeting with POTUS.
Kuwaiti Domestic Politics
--------------

2. (C) Kuwaitis will appreciate your positive acknowledgement
of the fact that their May 16 parliamentary election put --
for the first time -- four highly qualified women candidates
in office; Kuwaitis were disappointed that this signal event
failed to obtain a mention in the President's otherwise
well-regarded Cairo speech. Nothwithstanding this important
achievement, fundamental tensions remain and Kuwait's
political system is locked in a legislative stalemate that
reflects the political emergence of tribalists as a
boisterous counterpart to the old mercantile class that long
dominated Kuwaiti politics. The tribalists lost little time
in grilling the Interior Minister, who faces a no-confidence
vote on July 1. While tribalist/Islamist influence has not
directly impacted our bilateral relationship with Kuwait,
this demographic's continued strength in parliament is likely
to render more difficult the government's efforts to pass
comprehensive CT legislation and could, as well, limit the
GOK's flexibility on Iraqi financial issues.
Relations With Iraq
--------------

3. (C) The GOK is deeply troubled by Iraq's efforts to
wriggle out of its Chapter VII obligations, insisting that
they need continued UN backing until the key bilateral issues
are resolved. While the GOK has several concerns --
including UN Compensation Commission claims, outstanding
bilateral debt, and a Kuwait Airways judgment against the GOI
and Iraq Airways -- maintaining the UNSCR 833 guarantee on
the inviolability of the border is paramount. Recent efforts
led by UNSRSG Staffan de Mistura to reduce Iraq's heavy war
reparations burden in return for PM Maliki's "acceptance" of
UNSCR 833 has resurfaced Kuwaiti anxiety over Maliki's true
intentions, and the readiness of the UN (and U.S.) to hew
firmly to the agreed land boundary will be viewed as an
important sign of our commitment to Kuwait's sovereignty and
security. The GOK has hinted at flexibility in negotiating
some of the compensation issues with Iraq if the border issue
is resolved satisfactorily. Remaining compensation claims
include USD 17 billion in loans stemming from the Iran-Iraq
war and USD 27 billion in UNCC awards (including USD 3
billion in environmental compensation claims and USD 24
billion in additional UNCC awards). While it appeared
earlier that the Amir may have privately agreed to settle a
USD 1.3 billion judgment against the GOI related to Kuwait
Airways for USD 300 million, a parliamentary backlash against
public statements by the Iraqis caused the GOK to backtrack.

4. (C) On a more positive note, Iraq recently showed
increased willingness to cooperate with Tripartite Commission
efforts to locate and return the remains of Kuwaiti missing
persons from the 1990 invasion. Meanwhile, Kuwait continues
to sell fuel oil to Iraq for use in power plants and has
committed to send money to help the Iraqis deal with
environmental remediation.
Iran
--------------

5. (C) The GOK is watching with concern post-election
developments in Iran, but has avoided manifesting these
concerns publicly. Overall, the Kuwaitis regard Iran as a
real threat to their security and are equally leery of U.S.
approaches that they perceive veer to either "appeasement" or
"confrontation." They worry that over-muscular diplomacy, to
say nothing of military action, will only heighten the danger
to Kuwait's oil-based economy and could provoke Iranian
attacks on U.S. military facilities here. The GOK frequently
urges interlocutors to emphasize dialogue with Iran as a
means to advance regional stability and has urged close
cooperation with the Russians and Europeans to convince Iran
to back away from its nuclear ambitions to avert putting the
region at risk of a conflict. As a small, relatively weak

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country, Kuwait looks to the U.S. as its protector, but also
works energetically to consolidate ties with Saudi Arabi and
the GCC States, which it views as a Sunni-domninated
counter-weight to expanding Iranian influence, as evidenced
by a growing Hizbollah presence throughout the region.
MEPP
--------------

6. (C) The GOK has been a generally helpful interlocutor on
Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts, backing the Palestine
Authority and President Abbas, the Quartet Principles and the
Arab Peace Plan; it routinely advocates moderation in Arab
League discussions. While the GOK backs the PA vice Hamas,
some Kuwaiti MPs voiced their support for Hamas during
Israel's December incursion into Gaza. GOK interlocutors
have told us they were deeply inspired by the President's
recent Cairo speech and feel this will inject new vigor into
GOK and other AL support for the peace process and the Arab
Peace Initiative. GOK pledged support to the Palestinians
has been generous. Present GOK Palestinian aid commitments
include USD 220 million remaining from a USD 300 million
Paris Donors Conference pledge from 2007, a USD 34 million
UNRWA pledge from the January 2009 Arab Economic Summit, and
USD 200 million from the March 2009 Sharm Al-Sheikh donors
conference. GOK officials have stressed they will not fund
Hamas; they have have also strongly expressed their
preference not to provide budgetary support to the PA. They
frequently have urged U.S. normalization of relations with
Syria as a means of weaning it away from Iran and into the
moderate "peace camp."
GTMO Detainees
--------------

