FAREWELL REFLECTIONS: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP REQUIRES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KOLONIA 000123 SIPDIS STATE FOR A/S KURT CAMPBELL AND DAS SCOTT MARCIEL; INTERIOR FOR A/S ANTHONY BABAUTA E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/14/2019 TAGS: PREL EAID FM CH SUBJECT: FAREWELL REFLECTIONS: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP REQUIRES IMPROVED AID DELIVERY; CHINA BIDS HIGH CLASSIFIED BY: Miriam K. Hughes, Ambassador, Amembassy Kolonia, State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) 1.(SBU) INTRODUCTION. Following are observations of Ambassador Miriam Hughes as she prepares to depart post following a two-year tour of duty. Comments are offered to provide insights from a front-line perspective in a country that is subject to unpredictable change and pressure. Ambassador has completed farewell calls on officials of the four island states of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM),as well as the FSM National Government (FSMNG). End Introduction. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY. The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) remains deeply attached to the United States and appreciates American collaboration more than that of any other nation. At the same time, Micronesians are anxious to gain access to easy cash and to pursue short-term political advantages. To avoid destabilization, we need to redirect resources available under the Amended Compact of Free Association to expand our partnerships on the ground. Despite generous U.S. assistance, the FSM economy suffered one of the worst outcomes among the Pacific nations in FY 2007 and FY 2008, according to a recent report of the International Monetary Fund. Political tension has deepened among the four states and the central government, with the states increasingly perceiving the FSMNG as an obstacle to their development. The top-down, intrusive mechanisms that we use to administer Compact assistance have exacerbated tensions and generated perceptions of interventionism. It is timely to review progress and areas for improvement in our Compact aid program. While U.S. interests are relatively limited in Micronesia, we retain special obligations, and geopolitical stakes are changing. Chinese influence is rapidly expanding and contributing to malaise. Our overall relationship with Micronesia remains strong, but some key elements hang in the balance that could affect the unity of a weak Federation. End Summary. SIGNS OF CHANGE - CHINA PROPOSES A MONOPOLY ON FISH ¶3. (C) At the conclusion of a two-year tour of duty in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM),Ambassador Hughes observes that this small island nation in the far western Pacific has been buffeted by change and now confronts complicated choices that are difficult for the Micronesians to manage. China, Japan and to a lesser extent Australia, which all maintain active, expanding embassies in the FSM, have stepped up their activities in a nation that is situated close to the U.S. territory of Guam and embraces one million square miles of ocean and coveted fishing grounds. How we fulfill our obligations as a global power in the Pacific is reflected on a small scale in the way we conduct relations in Micronesia. Our special relationship with this former Strategic Trusteeship Territory remains a source of pride and security to the FSM. Under an original Compact of Free Association (1986-2003),America helped create viable democratic institutions. Elections are free and lively, despite imperfect voting mechanisms. However, Micronesian governance is erratic and prone to opportunism and secret deal-making. ¶4. (C) Through various activities, the Peoples Republic of China is pressing intensely for advantage. Luen Thai, which is a quasi-state company of China within Tan Holdings, is currently negotiating for fishing rights and fish processing facilities in all four FSM states. The potential deal would in effect lock in a Tan vertical monopoly to include fishing, fish processing, transshipment, marketing and sales, according to one lawyer who is engaged in confidential negotiations with the FSMNG, Luen Thai, and legal representative of the states. On the table at this time is a supposed draft proposal to grant fishing licenses throughout the FSM's 200-mile EEZ. Fish licensing fees estimated at $120 million would accrue exclusively to the FSMNG, which the states resent. The draft agreement provides that all fish would be offloaded in the FSM for processing in plants that Luen Thai would construct. ¶5. (C) The deal depends upon FSMNG acceptance of a loan from China's Export-Import Bank that reportedly now exceeds $25 million. The FSMNG would use these funds to refurbish processing plants and purchase 11 ships, three