Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KUWAIT462
2009-05-07 14:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

KUWAIT'S AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ DESCRIBES SLOW

Tags:  PREL KU IZ 
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VZCZCXRO8831
PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0462 1271443
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071443Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3305
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1420
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 000462 

SIPDIS

NEA/ARP, NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018
TAGS: PREL KU IZ
SUBJECT: KUWAIT'S AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ DESCRIBES SLOW
PROGRESS; HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS CENTER TO CLOSE

REF: KUWAIT 349

Classified By: Political Counselor Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and
d

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 000462 SIPDIS NEA/ARP, NEA/I E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018 TAGS: PREL KU IZ SUBJECT: KUWAIT'S AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ DESCRIBES SLOW PROGRESS; HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS CENTER TO CLOSE REF: KUWAIT 349 Classified By: Political Counselor Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and d ¶1. (C) During a May 4 call by POLCOUNS and Econoff on Ambassador Ali Al-Mou'min, Kuwait's Ambassador to Iraq, Al-Mou'min said that he has made progress in getting his mission up and running, but remains frustrated at the difficulty in getting his Iraqi counterparts to come to grips with the main items on the bilateral agenda. As described by Al-Mou'min, his Iraqi interlocutors are generally positive and encouraging during meetings on bilateral topics, but invariably fail to provide concrete responses when it comes to the "how and when." Al-Mou'min noted as an example the GOI's failure to follow up on GOK offers to finance an upgrade to the Safwan border crossing point on the Iraq side to speed up the passage of truck convoys. Complaining that "we give and they won't take," Al-Mou'min cited repeated delays and confusion emanating from the GOI side, even when the GOI is a clear beneficiary. Notwithstanding his evident frustration, Al-Mou'min expressed optimism about the prospects for signing a bilateral MOU covering a number of less contentious items that have been discussed by commissions from both sides, including cultural exchanges, medicine, and education. Al-Mou'min said he anticipated such an MOU could be signed during an eventual visit to Baghdad by Kuwait's Prime Minister (who will be named following May 16 parliamentary elections here). Al-Mou'min plans to return to Baghdad immediately following the elections. ¶2. (C) Al-Mou'min appeared mildly upbeat about his overall efforts to re-establish his mission in Baghdad. He reported that the overall security picture was somewhat improved in Iraq, notwithstanding recent bomb attacks, and that his Iraqi police escorts were more attentive in recent weeks, following earlier death threats against him. Despite the improved security, Al-Mou'min said that he had made only one recent trip outside Baghdad (to Irbil). He noted that he has been able to move back and forth between Kuwait and Baghdad efficiently in recent months using UNAMI or Skylink charter flights. In reponse to a query from Emboffs, Al-Mou'min said there are no plans to re-establish regular commercial flights between the capitals by the two countries' signature airlines. ¶3. (C) Al-Mou'min confirmed reports that the Kuwait-based Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC),which he has long headed, will end operations on June 31. The decision, he said, was made by the MFA on the grounds that, since both countries have missions in each other's capitals, the HOC is no longer needed. He said the present responsibilities of the HOC -- coordination of NGO assistance activities in Iraq and the movement of injured Iraqis to medical facilities overseas -- will likely fall to the Kuwaiti MFA's International Organizations department. Al-Mou'min frankly regretted the decision and doubted the MFA would have the capacity to do the job effectively. ¶4. (C) Comment: While Al-Mou'min always projects an upbeat, somewhat distracted attitude, he was candid about his continuing frustration over the difficulty of identifying GOI interlocutors empowered to make decisions. At the same time, we were struck by the fact that Al-Mou'min's own government seems to be keeping him in the dark on important bilateral issues. Al-Mou'min said, for example, that he was unaware of the travel to Baghdad last week of a Kuwaiti commission to discuss joint management of oil fields that was announced in the Kuwaiti press. More tellingly, he said MFA had never briefed him on the outcome of the April 4 Doha Summit, where Kuwait's Amir reportedly had a tense exchange with Iraqi PM Maliki (reftel). The picture suggests that the GOK is content to allow Al-Mou'min to re-establish a Kuwaiti presence in Baghdad, but does not intend to use him for now as a point man on major policy issues. ********************************************* ********* For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: visit Kuwait's Classified Website at: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it ********************************************* ********* JONES

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