Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KUWAIT105
2009-02-04 13:58:00
SECRET
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

MFA U/S DEFENDS KUWAITI ARAB ECONOMIC SUMMIT

Tags:  ECON PREL KPAL EAID KU 
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VZCZCXRO3699
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHKU #0105/01 0351358
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 041358Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2770
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1695
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1375
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000105 

///// C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CLASSIFICATION /////

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/IPA, NEA/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS: ECON PREL KPAL EAID KU
SUBJECT: MFA U/S DEFENDS KUWAITI ARAB ECONOMIC SUMMIT
OBJECTIVES; PA SUPPORT; GTMO; KUWAIT AIRWAYS

REF: A. KUWAIT 54

B. KUWAIT 41

C. KUWAIT 59 (NOTAL)

D. KUWAIT 95

E. KUWAIT 73

F. KUWAIT 71

G. KUWAIT 97

KUWAIT 00000105 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Econcouns Oliver John for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000105 ///// C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CLASSIFICATION ///// SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/IPA, NEA/RA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019 TAGS: ECON PREL KPAL EAID KU SUBJECT: MFA U/S DEFENDS KUWAITI ARAB ECONOMIC SUMMIT OBJECTIVES; PA SUPPORT; GTMO; KUWAIT AIRWAYS REF: A. KUWAIT 54 ¶B. KUWAIT 41 ¶C. KUWAIT 59 (NOTAL) ¶D. KUWAIT 95 ¶E. KUWAIT 73 ¶F. KUWAIT 71 ¶G. KUWAIT 97 KUWAIT 00000105 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Econcouns Oliver John for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On February 2, MFA U/S Khaled Al Jarallah met with Ambassador to offer the GoK,s perspective on the results of Kuwait's January 19-20 Arab Economic Summit, and the sharp differences that were evident between the "Doha" and "moderate" camps with regard to Gaza. The Amir contributed $500m to establish a $2 billion Arab fund to support small and medium sized enterprises throughout the Arab world. Ambassador urged immediate GoK budgetary support for the Palestinian Authority (Ref G). Noting a recent exchange between Kuwaiti Ambassador to the U.S. and S/WCI, Ambassador underscored continuing USG concerns about GoK ability to deal with the security risks posed by terrorists and facilitators, including the four remaining Kuwaiti detainees in GTMO. In response to Ambassador,s query, Jarallah offered his understanding that the GoK, i.e. the Amir, had agreed to accept $300 million in final settlement of the long-standing Kuwait Airways dispute with Iraq, but acknowledged differing views within Kuwait's National Assembly. Jarallah recommended tacit acceptance of this arrangement by the Iraqi side, without public fan fare. Finally, noting the ongoing swirl of rumors regarding the Amir,s possible dissolution of parliament in the coming weeks or months, Ambassador urged transparency on any decisions to enable Kuwait,s most important democratic ally to offer a balanced response. End Summary. Arab Economic Summit Hijacked by Gaza Debates -------------- ¶2. (C) As part of a concerted GoK effort to shape impressions of the recent highly fractious Arab Economic Summit, U/S Jarallah chronicled for Ambassador (as he had the previous day for the EU and Asian/African Ambassadors) the two year genesis of the summit. According to Jarallah, the Amir had proposed to Egyptian President Mubarak an Arab League Summit based not on more political posturing, but on tackling urgent economic needs: infrast
ructure development, trade services, environment, health, education, food and water security, and poverty alleviation. When the global financial crisis and Gaza forced themselves on the agenda, the summit organizers had &no choice8 but to deal with them. ¶3. (C) In a clear effort to defend the &moderate8 camp, Jarallah stressed that the Kuwaitis had put Gaza at the "heart of the summit." As the Arab League members began negotiating a draft communiqu on the Gaza crisis, serious differences between the "Doha" and "Kuwait" camps emerged. For example, Kuwait and the other "moderates" wanted to refer to the Arab Peace Initiative, which "they" (i.e., Syria, Qatar) did not want mentioned; the "moderates" wanted the communique to acknowledge Egypt's efforts to broker a cease fire, but the Syrians were not ready to accept any language on the Egyptian initiative, arguing that their own should be mentioned (to which Jarallah reportedly replied "what initiative?"). Finally, Qatar wanted mention of the Doha summit, but Kuwait, Egypt and Saudi Arabia refused, noting that it was "illegitimate" under Arab League rules and had included the Iranians, "and we know what it means when Iran participates." As it had been difficult to reach consensus, Jarallah noted wryly, the parties developed a joint statement on reconstruction efforts. ¶4. (SBU) Jarallah described the economic portion of the summit as "a good meeting." The Amir established a two billion dollar Arab fund to finance small and medium enterprises with a $500 million contribution. The Arab Fund would serve as the secretariat and the fund would have its own board. In response to Ambassador's inquiry as to how the new fund would differ from Kuwait's well regarded Kuwait Fund, Jarallah explained that the Kuwait Fund, the Arab Fund, the Islamic Development Bank (and possibly others) would have positions on the board. Jarallah also said that the GoK would be setting up a committee to follow-up on implementation of the economic resolutions made at the summit. Ambassador urged additional budgetary support for the PA (ref G.). Anti-Terror Cooperation and GTMO -------------- KUWAIT 00000105 