EASTERN DRC NOTES -- OCTOBER 13: BOSCO SAID TO BE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000936

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2019
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PREF PGOV PREL KPKO CG
SUBJECT: EASTERN DRC NOTES -- OCTOBER 13: BOSCO SAID TO BE
CONSIDERING ESTABLISHING NEW MILITIA

REF: KINSHASA 915

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Samuel V. Brock for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Sources in Goma have told us that former
CNDP military chief Bosco Ntaganda has met with several Mai
Mai groups in North Kivu to discuss the possibility of
establishing a new militia. A former member of Nkunda's
inner circle, a lawyer named Muiti, opined that attempts by
Nkunda supporters to re-emerge as a political and military
force were "an empty shell." The GDRC, including at the
level of President Kabila, have ensured that integrated CNDP
commanders are well treated within the FARDC. After months
of hesitating, "General" Yakutumba has agreed to integrate
the remainder of his Mai Mai forces. Somewhat surprisingly,
the FDLR may be instituting a change in tactics vis-a-vis
local populations, opting to publicly punish its troops who
engage in exactions. This apparent shift could signal a
belief by the FDLR that Kimia II will soon wind down and the
group will have to re-engage with local populations. End
summary.

Bosco's insurance policy
--------------


2. (C) Three apparently independent sources recently told us
that former CNDP military chief Bosco Ntaganda is
establishing a new militia concentrated near the Ugandan
border at Ishasha. Sources maintain that Bosco has already
approached several Mai Mai leaders in North Kivu from both
integrated and non-integrated groups, about joining the new
force. Bosco reportedly met with some of these groups in
Masisi September 23-24, while his cousin hosted other Mai Mai
elements last month in Kampala. It is uncertain whether
these entreaties have yielded anything concrete.


3. (C) One of our Goma sources told us that CNDP President
Kamanzi is allegedly involved in these efforts. There are
three, mutually compatible, motives behind Kamanzi's actions:
an attempt to pressure the GDRC to offer him a ministerial
position in a new government; an alternative route to some
kind of government postion, should he not receive a
ministerial portfolio; or, quite simply, Kamanzi and Bosco
are reportedly cousins, so Kamanzi has decided to help him.

More on the "real CNDP"
--------------


4. (C) Muiti, a lawyer and trusted member of Nkunda's inner
circle before Nkunda's arrest, told us that claims by Nkunda
die-hards, e.g., Bertrand Bisimwa (reftel),that elements of
the Nkunda wing were ready to re-emerge as a political and
military force were "an empty shell." According to Muiti,
CNDP commanders are firmly in the camp of the "new CNDP."
Muiti said that he sympathized with many of the complaints
that the old guard had made, but he insisted that there was a
completely new dynamic now that precludes the re-emergence of
the Nkunda wing.


5. (C) Bisimwa and others, according to Muiti, approached
Makenga and other integrated CNDP commanders to test the
waters for a new rebellion. Makenga is reported to have
politely rebuffed Bisimwa. Muiti noted that CNDP commanders
are increasingly content in the FARDC. They have satisfying
command positions and President Kabila himself is believed to
ensure that they are well-treated within the FARDC.

Mai Mai Yakutumba to integrate
--------------


6. (SBU) Following an October 2 meeting with General Amuli,
Kimia II commander, "General" Yakutumba announced that he and
QKimia II commander, "General" Yakutumba announced that he and
the remainder of the Mai Mai Yakutumba militia would
integrate. Mai Mai Yakutumba claim that, after months of
discussion, the FARDC has finally accepted Yakutumba's
conditions for integration, i.e., they would be integrated
where they operate and they would be allowed to command
operations against the FDLR in their areas of control. The
FARDC, for its part, claims that its September 25 ultimatum
to Yakutumba, to integrate or be hunted down, was decisive
(Comment: It is not clear why Yakutumba decided to integrate
now as it had ignored previous ultimatums. End comment).


7. (SBU) Approximately 400 Yakutumba were integrated at
Minembwe in August. This group was predominantly from the

KINSHASA 00000936 002 OF 002


ethnic Folero group, while Yakutumba and his newly integrated
troops are Bembes. Yakutumba's spokesman claimed that the
group's remaining troops number 3,000, with 1,500 weapons.
(Comment: The numbers are probably closer to 1,000
combatants with 300 weapons. End comment)

Mai Mai unhappy with political process
--------------


8. (SBU) Our sources told us that the political
representatives of North and South Kivu Mai Mai groups have
become increasingly frustrated that the GDRC still has not
given them political positions, promised to them under the
March 23 Agreement. On September 23, the groups announced
their withdrawal from the (virtually moribund) National
Monitoring Committee. The groups have recently written to UN
mediator Obasanjo requesting him to ensure that "each party
respects its commitments."

FDLR "charm offensive"
--------------


9. (SBU) Somewhat surprisingly, the FDLR appears to have
adopted a new approach to interacting with local populations
in key parts of North Kivu, particularly around its
stronghold in Ntoto in western Masisi. Several incidents
over the past two weeks, for which undisciplined FDLR troops
have been punished by their superiors, may indicate a pattern
of improved PR techniques vis-a-vis the local population. On
September 28, the FDLR publicly beat one of its troops for
looting. The week of October 5, 40 FDLR troops arrested 12
of their own who apparently had looted a village west of
Ntoto. NGO contacts in southern Lubero reported a similar
pattern of the FDLR publicly punishing looters and making
efforts to mend relations with the local population.


10. (C) Comment: Bosco's survival as a free man is tenuous
given the ICC arrest warrant against him. He knows that
Kabila will dispose of him whenever he is no longer needed to
ensure progress in achieving a peace settlement in the
eastern DRC. The possibility that Bosco is constructing an
"insurance policy" for himself by reconstituting a militia
force is both very plausible and worrisome. Of the two
possible pools of ex-combatants from which a reconstituted
CNDP force could re-emerge -- the old Nkunda wing or the
Bosco wing -- we view the latter as the greater threat to
improved security dynamics in the Kivus. Like Nkunda, who
has an ever smaller circle of allies (reftel),Bosco must
feel insecure in the medium-term. Unlike Nkunda, Bosco and
his troops still possess the firepower to cause significant
problems. The integration of Mai Mai Yakutumba, in line with
its pre-conditions, is predictable and it may even placate
on-going rumblings amongst non-Rwandophones, demonstrating
that it is not true that only the CNDP and PARECO-Hutu have
been allowed to remain in their home regions. The apparent
"charm offensive" by the FDLR suggests several possibilities:
its leaders realize that their brutal reprisals have gone
too far with local populations; they believe Kimia II is
winding down, and are therefore shifting out of conflict
mode; and they intend to remain where they are, recognizing
that if they are to do so they will need to re-build
relations with local populations. End comment.
BROCK