of which could be super long liners for frozen fish transshipment. The sale of airplanes from China is also allegedly part of the proposal. KOLONIA 00000123 002 OF 005 The plants would be constructed and/or refurbished entirely with material imported from China, the lawyer said. Luen Thai has offered to guarantee repayment of the loan from China based upon its profits from this commercial venture. It is not clear how significantly, if at all, the FSM states would profit. FSM President Emanuel Mori and Secretary of Research and Development Peter Christian, among other national leaders, are strong supporters of this potential deal. Owing to the foreign loan proposal, the package would need to be approved by the FSM Congress. Action may take place at the January 2010 Congressional session. ECONOMIC DECLINE ¶6. (SBU) The FSM is a mixed, roiling pot. On the one hand, the FSM Telecommunications Corporation has advised that cable television will soon reach the destitute State of Chuuk, where over half the Micronesians in the FSM reside (approximately 53,000 people.) In the capital State of Pohnpei, Japan is making steady progress on a project to extend the runway of the international airport. The 800-foot extension will enable more flights and larger aircraft. Domination of passenger transportation by Continental Airlines' small fleet of 737 island hopping jets is likely to be challenged in the future. The FSM will then need to stand up its own airport security system to meet TSA and ICAO standards, rather than depend upon Continental. ¶7. (SBU) Despite these and other signs of modernization, the FSM economy continues to deteriorate. A recent Baseline National Poverty Index estimates 29.9 of the FSM population falls below this poverty measure. There is currently no radio station in Chuuk that is capable of reaching that state's 42 outer islands and atolls. State revenue is insufficient to supply a dwindling Chuuk police force with mobile radios or to even operate a 911 emergency telephone number. Crime is rising. The small State of Kosrae (population approximately 7,800) has failed to generate sufficient income to cover the state's fourth quarter operating expenses in FY 2009 and FY 2010, despite the Governor's successful reform initiative two years ago to reduce the state work force by over 100 positions. Pohnpei State has made overtures to Taiwan to attract commercial assistance, angering China. Pohnpei Governor John Ehsa is under considerable pressure to deliver on a campaign promise to provide lunches to high school students, which is currently beyond his reach. ¶8. (U) A recent report of the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),which conducted consultations in the FSM in February 2009, indicates that economic output declined by 3.6 per cent in 2007 and by an estimated 1 per cent in FY 2008. The IMF report states, "As a result of problems with disbursing grants under the Compact agreement with the United States, rising commodity prices, and difficult business environment, the economy has contracted for five years in a row - one of the worst outturns among the Pacific nations." SMARTER AID DELIVERY ¶9. (C) A key issue for U.S. interests in Micronesia is how to make our ample Compact and other federal program assistance work better to build capacity in the FSM and stimulate realistic private sector activity. The aid is generous, totaling some $140 million annually for a country with a population of approximately 109,000. However, disbursement of Compact cash grants to the states is delayed at the FSM National Government level. Chuukese officials complained to the Ambassador that they often do not get their first quarter installments until spring, complicating implementation of projects and official travel. Inefficiency and in-fighting within the FSMNG appear to hamper the flow of allotments that the national government receives regularly from the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI). The FSM Office of Statistics, Budgets, Overseas Aid and Compact Management (SBOC),which is supposed to manage Compact funds and policy, is unwieldy, inadequately staffed and at odds KOLONIA 00000123 003 OF 005 with the FSM Department of Finance. Even when cash grants reach the state level, frequently the Micronesians have difficulty spending the money. Significant sums are returned to DOI as "carryover funds" that are not absorbed. ¶10. (C) The challenge of U.S. aid delivery in Micronesia is something we as a U.S. Government can and must fix. Implementation and monitoring of grants and programs by DOI personnel based in Honolulu and Washington occur outside the authority of the Chief of Mission and without a cohesive policy umbrella. Some Micronesian leaders are clearly using their DOI connections to tie U.S. funds to their political purposes. As