002.2 OF 003 ¶5. (S) Ambassador advised Jarallah that Kuwait's Ambassador to the U.S. Shaykh Salem Al-Sabah had met with S/WCI Ambassador Williamson to discuss Kuwait's four remaining GTMO detainees. She explained that the process was still in flux, but that the USG continued to have concerns about GoK efforts to mitigate the security risk posed by the four individuals following their release and return. She noted that Kuwait's PM had told then-Secretary Rice in September 2008 that Kuwait was setting up a rehabilitation center, but that there had been no movement since that conversation. Ambassador added that the GoK also had asked the Embassy to approach the MNF-I about releasing Abdulrahman Al-Bathali, which would raise the same security issues. Meanwhile, two recent court decisions cast doubt on Kuwait's ability to implement security guarantees (ref D-F). Jarallah appeared to understand Ambassador's points, acknowledging that the USG needed credible security guarantees but suggesting that while many in the GoK understand the danger these individuals posed, there remained significant popular pressure to have them returned. Kuwait Airways Dispute with Iraq -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador told Jarallah that we had been hearing several contradictory stories about whether Kuwait Airways had settled with Iraq and whether the Amir had "kicked in" $200 million of his own funds to bring the settlement amount to the $500 million reportedly earlier negotiated by both sides; the Iraqis were now claiming a settlement amount of $300 million. Meanwhile, while members of Kuwait,s parliament were insisting on collecting the remaining $1 billion of the original settlement amount, Kuwait Airways legal counsel were insisting the claim remained outstanding. Jarallah acknowledged the discrepancies in accounts with a knowing smile: the Amir had instructed the Kuwaitis to "resolve" the problem, with the tacit understanding that the $300 million figure would serve as a final payment and permit the GoK to remove any legal holds on Iraq,s Bombardier aircraft. Jarallah admitted that even Ali Al-Mou'min, Kuwait's Ambassador to Iraq, had been contacted by GoI officials to ask which of the two positions was official and final, i.e., the GoK's $300 million settlement or Kuwait Airways insistence on eventual payment of the $1.2 billion court settlement decision. Jarallah instructed Al-Mou'min to tell the GoI officials that the GoK response was the official one. ¶7. (C) Jarallah confided that the GoK had wanted to keep the agreement "government-to-government" and not involve Kuwait's parliament. It would have been helpful -- and would still be helpful -- he suggested, if the GoI would not publicly discuss the deal and trumpet its victory., The terms were so much more advantageous to the GoI than the court judgment that it was bound to draw the ire of Kuwait's parliament. (Note: Septel will cover post's conversations with Kuwait Airways on the deal and the major disconnect between Kuwait Airways and senior GoK leadership. Our sense is that the Amir wanted to solve this quietly and was caught out by the Parliamentary opposition. End Note.) Iranian Smugglers -------------- ¶8. (C) Ambassador raised the issue of seven Iranian fisherman/smugglers rescued by NAVCENT earlier last week when their boat had foundered in the Gulf. The Omanis had agreed to take the fishermen and repatriate them to Iran while our requests to both Bahrain and Kuwait to do likewise were pending. She urged that a standard operating procedure be developed to enable NAVCENT to turn Iranian fishermen over to the Kuwaiti coast guard in future such episodes. Ambassador noted the Iranians had been smuggling large quantities of hashish, which was now on the bottom of the Gulf. Visa Problems -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Jarallah expressed concern about the "long delays" Kuwaitis were experiencing in obtaining visas, especially in medical cases. Ambassador acknowledged that security clearance delays had increased substantially, but stressed that Kuwaitis had among the highest visa acceptance rates in the world. (Note: Jarallah rarely if ever raises visa concerns and his deputy office director later expressed to KUWAIT 00000105 003.2 OF 003 EconCouns his strong concern that long delays could have a serious long-term negative impact on the overall relationship. End Note.) Parliament Dissolution Rumors -------------- ¶10. (C) Before leaving, Ambassador raised with Jarallah swirling and persistent rumors that the Amir intended to dissolve the parliament within weeks or months, perhaps unconstitutionally. Ambassador urged the GoK not to surprise or blindside its most important democratic ally, as we would have to respond to any such development and to be supportive of the GoK under such circumstances would need to fully understand the context. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Perhaps a day late and a dollar short, but nonetheless remarkably transparently and frankly, the GoK has taken the initiative to shape the battle space in the ongoing Arab League division between &moderates8 (KSA, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait) and "extremists" (Qatar, Syria and their supporter and client Iran and Hamas) while trying to salvage the Amir,s original objectives. Jarallah spent the previous two days briefing Arab, EU, Asian and African Ambassadors on the Summit,s results. The U.S. Ambassador was given a special "one on one" session, although our colleagues apparently heard much the same spin. End Comment. ********************************************* ** For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit Kuwait's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it ********************************************* ** JONES

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