Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KUWAIT497
2009-05-17 14:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

KUWAIT ANGLE ON REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR

Tags:  PREL PGOV KU IZ 
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VZCZCXRO6316
PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0497/01 1371440
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171440Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3341
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1426
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000497 

SIPDIS

NEA/ARP, NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KU IZ
SUBJECT: KUWAIT ANGLE ON REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR
IRAQ

REF: A. STATE 48144

B. KUWAIT 125

C. KUWAIT 349

D. KUWAIT 462

Classified By: Political Counselor Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and
d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000497

SIPDIS

NEA/ARP, NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KU IZ
SUBJECT: KUWAIT ANGLE ON REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR
IRAQ

REF: A. STATE 48144

B. KUWAIT 125

C. KUWAIT 349

D. KUWAIT 462

Classified By: Political Counselor Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and
d


1. (C) Embassy read with interest ref A discussion of a new
diplomatic strategy aimed at securing Iraq's future political
stability through an enhanced process of regional
integration, including stronger bilateral ties between Iraq
and key states. Kuwait's decision to send an Ambassador to
Baghdad in October 2008, followed by an exchange of
high-level visits in early 2009 (ref B) sparked optimism that
the long freeze in official Kuwait - Iraq relations was
experiencing a thaw. While these tentative steps set the
stage for improved future bilateral cooperation, a reportedly
terse exchange over the border issue between Kuwait's Amir
and PM Maliki at the April 4 Doha Summit (ref C) -- combined
with the dissolution of Kuwait's government and parliament in
mid-March pending elections on May 16 -- have undermined
bilateral progress. Overall, the GOK remains deeply
frustrated by what it perceives to be Iraq's intransigence on
a host of issues stemming from Iraq's 1990 invasion,
including boundary demarcation, compensation, debt and the
return of missing persons and archives. It is also troubled
by Iraq's failure to reciprocate Kuwait's gesture of sending
an ambassador to Baghdad.


2. (C) Notwithstanding halting progress on resolving the
leading bilateral issues, Kuwait and Iraq have exchanged a
number of bilateral working-level visits in recent months on
energy, property and debt issues. Kuwait has been providing
approximately one million liters per day of fuel oil to
Iraq's Southern Oil Marketing Organization for use in the
generation of electricity in Iraq and, according to Kuwait's
Ambassador to Iraq, there has been some progress on
negotiating MOUs on bilateral education, cultural and medical
exchanges (ref D). The GOK anticipates -- pending movement
on key issues -- sending its Prime Minister (to be named
following the May 16 elections) to Baghdad in coming months
and views signature of these MOUs as a possible deliverable.
From the GOK side, there is a strong desire to expand and
improve bilateral relations with Iraq and, in its view, it
has made efforts to be proactive, as in its underwriting
funding through a UN-managed account for the construction of
new housing for the resettlement for Iraqi farm families
currently living in houses that encroach on the Kuwait border
and also offering to fund improvements to Iraqi facilities at
the Safwan border crossing to expedite the transit of goods.

As Kuwaitis frequently note, "We offer, and Iraq refuses to
accept the check."


3. (C) Given its desire to ensure Iraq's evolution as a
stable, responsible and non-aggressive neighbor, the GOK
would likely respond positively, even to the point of hosting
a carefully-considered multilateral process that could serve
the function of reining Iraq in, but would be leery about its
inclusion in processes that, given its relative size, Iraq
might come to dominate. For this reason, the GOK has been
responsive to inclusion of Iraq in the GCC 3 process, but
would resist for the foreseeable future Iraq's inclusion in
the GCC itself. There are few existing examples of
multilateral processes that include both Kuwait and Iraq; one
exception is the participation of both countries in the
Tripartite Commission (together with the ICRC, US, France,
Britain, and SAUDI Arabia) aimed at recovering the remains of
missing persons from the 1990 Gulf War. In the GOK view,
Iraq's participation in this body has been, thus far,
frustratingly recalcitrant.


4. (C) The following responds to queries raised in ref A,
para 12:

-- Question: In what issue areas is the host government
already engaging in bilateral and/or multilateral discussions
on functional issues (water, energy security, refugees,
border security, health, education, etc) with other countries
in the region, regional and international organizations, and
NGOs and other private sector actors like foundations and
philanthropic organizations?

-- Response: The GOK engages in working-level bilateral
technical discussions with Iraq on oil/energy issues and on
border security and the maintenance (under UN auspices) of
border markers. There are also periodic bilateral
engagements and exchanges aimed at improving naval

KUWAIT 00000497 002 OF 003


cooperation on ship movements and security within the Khor Al
Abdullah waterway, under U.S. NAVCENT auspices. Kuwait is the
first country in the region to have signed a security
agreement with NATO and to have participated in a joint naval
exercise. While turmoil within Kuwait's military has
prevented further initiatives, a future expanded relationship
with NATO might create opportunities for engagement with
Iraq. Kuwait and Iraq have discussed possible MOUs on
cultural, medical and educational exchanges. Kuwait and Iraq
both participate in the Tripartite Commission aimed at
recovering the remains of persons missing from Iraq's 1990
invasion of Kuwait.

