EASTERN DRC NOTES - JANUARY 30

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000094

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT: EASTERN DRC NOTES - JANUARY 30


1. (U) The items contained in this report consist principally of
spot information from various sources. This report is not
exhaustive, nor can all the information contained therein be
confirmed at this time.

LRA Issues
--------------


2. (SBU) MONUC reported that on January 27, LRA rebels killed 40
civilians in the city of Meridi, a major city in southern Sudan. A
counterattack by the local population reportedly failed. MONUC
speculated that, once Okot Odhiambo had surrendered, his fighters
may have gone on this rampage (Note: An unconfirmed press report
alleges that Odhiambo has already surrendered to the UPDF. End
note).


3. (SBU) A senior MONUC official provided a briefing on a recent
visit to Haut Uele, describing the situation as "a humanitarian
catastrophe." The LRA was keeping several armies at bay, inflicting
terrible suffering on local populations. The situation has been
compounded because humanitarian groups are unable to reach affected
areas; even within Dungu, humanitarian organizations must travel
with MONUC escorts. The LRA continues to prefer using machetes on
victims to preserve low supplies of bullets. The UPDF, according to
MONUC, believes it will spend another 15 months fighting the LRA.


4. (SBU) A western diplomat, who had recently traveled to Dungu,
told PolCouns that there has been a noticeable breakdown in FARDC
discipline in Haut Uele since Operation Lightning Thunder began.
FARDC soldiers, who arrived in increased numbers in the area on
December 1, were initially disciplined. However, recently, the
FARDC has committed rapes, looting, and extortion in the area.
MONUC and UPDF forces are not present in the city, restricting
themselves to the MONUC base 10 kilometers from the city and the
airport.


5. (SBU) Moreover, the civilian population is terrified, expecting
an attack on Dungu. While this may be unlikely, our contact said
that it is not impossible, given MONUC's reduced presence and the
ability of the LRA to evoke fear. The LRA's tactic of dividing up
into smaller, more mobile units appears to be successful, according
to our contact. The civilian population and local politicians
recognize the LRA poses a tremendous threat, but the population is
obviously frustrated.


6. (SBU) A senior MONUC military officer in Kinshasa noted that the
UPDF invitation to operate in DRC territory has been extended until
February 6. He also said that MONUC is reinforcing its presence in
the area with Guatemalan special forces and a company of Moroccan
soldiers. They are working on road rehabilitation between Dungu and
the town of Duru to the north, which could be used as a humanitarian
corridor.


7. (SBU) The hope is to use the Guatemalans as the backbone of a
quick reaction force to address LRA problems, and use the Moroccan
company to establish a Forward Operating Base at Duru. Separately,
MONUC has helped provide transportation to the FARDC, which
reportedly has established a more extensive footprint in the area
(Comment: Despite all of this, MONUC's contribution to the anti-LRA
effort is clearly limited. The organization does not have much of a
presence in Haut Uele and is generally confined to the base at
Dungu, with not much projection beyond that. MONUC, overall, does
not appear to have a good idea what the FARDC and UPDF are doing at
any given moment in Haut Uele. End comment).

Joint FARDC/RDF Operation
--------------


8. (SBU) There are persistent rumors that some women and children
of FDLR combatants have left for safer areas. FDLR forces continue
to mass near Kashebe, Ntoto, and Bunyakiri in South Kivu. MONUC
opined the FDLR may be massing in these areas either to confront the
joint operation directly or to prepare for a withdrawal to Maniema
or Katanga, neither of which is mutually exclusive. The FDLR is
also reportedly ready to deploy up to eight battalions in two phases
along the Kavuma-Kalehe axis in South Kivu.


9. (SBU) MONUC strategy focuses on containing the FDLR at the line
between North and South Kivu. MONUC cautioned that, because of the
terrain, it will not be able to prevent all FDLR fighters from
attempting to move from South to North Kivu. MONUC highlighted the
area near Shabunda as a particularly vulnerable area for potential
FDLR reprisals. Because it is not accessible by road, it would be
particularly difficult for humanitarian and protection assistance to
reach this area. MONUC cautioned that it has been effectively shut

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out of most details on operational planning.


10. (SBU) MONUC reported that the FARDC and RDF are close to
finishing the process of closing off the Rwandan and Ugandan
borders. Offensive actions against the FDLR will commence in the
following phase. Seven FARDC brigades are committed to the
operation. The best estimate of current RDF numbers is 3-4,000
(Note: RDF forces still refer to themselves as "special intelligence
units." End note). Separately, MONUC will potentially provide
logistical support (specifically, transportation, food, medical,
fuel and airlift support) to the FARDC in the course of this
operation, as well as training for newly integrated units.


11. (SBU) Comment: What remains unclear is how victory is to be
defined in this effort, whether that be wiping out the FDLR as a
whole or ensuring that all are repatriated back to Rwanda; or the
capture or killing of the top level commanders; or something else
entirely. End comment

CNDP Issues
--------------


12. (SBU) A North Kivu source, with direct contacts to the Amani
Process and good contacts to the CNDP and other armed groups, told
PolCouns that Bosco remained reluctant to commit CNDP fighters to
integration with the FARDC. This explained why he showed up one
hour late for a FARDC/CNDP integration ceremony at Rumangabo on
January 29. This source maintained that Nkunda had recently moved
from Gisenyi to Kigali (Note: a senior MONUC official in Kinshasa
reported the same information. End note) and that he had directly
contacted our source to confirm that he remained "in control" of the
CNDP.


13. (SBU) Our contact insisted that the GDRC had orchestrated the
split between Bosco and Nkunda. According to our contact, Kigali had
initially proposed Nkunda as the frce commander for the FARDC/RDF
joint operation,but Kinshasa rejected this idea. Kigali then
prposed John Numbi instead, and the GDRC immediatelyaccepted.
Part of the DRC-Rwandan deal allegedly ncluded the division of
North Kivu along the lins of the Grand Nord and the Petit Nord, as
well s ensuring a governmental position for Nkunda whenthe dust
had settled. Regarding the January 29 umangabo integration
ceremony, our contact sai it was purely symbolic, "nothing more
than a re-run of the failed mixage process." The operation,
according to our contact, is run by a very small circle of Rwandan
and DRC officials.


14. (SBU) omment: At the very least, despite general plans
escribed by MONUC for an initial "accelerated" intgration process
for CNDP fighters followed by a ore measured "classic" process,
exactly how thisall would work is unclear. A senior MONUC officia
in Kinshasa hinted at the idea that the CNDP ran and file (which
apparently is 70-80 percent Hut) may not be on board with their
commanders, whoare mostly Tutsi and who, according to the officia,
have gone over to Bosco. End comment

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