FRAUD SUMMARY - KINSHASA

UNCLAS KINSHASA 000898 DEPT FOR CA/FPP; CA/FPP PLEASE PASS DHS CIS/FDNS; FOR CA/VO/KCC; POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC CG SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - KINSHASA REF: A) State 57623; B) State 997431; C) Kinshasa 17; D) Kinshasa 346 ¶1. Per reftel A, post is updating its country fraud summary, covering March 1, 2009 to August 31, 2009. ¶A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS ¶2. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is slowly recovering from a war begun in 1998 that led to the deaths of more than five million persons. Conflict flares periodically in the mineral-rich eastern part of the country, and the war's after effects continue to hamper economic growth and the formation of stable government. Most Congolese citizens live on less than $120 per year, and every day Congolese citizens die as a result of preventable diseases and lack of access to basic medical care. Approximately 70% of the population is malnourished. ¶3. Two principal challenges exist for anti-fraud work. First, fraud and corruption are wide spread, both from applicants trying to obtain immigration benefits and from Congolese officials trying to supplement low salaries by selling fake civil documents or bona fide documents based on false information. Second, government administrative capacity, at all levels, is weak to nonexistent, and even when government officials express interest in combating fraud, they often lack the tools necessary to enhance transparency. Most government offices, for example, do not have access to computers. As a result, basic civil documents -- passports, birth certificates, and marriage certificates - are easy to obtain: often, applicants simply appear at a government office and pay a fee. ¶4. Lack of standardization of Congolese names adds an additional challenge. Every day, the consular section sees applicants with two or three valid passports, each with a different name. The name "Jean Jacques Mulongo Makengo," for example, could appear as a surname in four different ways: "Makengo;" "Mulongo Makengo;" "Jacques Mulongo Makengo;" or even "Jean Jacques Mulongo Makengo," first name unknown. Congolese civil servants, in general, do not verify biographic information, and cultural traditions allow individuals to change names throughout their life. Mala fide applicants exploit this custom to acquire new names in order to hide prior refusals or ineligibilities. ¶B. NIV FRAUD ¶5. Mala fide G-2 applicants represent the largest source of NIV fraud. DRC officials frequently apply for visas in large groups at the last-minute, with incomplete applications and diplomatic notes missing essential information. In many cases, the reason for travel has ended before the Embassy receives the NIV application. Interviewing officers face a daily challenge of sorting genuine officials from hangers-on. A more serious problem involves administrative control over diplomatic notes. The Cabinet includes more than 40 ministers, each with a separate office of protocol; Parliament and the Presidency also have protocol offices. The result is a flood of diplomatic notes, often for travelers who are not officials or who are traveling for pleasure. The consular section has met three times in the past year with the MFA's chief of protocol, who has admitted that the MFA lacks the ability to control the issuance of diplomatic passports, official passports, or diplomatic notes. The Embassies of Canada, Belgium, and Great Britain report similar problems with applications from Congolese officials. ¶6. As a result, the consular section interviews all G-2 and A-2 applicants, except ministers and officials with U.S. travel in the past two years. In March, the DRC submitted more than 250 applications for a UN conference on woman's issues. Post interviewed one-half of the applicants and found that 30% were not government officials; some were applying on tourist passports. The GDRC withdrew the remaining applications. Also in March, the consular section conducted a field investigation for three A-visa applicants who were unable to explain the purpose of their trip. The investigation revealed that the applicants had genuine diplomatic notes, but none actually worked for the government. To help reduce mala fide applications, post held an open house for all DRC protocol offices in June, and in August, for the first time in years, the DRC did not submit a large-number of questionable applications for the UNGA. Post plans to continue to liaison with other missions, hold semi-annual open houses, and interview the majority of government officials. The consular section will also continue to insist on complete documentation for official visas and to decline requests for interviews after-hours. ¶7. In contrast to G-2 applicants, the consular section finds few problems with G-4 applicants, and during the reporting period, post waived the personal appearance for G-4 travelers. Post liaisons closely with the protocol office from the UN, which provides the lion's share of applications, many from visa waiver countries. In April, however, post discovered a mala fide traveler using a genuine UN diplomatic note. The UN conducted a full investigation, discovered that the applicant's husband - a UN employee - had acquired the note, and fired the husband. No similar incident took place during the reporting period. ¶8. All B-1/B-2 applications are ripe with fake documents: false bank statements, forged employment letters, and questionable property deeds, but applicants who are part of a group - a church, service organization, or business association- provide the second largest source of mala fide applicants. In a typical pattern, the group applies in stages, with the best qualified applying first. In June, for example, post issued a B-1 visa to a Malian trader going to New York. Fourteen more Malians applied in the next month for the same purpose; all were