KUWAITI MINDEF GREENLIGHTS KC130J SALES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001119 NOFORN SIPDIS NEA/ARP, NEA/RA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MARR KU SUBJECT: KUWAITI MINDEF GREENLIGHTS KC130J SALES Classified By: Political Counselor Pete O'Donohue for reasons 1.4 b and d Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Kuwaiti MinDef Shaykh Jaber Al-Mubarak Al-Hamad Al Sabah conveyed to Ambassador on November 23 his support for the long-delayed Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for the purchase of the KC130J aircraft. He attributed the delays in signing the LOA to bureaucratic and budgetary processes within the Kuwaiti Ministry of Finance and downplayed concerns that it would not be signed eventually. The very cordial meeting, in which the MinDef confirmed Kuwaiti strong commitment to the bilateral defense relationship, afforded Ambassador an opportunity to pitch C-17 and F-35 sales as well. End summary. Advancing KC130J Sales -------------- ¶2. (C) In pressing for the signing of the long-delayed LOA for the foreign military sale (FMS) of the six KC-130Js and associated training, support, and equipment, Ambassador stressed to the MinDef that the KC130J would serve as a vital component of Kuwait's strategic arsenal. She welcomed Kuwaiti consideration of non-USG equipment -- a nod to Kuwaiti deliberations over French Rafale purchases -- but advised the GOK to consider all the associated costs for maintenance and support, as well as the critical issue of interoperability, when considering such purchases. The Ambassador also reminded the MinDef of Kuwait's previous experience with the French following Iraqi's invasion of Kuwait, when the Kuwaiti Mirage aircraft were grounded due to maintenance problems and lack of munitions, and the French were unable to deliver. ¶3. (C) Ambassador also conveyed to the MinDef that per her conversations at last week's Dubai Air Show, Kuwait's prospective Deputy Chief of Staff and acting Air Force Commander were favorably disposed to the purchase of the KC130J. (Note: After the meeting, Kuwait AF Brig General Waleed al-Ateeqi thanked the Ambassador for pushing this sale forward. End note.) Acknowledging the price increase since the initial offer, Ambassador pledged USG commitment to negotiating with the vendor to get the best value, pending the MinDef's signature on the LOA. The MinDef attributed the delay in the LOA signature to Ministry of Finance bureaucratic and budgetary decisions, but downplayed any concerns the LOA would not be signed, joking that "since I'm acting PM now, I guess I will just have to order myself to sign it!" ¶4. (S/NF) (Note: The KMOD J2 -- who is the presumptive DCOS -- confided to OMC-K November 25 that Kuwait intends to sign for the LOA "as is" to avoid further delays, but plans to amend the terms at a later date to purchase only three of the KC130Js (instead of the planned six),and to use the remaining funds to buy one C-17. The J2 stated that this information is not public knowledge, and he asked that details of this deal not be discussed, even with the presumptive COS. End note.) MinDef's Eid Wish List -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador also added that the MinDef's senior AF staff showed interest at the air show in the C-17 which, per earlier exchanges, the Amir also wanted. Our understanding following the air show was that the Kuwaiti AF is drafting a request for Pricing and Availability via the FMS route. The MinDef asked laughingly what other planes were shown to his staff at the Dubai Airshow; "had we compared the French, British and American fighters? Which was the best?" Ambassador replied "The F-22," to which he immediately replied "But that's not for sale!" Ambassador suggested the F-35 might be the ideal platform for Kuwait's AF once it phases out the F-18's. Raising the "French planes," the MinDef volunteered that the Amir had said to French President Sarkozy during the latter's visit to Kuwait February 2009 only that Kuwait would be interested in Rafales "if the price were right" and the aircraft made sense. In fact, there was no intention at present to purchase other than French naval vessels and associated armaments. (Note: FM Dr Mohammed told Ambassador last week that the Rafale sale did not make sense for Kuwait, although he thought they would turn to the French for civilian nuclear facilities, also pushed by KUWAIT 00001119 002 OF 002 Sarkozy during the same trip, since "the French have much more experience in that area." The FM urged the Ambassador to press the PM not to purchase the Rafales. End note.) Defense Relationship Strong -------------- ¶6. (C) The Mindef graciously accepted the Ambassador's apology for minor annoyances -- such as the recent loud demolition by a USN team of an unidentified floating object opposite the MinDef's beachfront chalet while he was there with his family and the mistaken landing of two US Marine Corps helicopters at the wrong (poorly marked) military helipad -- assuring the Ambassador that the bilateral defense cooperation remains strong, and American appreciation for Kuwaiti hospitality is well understood. Encouraging Development of Regional Air Defense Center -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Ambassador extolled the successful conduct of the recent Kuwaiti-led "Arrows of the Gulf" Gulf Cooperation Council military exercise, in particular the performance of Kuwait's F-18 and Apache pilots. She added that Kuwait's exemplary management of its two Patriot batteries over the years had led General Petraeus to suggest that perhaps Kuwait could serve as a regional air defense center. The MinDef was visibly pleased with this praise. JMC Postponement; Iran -------------- ¶8. (C) Ambassador regretted the postponement of the Joint Military Commission (JMC) until January, but noted that this delay afforded the opportunity to develop a better sense of vision for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which will impact discussion of the future US military footprint in Kuwait. In response to Ambassador's inquiry about press reports (in the wake of the PM's November 21-22 visit to Iran) that Kuwait was "opening a special port" solely for Iranian imports, the MinDef was dismissive, but observed wryly that in point of fact Iran owed the US a debt of gratitude for having removed the threats of Iraq and Taliban on its borders. Comment: -------------- ¶9. (C) The meeting with the MinDef (currently acting PM), conducted in an extremely cordial atmosphere, began late due to traffic jams and a delayed prior meeting with the Minister of Interior. Waving off apologies, the MinDef quipped that naturally it was the Interior Minister causing problems, thus his being targeted for Parliamentary grilling. The MinDef -- a perennial rival of the PM -- also faces potential questioning by the National Assembly and has himself been rumored as a potential loser in any future cabinet reshuffle given his animus towards the PM. His ebullience during the meeting, however, suggests he believes his Cabinet position to be secure -- at least for now. End comment. ********************************************* ********* For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: visit Kuwait's Classified Website at: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it ********************************************* ********* WILLIAMS