PERSPECTIVE FROM MALAYSIA ON PM NAJIB'S VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUALA LUMPUR 001012 SIPDIS FOR EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, AND INR E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM TH MY SUBJECT: PERSPECTIVE FROM MALAYSIA ON PM NAJIB'S VISIT TO SOUTHERN THAILAND REF: A. BANGKOK 3171 -- MALAYSIAN ANGLE ON THAI SOUTH ¶B. BANGKOK 2792 -- PM NAJIB SAYS AUTONOMY POSSIBLE SOLUTION IN THAI SOUTH ¶C. BANGKOK 3104 -- INSURGENTS WELCOME PM NAJIB Classified By: Political Counselor Brian D. McFeeters for reasons 1.4 b and d. Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (SBU) In mid-December, Malaysian and Thai contacts in Kuala Lumpur briefed Poloffs on Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak's visit to Thailand from December 7-9. All contacts emphasized that both Prime Ministers see the insurgency in Thailand's southern three provinces as an internal Thai problem that needs to be resolved by Thailand. Our Malaysian MFA interlocutor focused exclusively on the South but opined that he believed Thai PM Abhisit was on the right track to bring peace to the area. Conversely, a local Thai diplomat reminded us that there were other issues of mutual cooperation discussed besides the South. The visit appeared prominently in Malaysia's government-influenced media, highlighting the GOM's desire to keep its citizens abreast of Thailand's internal strife and their PM's efforts to reach a peaceful resolution. ¶2. (C) Comment: Compared to their northern neighbors, Malaysians are generally unconcerned about the violence in Southern Thailand and are not concerned that it will spill over the border, so PM Najib is not under pressure to act. This has not stopped PM Najib, through the government-influenced media, from continuing his public relations offensive designed to present him as a major player within ASEAN and the world on this issue. Najib's visit, while light on substance, made clear that his government does not plan to interfere in Southern Thailand, at least not overtly (ref A). End Summary and Comment. The MFA Provides an Expected Readout... -------------- ¶3. (C) Polcouns and Poloff met with MFA Under Secretary for Southeast Asia Adnan Othman, who accompanied PM Najib throughout his visit to Thailand, for a readout of the visit on December 17. Adnan said that discussions mainly focused on the southern provinces, and did not provide any details on other issues besides the South. Both leaders recognized the South as "an internal Thai problem" that must be solved by Thailand. Adnan said that PM Najib was generally pleased with PM Abhisit's efforts to bring peace to the South, noting that Thai Muslims had complete freedom of religion in Thailand; that said, PM Najib also suggested that the Malay language should nevertheless be taught in public schools, stating "it does not make them any less Thai." PM Najib also pushed for an increase in the standard of living in Southern Thailand, using what Malaysia considers "the 3 E's: employment, education, and entrepreneurship." Adnan also pointed out that PM Najib's previous use of the word 'autonomy' (reftel B) "was taken out of context," but also said that the three southern provinces could be given more control over local government functions, citing Sabah and Sarawak as role models for Southern Thailand. ¶4. (C) Adnan generally praised Thai PM Abhisit's efforts to address the situation in the South, but did not express optimism that the situation would improve. Adnan noted that Abhisit has the potential to improve the situation in the South as he becomes more credible as PM, but the insurgents to date remain hesitant to negotiate with him because they don't want to interact with someone who might not be able to deliver on his promises. The longer Abhisit stayed on as PM, said Adnan, the more likely he would be to succeed. Adnan expressed confidence that Abhisit "knows what he needs to do". According to Adnan, PM Abhisit told PM Najib that he wants to decrease the military's presence in the south. Adnan confided his own view that the problems in the south are fueled "by a turf battle between the police and the military" and opined that attacks often occur with the military's tacit knowledge. Reinforcing this point, Adnan said that a senior Thai military officer had told him informally on the evening of December 8 -- after the bomb attacks in the area and subsequently when Malaysian officials became nervous about PM Najib visiting Southern Thailand on December 9 -- that no attack could happen without the