denied. Post relies on past experience, search engines, and contacts within the local community to determine bona fide intent for these types of travelers. Post also maintains an electronic fraud toolkit which includes information on how to identify valid DRC documents, and the consular section is enrolling all staff in FSI's online anti-fraud training. In June, post conducted a workshop for leaders of various community organizations to explain visa processing and to encourage screening of applications. More than 40 representatives attended, and the consular section plans another workshop for the next reporting period. ¶9. Several changes were made in the reporting period to use anti-fraud resources more effectively. The consular section moved away from document verification as the primar method of detecting fraud to place greater emphasis on interviewing. In this regard, the consular section greatly benefited from a two-month TDY by a WAE who demonstrated effective interviewing techniques. Post discontinued the practice of issuing one-month visas as an anti-fraud measure and ended the call-back program: borderline applicants are now simply denied. These changes freed resources to perform more field investigations, which focused on serious fraud, including alien smuggling, imposters, and mala fide relationships. ¶C. IV FRAUD ¶10. A reorganization of anti-fraud resources also took place in the immigrant visa section. The consular section no longer verifies every civil document presented in immigrant visas cases. The verifications represented a considerable commitment of time, particularly given the difficulties of travel in the DRC, and often produced inconclusive results. In addition, all documents are not central to adjudicating every kind of immigrant visa case. As in NIV work, emphasis has moved to spending more time on interviews and field investigations. The consular section pays particular attention to minors. A 2007 NIV validation study showed a high-incidence of overstays for children, particularly boys, between the ages of 10 and 14. Post believes a similar kind of risk exists in immigrant cases for children, who may be petitioned by persons lacking a biological relationship. ¶11. DNA testing provides an invaluable tool in anti-fraud work across immigrant visa categories, most notably for Visas 92/93, and post welcomes the changes brought by reftel B. The primary value of DNA testing for the consular section is deterrence. In fiscal year 2008, post monitored 85 DNA tests; 80 came back positive. Post estimates, however, that perhaps twice that many tests were recommended but never completed, suggesting at least some mala fide applicants dropped claims rather than risk being exposed. The general public is aware that the consular section regularly suggests DNA testing. ¶D. DV FRAUD ¶12. In fiscal year 2008, post saw a 30% rise in DV adjudications, the second year of such an increase. "Pop-up" marriages - marriages that took place after the principal applicant entered the lottery - represent the largest number and most difficult of fraud cases. Post conducts separate interviews for the husband and wife in pop-up marriages and requires convincing secondary evidence. Still, many interviews lead to field investigations, and post estimates that half of these marriages are not issued DVs. Post has continued the practice of verifying all DRC high school diplomas, and fake diplomas constitute the second largest source of DV fraud. Applicants also present certificates and training program diplomas to claim an education equivalent to an American high school diploma. The consular section usually does not accept these claims. Finally, post confirmed 12 cases of imposters during the DV season. ¶13. The WAE TDYer helped train the section in uncovering patterns of fraud by using Lexis/Nexus and CCD to find visa fixers in the United States and by identifying potentially problematic cases that needed additional attention. For example, post found that one address in the United States yielded 11 2009 DV winners. Of these cases, two were issued, two were denied for pre-existing derivatives, one missed the interview, five had "pop-up" marriages, and two were subjects of field investigations. The consular section plans greater use of computer-assisted anti-fraud tools during the next DV season. ¶14. Post has reported on the DRC's efforts to introduce biometric passports and on the difficulties applicants face in acquiring passports (reftels C and D). The delays affect all categories of applicants, but DV winners are particularly hard hit. Most DV winners receive their passports in the last two months of the fiscal year, and the sudden rush of applicants taxes the fraud unit. DV cases in the DRC are high risk - exceeded only by Visas 92/93 - and post will continue public outreach to encourage DV applicants to become documentarily qualified as soon as possible. ¶E. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD ¶15. Post had one case of ACS fraud: an imposter tried to obtain a US passport using genuine documents. The ACS FSN was alerted when a comparison of the application and documents showed errors. During the interview with the officer, the applicant was unfamiliar with the biographical details of his application. The case was turned over to the RSO, who elicited a confession. ¶F. ADOPTION FRAUD ¶16. Adoptions cases are numerous and problematic. Congolese law governing adoptions is complicated and confusing - and frequently ignored by courts. For example, the law forbids couples with two children from adopting a third; local judges, however, frequently ignore this prohibition and issue valid acts of adoption to couples with large families. In addition, informal adoptions are commonplace. In the typical scenario, a child goes to live with a family member who is better off financially (or who is immigrating to the United States),but no legal adoption takes place, and the biological parents remain active in the child's life. For these reasons, adoption cases take up a large portion of anti-fraud resources, because a large number of documents must be authenticated and because a field investigation is usually required. ¶G. USE OF DNA TESTING ¶17. As mentioned earlier, DNA testing is vital to Embassy Kinshasa's anti-fraud work, particularly in Visas 92/93 cases, where documents are often missing or unavailable. Despite the poverty found in the DRC, most applicants do not object to the costs associated with the testing, since it often provides the only means to establish a biological relationship. Instead, applicants express concern about the time needed to receive results, but even then, the testing can be faster than trying to obtain documents from local officials in areas racked by war. ¶H. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD ¶18. Visa 92/93 cases present unique anti-fraud challenges. A typical mala fide applicant holds the same profile as a typical bona fide applicant: a child who knows little or nothing about the petitioner and lacks documents proving the relationship. DNA testing is vital for confirming biological relationships but cannot authentic marriages or adoptions, which are common. Most Visas Qauthentic marriages or adoptions, which are common. Most Visas 92/93 applicants, moreover, are poorly educated, bewildered by the bureaucratic demands of immigrant visa processing, and living close to poverty. The end result can be cases that stretch out for months. As an example, in October 2008, the consular section interviewed seven children petitioned by their father in a Visas 92/93 case. The two oldest children did not look like the other five, had no secondary evidence of their relationship to the petitioner, and at the interview, appeared to be coached. Post asked for DNA testing. The two youngest children were tested in March 2009, and visas were issued, but the other five have never reappeared. During the reporting period, post confirmed several cases of fraudulent relationships but no cases of imposters. ¶I. ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL ¶19. Trafficking remains a serious concern for post. Consular officers pay close attention to children in all visa categories. During the reporting period, post did not issue any tourist visas to children traveling alone or to domestics. Post scrutinizes Kinshasa's large Lebanese community, some of who may be involved in terrorist fund-raising. In August, one Lebanese businessman was denied a visa when his SAO indicated ineligibility. In September the DRC sent a diplomatic note for two Cubans working as presidential physicians; both had applied in 2008 with different names in Congolese passports. The applicants have been found ineligible under 212(a)(6)(C),and post plans to ask the DRC for a formal explanation. ¶J. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS ¶20. Post had one DS criminal fraud investigation. ¶K. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY ¶21. Post had concerns about the security of the interim biometric passports the DRC began issuing in 2008, but the Department determined that the passports were valid travel documents, and the DRC stopped issuing them in March 2009. The old, non-biometric passports are still valid, most with a validity date until 2012. These passports provide biographic information written in ink, which is often difficult to read, and lack rudimentary security features. Of more concern are the administratve procedures involved in acquiring passports. Application procedures are not standardized, and it is possible for an applicant to obtain a passport without supporting documentation. Even that supporting documentation can be suspect. Congolese law requires that all births be registered within three months. But if a birth is not registered, two witnesses can make a sworn statement, a local magistrate can issue a judgment based on that statement, and a birth certificate can be issued. The majority of DV and Visas 92/93 applicants seen in the reporting period provided birth certificates registered in 2009. Marriage certificates are even more problematic. Congolese law recognizes three types of marriages, customary, civil, and religious. Customary marriages are regulated by local governments, which show little interest in providing administrative oversight. ¶L. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES ¶22. The consular section enjoys a solid working relationship with the MFA's office of protocol and with the Director General of immigration. Local officials, with a few exceptions, work willingly with fraud investigators. But these relationships have built-in limits: both the Director General and the Chief of protocol have made multiple visa recommendations for mala fide travelers. Even those host government officials willing to work with the consular section are hampered by administrative constraints, such as intermittent power supplies, incomplete administrative records, and low employee morale. ¶M. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN ¶23. The vacant entry-level officer position is the section's number-one concern. The junior officer position - one of two officers in the section - has been vacant for six months and is unlikely to be filled before January. This officer is normally the visa chief and head of the anti-fraud unit. Fraud prevention remains a top priority, but reorganization and shifting resources can only go so far, and effective fraud work requires a second officer. Because of the staffing gap, the consul was forced to cancel attendance at the anti-fraud course in June. ¶N. STAFFING AND TRAINING ¶24. The Consul and the FSN Consular Assistant serve as the Fraud Prevention Unit. Two consular FSNs have applied for fraud training QPrevention Unit. Two consular FSNs have applied for fraud training in Washington in November, but currently post does not have any officers who have completed fraud prevention training. BROCK