MALAYSIA: REFORMING THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT?

S E C R E T KUALA LUMPUR 000913 DEPT FOR EAP, S/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS MY SUBJECT: MALAYSIA: REFORMING THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT? REF: A) KUALA LUMPUR 853 B) KUALA LUMPUR 839 Classified By: Ambassador James R. Keith, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In September the Malaysian government conditionally released five suspected terrorists detained under the country's Internal Security Act (ISA),which permits law enforcement authorities to detain for up to two years (with extensions possible)persons deemed a threat to national security. With this most recent tranche of releases, only nine persons remain in detention under the ISA. Officially, Malaysian authorities tout the effectiveness of their deradicalization program to justify releasing known terrorists, but the releases have another side: to disarm critics of the ISA. For the same reason, the GoM has also been giving signals that it would support changes to the ISA during the current parliamentary session. But the government has no intention of abandoning the ISA, which it sees as a useful tool for dealing with its perceived enemies. End summary. ¶2. (C) Comment: The Malaysian government is sensitive to domestic and international criticism of the ISA. Opponents of the Act, particularly within Malaysia's Muslim community, have become more vocal in recent months, and contend that many of those detained under the ISA aren't terrorists but simply people who disagree with the government. We know that isn't true in all cases: at least some of those detained under the ISA (and subsequently released) were hardened terrorists, with well-established associations to such terrorist events as the October 2002 Bali bombing. ¶3. (C) While one can argue (as the government does) that the ISA has its use as a preemptive tool in the counter-terrorism fight, it also represents a serious impediment to setting up an effective criminal justice system in Malaysia. The ISA, along with a raft of other ordinances used for criminal cases, permits the detention of criminal suspects based on information available to law enforcement rather than the professional collection of evidence solid enough to take to court. Although the ISA is by no means arbitrary (persons detained under it are entitled to counsel, they can appeal their detention, and police must have probable cause to detain someone),evidentiary standards are far lower than for persons arrested under criminal codes. Without the incentive to collect evidence for presentation to a prosecutor, police may put away individuals but miss the opportunity to address criminal or terrorist networks behind them. The Malaysian law enforcement authorities with whom we work are just now beginning to understand the dilemma the ISA has created for them, despite our at least two-year-old public and private focus on this issue, and many of them, apparently including the Prime Minister, recognize the need for reform. Above all, our interlocutors in the police are eager for training of all types to improve their skills; they have become avid consumers of DS/Anti-Terrorism Assistance (DS/ATA) and International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) training, but would like to see even more. End comment. Recent releases -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In September the GoM announced the release of a further five alleged Jemaah Islamiah members who had been detained under the country's ISA, which allows the authorities to arrest suspects without warrant and to detain for periods of up to two years (subject to renewal in two-year increments) persons deemed a threat to national security. Of the five, two (Mat Shah Mohamed Satray and Abdullah Daud) had been in detention at the Kamunting Prison (which houses all ISA detainees) since 2002 and three (Mohamed Nasir Isail, Mohamed Kamil Haniafah and Mohamed Amir Haniafah) since 2007. Home Minister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein told the press at the time of the release that the five were let go "conditionally," as they were no longer considered a threat to the country. The release follows similar moves in April and May in which a total of 26 terrorist suspects were set free. With these most recent releases, only nine persons (four Malaysians and one each from Thailand, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Singapore) remain in detention under the ISA. Deradicalization more talk than substance -------------- ¶5. (C) Minister Hishammuddin's comments that the nine were "no longer a threat" reflects the government's claim that its rehabilitation program for terrorists is effective. The public face of the rehabilitation program is one of well-considered measures to convince terrorists of the error of their ways and demonstrate the government's good will. Last month the Director of Malaysia's Special Task Force for Counter-Terrorism, Dato Mohamad Fuzi Bin Harun, described the Malaysian deradicalization program to PolOff. According to Dato Fuzi, the program provided vocational training and religious instruction to incarcerated terrorists and presented them with a softer side of Islam, demonstrating that terrorism was against Muslim teachings. The government would only consider releasing radicals when they had shown contrition. On release, they would remain under probation, but would receive assistance from the government to help with their reintegration into society. The GoM recently cited its deradicalization program when it proposed delisting four known terrorists (including three implicated in the 2002 Bali bombing) under the UN 1267 process (ref A). ¶6. (C) The GoM's idealized picture of its deradicalization program may not match reality. The wife of Mat Shah Mohamed Satray, one of the five newly-released terror suspects, told us recently that her husband's "deradicalization" experience in prison in fact consisted of intermittent vocational training mixed with intimidation: in his case, the prison authorities used the threat of rearrest to coerce his good behavior. He had spent three years of