one U.S. Government team, we could develop smarter and more effective strategies. Secretary Clinton's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review appears to be a promising tool. ¶11. (SBU) Our most successful programs in the FSM do not place too heavy a burden on the Micronesians at this stage of their development. The FSM is a young and fragile nation, which became self-governing only in 1986. The Embassy receives daily reminders of a lack of internal professional capacity. Micronesians generally lack the education and technological skills to effectively use our taxpayers' money. However, they respond enthusiastically to American leadership of programs and projects. ¶12. (SBU) The visit of the USNS Mercy hospital ship in August 2008 elicited an outpouring of local volunteerism to help Seabees paint a hospital in Chuuk, repair island schools and organize inhabitants in three states for the delivery of primary medical care. Even in torrential downpours, the Chuukese recently joined U.S. Air Force personnel to stage a resoundingly successful Humanitarian Assistance Rescue and Relief Team exercise, which included validation of a new mobile hospital concept. Federal Aviation Administration construction projects, which are closely managed, have sprung up at all four FSM international airports. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration expertly runs weather stations in three states, providing regular training to Micronesian staff. The U.S. Postal Service mentors and monitors Micronesian mail workers and operations. Taking over lead responsibility for disaster management from FEMA in 2009, USAID subcontractors have begun to stockpile relief supplies and initiate practical, grassroots responder training. By working side by side with the Micronesians, these and other interagency representatives are building pride and partnership. ¶13. (C) Problems arise when our federal requirements are too sophisticated for the Micronesians, U.S. implementers are far away, and a weak central government cannot manage basic requirements. Compact infrastructure grants are a case in point. Only four Micronesian engineers reportedly reside in the nation. None of them is dedicated to Compact infrastructure. While some projects have started, progress has been uneven. Yap State officials complain strongly that their state has received no projects over the first five years of the Amended Compact. Serious Yapese leaders talk increasingly about prospects for seceding from the FSM and turning for support to Palau and Taiwan. Throughout the FSM, delays and lack of clarity about the allocation of a backlog of some $130 million of Compact infrastructure funds bear high, negative visibility and political costs. An FSMNG Program Management Unit (PMU),which is supposed to oversee Compact Infrastructure projects, comes directly under the control of a busy President. Not only is President Mori frequently away on travel; increasingly, he is perceived as a scheming politician who is dedicated primarily to his home state of Chuuk and prospects for reelection. The wellbeing of the nation as a whole is rarely mentioned. Distrust among the four states and the national government is deepening. Pohnpei has initiated discussion of secession at its current Constitutional Convention. Poor implementation of Compact sector grants is one significant source of contention. ¶14. (C) The FSM states depend for their operations upon Compact grant money, which covers approximately 65 percent of state budget expenditures. Former President Joseph Urusemal (Yap), who is now a national Senator, pleaded, "Please help us KOLONIA 00000123 004 OF 005 accelerate implementation. We are now in the fifth year of (Amended) Compact implementation and the situation is bad. I am usually very patient, but I have no more patience." Like President Mori and other FSM leaders in the national Congress and state governments, Urusemal recommended that DOI open an office in Pohnpei to improve communication, coordination, and aid administration for the purpose stated in the Compact, which is to benefit the Micronesian people. DOI has a complex and difficult role to fulfill in a fragile nation, which cannot be well accomplished by long distance, autonomous interventions. Ambassador Hughes fully agrees about the need to assign development specialists to Pohnpei, without necessarily increasing overall costs, and to incorporate them as respected colleagues and members of the Embassy Country Team. In the meantime, the U.S. Embassy is the only mission in the FSM that has no/no aid personnel - a shortcoming that compromises oversight and accountability of substantial U.S. programs and debilitates our efforts to coordinate donor assistance with other embassies and organizations. CHINA'S BIG FOOTPRINT ¶15. (C) The rising