MFA ARAB AFFAIRS DIRECTOR ON IRAN, SYRIA, PEACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000233 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/IPA, NEA/RA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2019 TAGS: PREL KPAL PTER ECON KU SUBJECT: MFA ARAB AFFAIRS DIRECTOR ON IRAN, SYRIA, PEACE PROCESS, AND US FOREIGN POLICY REF: A. STATE 21447 ¶B. STATE 20919 ¶C. KUWAIT 87 ¶D. KUWAIT 54 Classified By: EconCouns Oliver John for reasons 1.4 (b & d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On March 10, the director of the MFA's Arab World Department, Ambassador Jassim Al-Mubaraki told EconCouns and Econoff that he was impressed with the foreign policy steps of the Obama administration, particularly its willingness to start dialogue with Syria. It was critical to counter Iranian influence, he noted. Mubaraki also stressed that Israeli settlement building was "destroying" chances for peace and urged the USG to put pressure on the Israelis to stop settlement expansion and to take the two state solution seriously. Moderate Arab states were coming under increasing pressure to abandon the Arab Peace Initiative, he noted, although the Saudis had come to an agreement with Syria to keep it "on the table" until the end of the year. He added that he would be travelling to Syria in the next few days for a meeting of Arab states on the initiative. End Summary. Pull Syria from Iran's Orbit -------------- ¶2. (C) Mubaraki started the conversation by highlighting, what he described as, the positive changes in U.S. policies toward the region, specifically praising the U.S. decision to begin talks with Syria. Although Kuwait had its own problems with Syria, particularly its relationship with Iran, he thought dialogue was a useful exercise. Syria and Iran, he stressed were not ideological soul mates, but had an opportunistic relationship, with Syria playing the Iran card and Iran "busy" everywhere. EconCouns, drawing from ref b guidance, stressed that the USG continued to have serious concerns about Syria's actions and the threat it posed to the region and that dialogue was a tool to address our concerns. Mubaraki acknowledged the concerns, but welcomed the tactical shift. Iran is the threat -------------- ¶3. (C) Mubaraki stressed that the Iranian government was using its oil wealth to "interfere" everywhere, and that Iranian leaders had ambitions to become a superpower. Unfortunately, they were ignoring the legitimate needs of the Iranian people. The historical example the Iranians needed to consider, he suggested, was the Soviet Union. It was a superpower, but in the end it could not compete economically with the U.S. The same economic collapse would befall Iran in time. ¶4. (C) Mubaraki opined that neither Hezbollah nor Hamas were really concerned about the plight of the Lebanese or the Palestinians, but were Iranian proxies. That said, however, he denied that either posed a real threat to Israel. Hezbollah, he argued, threatened Lebanon and its stability. He noted that he would be meeting the head of Lebanese Armed Forces Samir Geagea for lunch later that day and hoped to hear his views on the situation in Lebanon. As for Hamas, he argued, it threatened Egypt's security rather than Israel's, noting the strong Muslim Brotherhood support for Hamas. As an aside, he bemoaned what he described as Kuwait's own small base of support for Hamas, citing MPs Nasser Al-Sane and Walid Al-Tabtabaei. He sharply criticized Tabtabae's excursion to Gaza for "a photo opportunity" and expressed regret that the "Egyptians hadn't put him in jail." Need to pressure Israel on peace -------------- ¶5. (C) None of this, Mubaraki argued, altered the centrality of the land for peace equation. Israel still occupied the Golan Heights and the West Bank and Gaza and needed to withdraw. It continued to build and expand settlements in violation of its agreements and international law. U.S. statements were welcome, but the administration needed to pressure the Israelis to demonstrate seriousness. Mubaraki noted that the moderate Arab states were coming under heavy pressure to back away from the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, noting the difficulties they faced in the run up to the Arab Economic Summit (in Kuwait) to preserve a common Arab strategy. He said that he had been up with the Arab League Secretary General and others until three or four in the morning trying to prevent countries from going to Doha "to KUWAIT 00000233 002 OF 002 meet with Ahmedinajad." ¶6. (C) Arab moderates did not "want to send a negative message" to the incoming Obama administration, but needed to see serious steps toward resolving the issue: "not just statements, but pressure on the Israelis." According to Mubaraki, the Saudis and Syrians had agreed that the Arab Peace Initiative could remain on the table until the end of the year. He added that he would be travelling to Syria in the next few days to look at what might come next. He stressed that Israeli actions were undercutting the moderates in the Arab world and strengthening the radicals. As long as there is no solution, he stressed, Iran, Hamas and Hizbollah will benefit and be strengthened. Iran is the "author" of Hizbollah but innocent people are being punished. Iran as a domestic threat. -------------- ¶7. (C) In response to EconCouns' question about Iranian activities in Kuwait, Mubaraki opined "they are active," but Kuwait was not currently a high Iranian priority. There were a number of reasons for this, he believed. Shia were a minority in Kuwait, unlike in Bahrain. In addition, most Kuwaiti Shia were "not poor" and were relatively well represented in the government, military, and parliament, so they had fewer grievances. In addition, he noted, they had been allowed to practice their own religious beliefs relatively freely, highlighting the large numbers of "Husseiniyas" (Shia prayer halls) in Kuwait. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Mubaraki's views -- critical on Hamas, Hezbollah, and Israel -- certainly match those of many in Kuwait. It is also clear that he shares his countrymen's concerns about Iranian influence and ambitions and views many of the troubles in the region through that lens. He is a generally open and friendly interlocutor, whose comments were meant to encourage rather than to criticize. End comment. ********************************************* ********* For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: visit Kuwait's Classified Website at: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it ********************************************* ********* JONES