RE-EMERGENCE OF CNDP'S NKUNDA WING?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000915

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PINR PHUM PREF CG
SUBJECT: RE-EMERGENCE OF CNDP'S NKUNDA WING?

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Samuel V. Brock for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Former CNDP Spokesman Bertrand Bisimwa
recently told us that the "real CNDP," i.e., the Nkunda wing
was poised to reenter the DRC political fray. Claiming that
the Bosco wing had no authority to sign the March 23
agreement with the GDRC, Bisimwa presented us with a memo
outlining the real CNDP's demands, which included the release
of former CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda, as well as traditional
calls for refugee/IDP resettlement and inter-ethnic
reconciliation. "Real peace," according to Bisimwa, would
only come to the Kivus when the GDRC and the real CNDP
negotiate. Bisimwa maintained that the overwhelming majority
of CNDP rank and file remained loyal to Nkunda, adding that
integrated CNDP commanders "would not be able to control"
their troops, if Nkunda is not eventually released. Any
re-emergence of an armed Nkunda wing of the CNDP bears
watching. However, we believe that the constellation of
forces opposed to such a re-emergence is extremely formidable
and the level of support for Nkunda within the CNDP rank and
file is questionable. End summary.


2. (C) We recently met with former CNDP spokesman and Nkunda
confidante Bertrand Bisimwa at his request. Bisimwa said he
wanted to give the USG a heads-up that the "real CNDP," i.e.,
the Nkunda wing, was about to re-emerge as a political force
in the DRC. According to Bisimwa, the real CNDP hd two
demands: the "modalities" of the CNDP's integration into the
FARDC needed to be worked out; and the political issues,
which underlay the CNDP's rebellion, had not been addressed.
Bisimwa claimed that, in January, the CNDP agreed that the
modalities of integration would be finalized only when
planned operations against the FDLR had concluded (Note: We
have no independent verification of Bisimwa's claim. End
note.). When pressed to elaborate on the political demands,
Bisimwa raised perennial concerns about refugee/IDP returns
and community reconciliation. But, he also specifically
called for the release of Nkunda and his "re-integration"
into he FARDC. Paragraph seven lists all of the political
demands contained in a memo, which Bisimwa gave to us
(previously emailed to AF/C).


3. (C) Along with the CNDP demands, Bisimwa volunteered two
guarantees. First, the real CNDP would not take any steps
"backwards," in particular, its troops would remain in the
FARDC. Second, it would not raise any new issues, i.e.,
issues that had not been on the negotiating table in Nairobi
in Fall 2008.


4. (C) Bisimwa slammed the current CNDP, maintaining that
the group did not really represent the CNDP, so its signature
on the March 23 agreement was irrelevant. The memo states
that "the March agreement signed between the government and
the dissident CNDP is illegitimate and has no obligatory
power over anyone in the military or in the political branch
of the movement." Bisimwa argued that the rapprochement
between the GDRC and GOR centered solely on bilateral issues
and did not deal with the CNDP. "Real peace," in Bisimwa's
words would only come to the Kivus when the GDRC negotiates
directly with the real CNDP (Comment: Unquestionably, the
CNDP, which many observers believed the GOR supported, was a
huge bilateral issue between Kinshasa and Kigali, and a major
component of the recent rapprochement. End comment.).
Qcomponent of the recent rapprochement. End comment.).


5. (C) Bisimwa insisted that the vast majority of CNDP
military elements remained loyal to Nkunda. While the real
CNDP did not want to reconstitute the CNDP as an independent
force, Bisimwa warned that CNDP commanders had kept control
of their troops and ensured integration into the FARDC by
assuring the rank and file that Nkunda would return after
Kimia II concluded. If the military operations stop and
Nkunda is not released, Bisimwa claimed that commanders would
not be able to "keep their men under control."


6. (SBU) The CNDP memo claims that pre-conditions for
re-establishing diplomatic relations between the DRC and
Rwanda were the removal of Nkunda and the neutralization of
the CNDP. Rwanda, according to the CNDP memo, had begun to
view Nkunda, a popular, self-confident Congolese Tutsi in a
resource-rich country, as a potential regional rival.
Rwandan CHOD James Kabarebe was the alleged "architect of the
DRC-Rwandan alliance against the CNDP." The memo claims that
"except for a few villainous officers, the CNDP armed branch
remains loyal to General Nkunda." In a not-so-veiled threat,
the memo announced that "Rwanda will not always be in a
position to play the role of a reserve police corps to be

KINSHASA 00000915 002 OF 002


called in anytime the DRC president is faced with political
and security challenges."


7. (SBU) The memo elucidates that following demands:

-- release of Nkunda and his "reintegration" into the FARDC;

-- development of a concerted and systematic framework to
govern the repatriation and reintegration of Congolese
refugees and IDPs in North and South Kivu;

-- these reintegration programs must include a plan for
resettlement of people in their respective land;

-- development of a program for inter-ethnic reconciliation
and peaceful cohabitation;

-- reform of the FARDC, as well as other security and
intelligence services;

-- implementation of a system of good governance, which will
deal with corrupt institutions; and

-- movement towards developing a system of greater regional
autonomy that will increase participatory democracy.


8. (C) Comment: Bisimwa's comments contain some insights,
but it seems unlikely that the faction he represents carries
much weight. At times he and the memo are seemingly
contradictory, e.g., claiming that the "integrated" CNDP
units would not leave the FARDC, while at the same time
clearly labeling the March 23 agreement as null and void.
While we certainly need to closely monitor any effort by the
Nkunda wing to reconstitute an independent armed force in the
Kivus, we do not believe such a threat is inevitable or
imminent for several reasons. Conventional wisdom has always
been that most rank and file CNDP were more loyal to the
undiplomatic and less flamboyant Bosco Ntanganda, who was
generally viewed with more empathy than was Nkunda.
Bisimwa's claims, therefore, that practically all CNDP cadres
support Nkunda should be viewed with skepticism.
Additionally, the Nkunda wing does not have any allies left
in the region. There is a formidable array of forces opposed
to his re-emergence on the scene: GDRC, GOR, Bosco wing of
the CNDP, and FDLR. Perhaps, as Bisimwa intimated, there are
elements in Rwanda who are unhappy with Nkunda's fate, but
our knowledge here in Kinshasa is limited. Finally, there is
no indication that integrated CNDP elements have fared badly
in the FARDC; on the contrary, there are numerous complaints
that CNDP units continue to operate with virtual autonomy
from the FARDC. Bisimwa's message appears to be a desperate
call for Nkunda's rehabilitation, although Nkunda, at least
for now, is "yesterday's man."
BROCK