-- Question: From the host country's perspective, which of
these groups are working effectively to produce joint action
to solve common problems, and which are largely talk shops
that have not produced and are unlikely to produce concrete
outcomes? Are there best practices in this area that could
serve as a model for other taskforces -- or lessons learned,
both positive and negative -- from previous experience that
should inform the Department's thinking?

-- Response: From the GOK's perspective, the GCC has been
effective on issues related to movement of goods and member
citizens between the GCC countries, e.g. the establishment of
a GCC identification card which allows visa free travel
between GCC countries for residents, and the establishment of
a GCC customs agreement for movement of goods between GCC
member states. The GCC is establishing a joint power grid
aimed at increasing overall electricity generation and
allowing the cross border movement of electricity to
alleviate seasonal shortages. The members are also pursuing
the establishment of a common currency and GCC central bank
to further facilitate trade. In contrast, the Tripartite
Commission (on the return of missing persons) has produced,
thus far, minimal results but is worth continuing in the
hopes of eventual results responding to a politically
sensitive domestic issue. Other bilateral dialogue has taken
place on a government-to-government basis on the full range
of bilateral issues, at both senior and technical levels.
These discussions have produced, at best, incremental
progress on advancing the bilateral relationship. There are
no "best practices" to be cited; the GOK's mode of
interaction with Iraq is based on patient dialogue and
non-confrontation. The challenge, from Kuwait's perspective,
is identifying an empowered Iraqi interlocutor;
unfortunately, it often appears to them that PM Maliki alone
fits that description.

-- Question: Where would the host government see gaps in the
capacity of existing multilateral arrangements to agree on
regional solutions to regional problems? Are there any
specific functional issues for which the host government
would support the formation of ad hoc multilateral task
forces? Are there subjects where host country would serve as
a natural leader?

-- Response: The GOK views as weak the capacity of existing
multilateral arrangements to produce regional solutions to
regional problems insofar as they involve Iraq. Embassy is
unaware of any specific functional issues involving Iraq for
which the GOK would support the formation of an ad hoc
multilateral task force. Given its small size and difficult
geographical position, the GOK is unlikely to serve as a
natural regional leader on any multilateral issues focused on
Iraq.

-- Question: What other stakeholders -- countries within and
outside the region, including the U.S. and regional,
international and non-governmental organizations -- would the
host government want to include in these discussions? What
kind of U.S. role would host country feel would be
useful/acceptable in such fora?

-- Response: In general, the GOK would welcome and encourage
broad multilateral engagement, to include the GCC, UN and
leading European countries (France, UK, Germany and Russia),
in Iraq's reconstruction and in ensuring Iraq's development
as a non-threatening neighbor. The GOK will view the U.S.
role in such an effort as indispensable, including on a
long-term basis.

-- Question: From the Embassy's lens, are there any specific
functional issues, such as water, the environment, health, or
education that might be ripe for an early harvest -- i.e.,
good candidates for pilot projects to prove the value of new
regional networks that would empower countries to reach
multilateral solutions to functional, transnational problems?

KUWAIT 00000497 003 OF 003



-- Response: In view of Iraq's need for increased
electricity generation and its link to the GCC through the
GCC 3 mechanism, it might be worth exploring possible Iraqi
participation in the new GCC power grid project. Kuwait and
Iraq have had initial discussions on joint operation of cross
border oil fields along the lines of the Kuwaiti-Saudi joint
operation agreement in the shared Neutral Zone. Support for
and invigoration of these efforts might serve multiple goals,
including improving bilateral cooperation, furthering both
countries' goals of expanding domestic oil production
capacity, removing a potential flashpoint issue, and opening
a window of opportunity for U.S. energy and oil company
participation in two challenging markets. In addition,
Kuwait has extensive expertise on water management, including
desalination and waste water treatment. It also has
extensive environmental experience related to its clean-up of
oil field damage incurred during the 1990 Iraqi invasion.
Kuwait also has extensive and relatively advanced health and
education systems. The GOK and GOI have already discussed
possible exchanges in the health, culture and education
sectors. Under the proper circumstances, the GOK might be
prepared to support the involvement of environment, health,
water management or education experts in bilateral or
multilateral fora.

-- Question: What other sensitivities would the host
government have in terms of membership (Iran, Israel, Iraq)
etc?

-- Response: The GOK would decline to join any multilateral
processes that included Israel, and would be leery about
Iranian participation in processes that dealt with security
or which appeared to open the door to increased Iranian
cultural, political or religious influence in the region.

-- Question: What functional issues or organizational
arrangements would best encourage host governments to expand
membership as comprehensively as possible (including Iran,
Israel, Iraq, etc)?

-- Response: The GOK views existing multilateral
arrangements (UN, IAEA, GCC) as sufficient for dealing with
the bulk of regional issues and is not likely to welcome the
expansion or creation of new instruments, particularly if
they include Israel or Iran.

-- Question: What would be an effective diplomatic
engagement strategy for us to advance such a concept in the
region, and in particular, with your host government?

-- Response: Intensive, personal engagement by senior USG
officials backed by long-term assurances of U.S. support for
Kuwait's security, sovereignty and territorial integrity.








********************************************* *********
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
********************************************* *********
JONES

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