his incarceration in solitary confinement, evidently because of the anti-ISA activities of his wife. Since his release, he had been unable to find work and was required to present himself to his local police station each week. He also had to keep to a 9:00 PM curfew and was prohibited from leaving his home village. Our contacts in the UK High Commission echo the dim assessment of deradicalization: According to the High Commission's Political Counselor, a mission from the UK looking at Malaysia's deradicalization program last year left with the impression that while the Malaysians talked a good game their program for imprisoned radicals was short on substance and lacked demonstrated metrics of its effectiveness. ¶7. (S) While the "deradicalization" aspect of the program may be questionable, the Malaysian authorities do closely track their former ISA detainees, both political and terrorist. The Royal Malaysian Police assign case officers, similar to parole officers, who follow the cases of those released and visit them regularly, with the number of visits diminishing as the releasees establish their trustworthiness. The police also enlist villagers, including imams, to keep an eye on the releasees to ensure they don't resume their terrorist activities. The restrictiveness of the release depends very much on the threat the former detainee poses: those deemed the least threatening have much more freedom of movement than the more dangerous "rehabilitated" terrorists. In all cases, the authorities monitor their communications and their contacts -- and those released from detention know this. Talk of changing the ISA -------------- ¶8. (C) Along with the spate of releases since April, the GoM is considering amending the ISA, which has been in effect since 1960. Enacted at the tail-end of the ethnic Chinese Communist uprising in the 1950's, the ISA was originally designed as a tool for law enforcement to round up suspected insurgents without a lengthy legal process -- a necessary move to confront what was widely seen at the time as an existential threat. While the Communist insurgency disappeared, the ISA remained on the books, and became for the ruling authorities an easy mechanism for putting away political opponents. This use of the Act peaked in 1987, during the Mahathir administration, when more than 100 political activists were detained, but has slowly tapered off since. The last political detainees under the ISA, ethnic Indians with the Hindu Action Rights Force (HINDRAF) detained following demonstrations in 2007, were released this past summer. Even so, NGO activists and opposition politicians fear the ISA. ¶9. (C) Prime Minister Najib came to office early this year with the promise of making changes to the law, and the releases of ISA detainees reflected part of his campaign pledge. Najib provided voluntary assurances to the Ambassador, both while he was still Deputy PM and since assuming his new office, that the ISA would be amended to target only genuine threats, and not political opponents. Home Minister Hishammuddin told the press October 29 that the changes under consideration touched on five aspects of the Act, including length of detention, rights and treatment of detainees and their families, the power of the Home Minister to decide on detentions, the use of the ISA for political reasons, and detention without trial. One concrete proposal Hishammuddin mentioned is to shorten the length of initial detention from 60 days to 28 days. The Home Minister said the changes would likely "meet public expectations," reflecting the government's concern that the ISA has become a target of criticism both domestically and internationally. That said, Hishammuddin told Ambassador in October that amending the ISA "wouldn't be easy" (ref B). ¶10. (C) In fact, while an undercurrent of opposition to the ISA has existed since the law went into effect nearly fifty years ago, the campaign to eliminate the ISA has heated up in recent months: authorities put down with water cannons and teargas an anti-ISA march in August, and anti-ISA NGOs like the Abolish the ISA Movement (Gerakan Masuhkan ISA, or GMI in Malay) and Suaram have become more vocal in their opposition to the law. Overseas, groups like Human Rights Watch consistently point to the ISA as a black mark on Malaysian's human rights record. The law rankles many mainstream Muslims, who have seen it used primarily to put away fellow Muslims whom the government has cited as terrorists, but without presenting evidence to back up the claim. Indeed, in recent years roughly two-thirds of ISA detentions have been for terror-related reasons. Of the nine currently under ISA detention, six were suspected of involvement in terror-related activities and the remaining three are document forgers. Even before PM Najib made changing the ISA a political plank, the authorities have become more careful about employing it. Numbers of ISA detainees have consistently declined in recent years, from 93 detainees at the end of 2006 to to 85 at the end of 2007 and to only nine at present. Keeping the ISA in the government's toolkit -------------- ¶11. (C) The ISA's opponents are deeply skeptical of the talk of amending the Act. Our contacts in the GMI report that the possible amendments to the ISA under discussion in parliament include curbing the power of the Home Minister in deciding who should be detained under the Act, improving treatment of detainees and allowing more oversight of the detention process. But many of the prospective amendments do little to end the arbitrariness of the Act. GMI's director told us the changes will be mostly cosmetic, designed not to curb the ISA but to retain its most important function -- allowing the authorities to detain whoever they saw as a threat, including both terror suspects and political opponents. Most glaringly, none of the measures under discussion allow for judicial review of the detention process. GMI thought that the Parliament would nevertheless accept the administration's changes with little debate, and the ISA would see a handful of modifications that would preserve intact its provisions permitting detention without trial and warrantless arrest. KEITH