role of China in the FSM is apparent. China has blanketed the FSM at every level with all-expense paid trips that include daily emoluments. National leaders clearly enjoy lavish multiple-city tours. Municipal leaders, clan chieftans, students, and local police have in many cases accepted repeated trips. A traditional leader of Netts municipality in Pohnpei, where the new U.S. Embassy is located, told the Ambassador during a farewell call that he and his wife each received $1,500 when they arrived in Beijing, with supplemental cash for shopping every day. At a certain point, he said the Chinese hosts asked to separate the men from their wives. At that point, the traditional leader claimed he refused to cooperate and he asked to go home. ¶16. (C) In Chuuk, five Chinese doctors recently arrived on a Beijing government contract to serve two years in the state hospital. Other doctors in the hospital complained to Ambassador Hughes that the Chinese did not speak English or practice the same type medicine. Instead, they said the Chuukese were teaching the Chinese about western (Micronesian) medicine. In Kosrae, Ambassador found that employees of Luen Thai company were living in a house owned by Vice President Alik Alik, who has publicly supported China's repression of the Uighurs. Kosrae's Director of Education, an American who has resided in the FSM for 17 years, commented, "For the first time, I am truly concerned about Chinese intentions." RECOMMENDATIONS ¶17. (C) Inauguration of the New Embassy Compound on August 26 sent a clear message about America's renewed commitment. Micronesians recognized this reassurance and warmly welcomed the fresh impetus. Over the long run, however, pride in sovereignty and the ability to pick and choose for short-term gain may tilt Micronesia in unpredictable directions. To maintain our interests, an interagency team might consider some adjustments, including: --Department of Defense: Expand engagement, particularly of humanitarian missions; reconstitute a roving Civic Action Team (CAT) to identify maintenance projects, train Micronesians and conduct local surveillance; assign a Defense representative to the Embassy. --Department of the Interior: Subcontract development specialists to manage grants and programs in-country; channel a portion of cash grants through non-governmental organizations; facilitate streamlined disbursements to the FSM states; foster accountability with less intrusion into internal budgets; join the Embassy Country team as valued aid representatives, who can expand coordination with other local stakeholders. KOLONIA 00000123 005 OF 005 --Project Management Unit: Assign American construction engineer/s, possibly the Army Corps of Engineers, to knowledgeably manage our infrastructure projects; pay American personnel from the infrastructure account; initiate a public website to track all Compact Infrastructure funds and projects. --Joint Economic Management Committee (JEMCO): Circulate resolutions well in advance of this annual meeting, particularly to enable the Micronesians to comprehend the contents and implications for their budgets; include the U.S. Ambassador to the FSM and the Micronesian Ambassador to the U.S. as full voting members of this core Compact management mechanism, which significantly affects bilateral policy. CONCLUSION ¶18. (C) A tour of duty in the FSM inculcates respect for the Micronesians, who are innately capable and eloquent people with unique traditions and long, historical memories. They recognize the benefits of close alignment with the U.S. Today, Micronesians hunger for enhanced American engagement and leadership. Although the nation has viable democratic institutions, the Federation itself is under growing strain. Each state is a separate entity with its own language, ethnicity and culture. A national identity has not yet substantially consolidated. Five years into the life of the Amended Compact, which expires in 2024, the cumbersome, centralized way in which we administer grants has proved problematic for a weak national government. Our tone and techniques are perceived as penalizing proud peoples and contributing to radicalization of the four states. Influential FSM leaders exploit separate tracks of communication. ¶19. (C) We need to decide whether to deal with the FSM as a neocolonial Trusteeship remnant or a sovereign nation. The role of the U.S. Ambassador must be strengthened as the executive manager of all U.S. Government activities in country. Otherwise, Micronesia will smile, feign compliance and drift toward the highest bidder, quite possibly at an accelerated pace. A better option is to build partnerships for progress, including with China, Japan and Australia. This emerging Pacific island nation merits a modest review and some fresh approaches and adjustments. HUGHES