7. (C) Obtaining the return of the four remaining Kuwaiti
Guantanamo detainees has been raised at every senior
bilateral meeting in recent years, reflecting strong public
pressure on the GOK. Galvanized by the President's
commitment to close GTMO by the end of the year, the GOK has
put considerable effort into developing a rehabilitation
center for religious extremists, which closely follows the
Saudi model. I toured the GOK facility on June 18 and found
a rather impressive physical plant (due for completion within
two months) backed by a program of psychological and
religious counseling aimed at restoring detainees to a state
of "normalcy" within six months. The GOK maintains that it
has the legal authority to hold the detainees for six months
prior to sentencing, clearly anticipating that some or all of
the detainees will be rehabilitated within this period. The
GOK also claims confidence in its ability to monitor the
detainees effectively post-release to ensure they do not
resume extremist activities. A DOD team charged with
defending one of the GTMO detainees visited the facility on
June 8 and later gave a press conference in which they
asserted the innocence of their client. The GOK will respond
angrily and publicly if the U.S. opts to release Kuwaiti
detainees to a third country, given their understanding
(apparently from their ambassador in Washington) that a
Saudi-type rehab center was the "quid pro quo" for their
return to Kuwait.
Afghanistan/Pakistan
--------------

8. (C) While the GOK has expressed its concern about widening
chaos in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region (the PM
characterized Pakistan as an "anarchic state ruled by a weak
president" in a January meeting with VP-elect Biden),it has
not rushed to unzip its purse. For Afghanistan, the GOK
disbursed USD 15 million for road building from a USD 30
million pledge made at the 2002 Tokyo Donors Conference and
deposited the other USD 15 million in to the UN trust fund;
in 2008 it provided about USD 460,000 in humanitarian aid,
including food and medical equipment. The Kuwait Fund no
longer provides loans to Afghanistan due to arrearages on USD
22 million loan from 1977. Our approaches requesting support
to sustain and expand the Afghan National Army have resulted
only in promises that the GOK would study the issue. On
Pakistan, the GOK pledged around USD 49 million for Pakistan
support at the 2009 Tokyo Donors Conference, but the GOK
subequently told us that the donation referred to funds
previously allocated for earthquake relief from the Kuwait
Fund. The money is presently tied up due to security
concerns that have prevented GOK officials from traveling to
Pakistan to sign papers. The GOK provided Pakistan with
about USD 7.8 million in humanitarian assistance last year
through the Red Crescent. Embassy has raised with the GOK
the possibility of assistance for IDPs, so far without
result.
FM Sales
--------------

9. (C) The GOK is frustrated over the amount of time it takes
to process FMS sales through the U.S. bureaucracy; their ire
is focused particularly on the glacially slow initial
approval process. Currently, completion of two major FMS

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packages worth a total of about USD two billion (sale of
KC-130J aircraft and upgrades of 250 Kuwaiti-owned Desert
Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicles),are stalled. The packet
for the KC-130J aircraft is NOW in the State Department in a
pre-consultative phase pending submission for Congressional
Notification. The Desert Warrior vehicle case was submitted
for Congressional Notification in February, but the process
has not yet been completed. Our OMCK shares the GOK's
frustration over the amount of time that these cases have
been pending and believes that it is essential to obtain
movement on these items soon to demonstrate to the GOK our
continued interest in them as an FMS partner and ally.
OMCK's position is that State needs to prod Congress to speed
up the CN process on these items.
TIP
---

10. (C) The GOK has expressed displeasure at finding itself,
once again, in Tier III following the recent release of our
annual TIP report. At heart, however, and despite its
protestations that the report does not reflect Kuwait's
recent efforts to step up the fight against TIP the GOK knows
(and privately acknowledges) that it has some homework to do.
We have encouraged the GOK to focus on the following areas
to improve its performance: passage of a comprehensive TIP
law; building a large shelter for victims; step up
prosecutions on TIP-type offenses; and training a cadre of
law enforcement officials and social workers on TIP issues.
While the GOK may be able to meet these requirements over
time, there is no likelihood it will be able to take
sufficient action within sixty days in order to qualify for a
Tier II watchlist.
Possible Meeting With POTUS
--------------

11. (C) We continue to await Washington's response to the
Amir's request for a meeting with POTUS in late July. We
understand the Amir wishes to engage on his economic vision
for the broader Near East region, as outlined during the
ill-fated Arab Economic Summit hosted by Kuwait in January
(and nearly derailed by internal AL squabbling over
approaches to the MEPP and Iran). He may also seek
assurances of our continued commitment to Kuwait's
sovereignty and security in light of Iraq's Chapter VII
efforts and the planned USG military withdrawal by August
2011, and share Kuwait's concerns over Iranian behavior. He
will almost certainly raise the return of Kuwait's four
remaining GTMO detainees.






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For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
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JONES