military's advance knowledge that some planning/activity was KUALA LUMP 00001012 002 OF 003 underway. ...that Differs from the Thai Embassy's Take -------------- ¶5. (C) Poloff met with First Secretary Suwit Mangkhala, who serves as a one-man political section in Thailand's embassy to Malaysia, on December 16. Suwit also returned to Thailand and accompanied both PMs throughout the visit. Suwit highlighted that most of the media reports in Malaysia focused on issues pertaining to Southern Thailand, but noted that in reality the problems in the South were secondary when compared to other issues that the leaders discussed-- most notably trade and exchanges. Suwit provided Poloff with a copy of the "Joint Press Statement" released by the offices of the two Prime Ministers, which contained a 15-point proclamation of the agenda discussed by the two PM's. Suwit noted that of the 15 points in the PMs' "Joint Press Statement," only 4 dealt with Southern Thailand. According to Suwit, PM Najib strongly encouraged Thailand to invest more in Malaysia. Suwit also said that both leaders emphasized people-to-people exchanges. ¶6. (C) Suwit began his discussion on Southern Thailand the same way that Under Secretary Adnan did: highlighting that both leaders agreed that this is a Thai internal problem that should be resolved solely by the Thai government. Unlike Adnan, however, Suwit noted that both leaders acknowledged that there are external influences on the problem (though he also emphasized that the responsibility to address them remained with Thailand). Suwit said that the foreign-influence primarily comes in the form of Thais who go abroad (Pakistan) to study. Many are not radicalized when they leave but come back that way (and also receive paramilitary training while they are there). Another issue discussed was dual citizenship: Thailand allows it, Malaysia does not. Suwit claimed that some of the troublemakers in the south are dual citizens who split their time between the two countries, but that immigration officials don,t know exactly who they are, as they use different names and aliases in each country. (Note: According to Suwit, during one of the meetings with PM Abhisit, Najib focused solely on security issues pertaining to the South, but very few people were allowed to attend this meeting. Suwit said that this was the only official meeting that he was not allowed to attend, and he did not know the details of that meeting. End note.) ¶7. (C) Suwit expressed frustration with both PMs for what he considered "mostly talk" on Southern Thailand, confiding that the two leaders "talk a good game", but apart from that he does not expect anything tangible -- particularly from PM Najib. He specified that the problem is not with the leaders themselves, but with the operational agencies that are responsible for coordinating joint efforts, such as the respective militaries and immigration offices. Different Reactions in State-run and Independent Media -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) State-run print media, including the New Straits Times, the Star, and Bernama, carried overwhelmingly positive reports of the visit and of PM Najib's efforts in particular, calling the visit to the South "a bold move" and highlighting that "Najib is looking for opportunity in diplomacy." Noting that Najib has visited Thailand more times than any other country since taking over as PM last April, government-influenced print media proclaimed that "the Prime Minister's visit...was a chance to reaffirm how well the two countries got along...to sing the praises of bilateral cooperation," and that the two leaders "were like peas in a pod," with Najib exhibiting "superlative statecraft." To bolster their opinion pieces, state-run media touted that "Najib's clear-sightedness on the travails of the south is supported by an unanimity of other informed neutrals." ¶9. (SBU) Independent online media portals adopted a more neutral stance and provided controversial background as well as praise for the PM. The Malaysian Insider noted that "there is suspicion among the Thai authorities about Kuala Lumpur's attitude towards the separatist rebels." Malaysiakini also commented that "Thailand has in the past accused Malaysia of failing to prevent insurgents criss-crossing the porous 650 km border." Malaysiakini, however, noted that "Najib is more cordial and soft in his diplomatic approach and the Thais like his style...there will KUALA LUMP 00001012 003 OF 003 be room to iron out issues." ¶10. (U) This cable has been cleared by Embassy Bangkok. KEITH