DDRRR, the FDLR, and Kimia II

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000896 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MOPS PREF PGOV PREL PHUM CG SUBJECT: DDRRR, the FDLR, and Kimia II ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Goma PolOff recently met with DDRRR officials, who presented a snapshot of their efforts in the Kivus. Many ex-CNDP units, "integrated" into the FARDC, continue to use child soldiers, according to DDRRR interlocutors. FARDC cooperation with DDRRR over the last month has improved noticeably, and FDLR repatriation rates have recently increased slightly. However, real challenges exist, including the apparent reluctance by many FDLR to surrender to DDRRR, because MONUC is supporting the FARDC in military operations against the FDLR. The FDLR is actively recruiting in many areas of North Kivu. In South Kivu, the FDLR has reportedly adopted a strategy of brutal attacks, primarily in an effort to weaken international community support for Kimia II. Some FDLR elements have apparently retreated to Katanga and Maniema Provinces. End summary. DDRRR Snapshot -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Goma Poloff recently accompanied MONUC personnel to a Goma DDRRR camp. Poloff interviewed 13 ex-combatants awaiting DDRRR processing. Six of the 13 were children. DDRRR's Matthew Brubacher reported that DDRRR receives 15 child soldiers per week, indicating that children comprise approximately one-half of all ex-combatants received by DDRRR. Brubacher maintained that many of the ex-CNDP units that had child soldiers in their ranks continue to use children in their new role within the FARDC. ¶3. (SBU) A 12-year old ex-combatant said that he had been workng as a cook for a new Mai Mai group, Manyoua-Mayoua, near Kisharo in Rutshuru Territory. Brubacher said this was the fourth new Mai Mai group to appear in September, commenting that the Mai Mai groups have been formed to combat the growing influence of ex-CNDP forces in the area. ¶4. (SBU) Brubacher reported improved cooperation between MONUC and the FARDC over the last month, with FARDC actively engaging in DDRRR operational planning. The FARDC strongly supported the establishment of the DDRRR's temporary camps. ¶5. (SBU) Operational difficulties, however, exist in maintaining the integrity of designated safe zones around DDRRR camps, as well as the general ability of FDLR elements to reach the camps. In addition, the FARDC often arrests FDLR combatants who attempt to reach the camps, thus discouraging FDLR elements from considering repatriation. Challenges Facing DDRRR -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Brubacher cataloged a list of challenges, which the DDRRR and DDR face: -- For DDR, the status of non-integrated armed groups is ambiguous. -- There needs to be a reduction in the delay between the disarmament of Congolese combatants and their reintegration to lower the risk of defection and re-recruitment. -- While coordination between DDRRR and the Kimia II military operations has improved, DDRRR still encounters difficulties in arranging rendezvous points for FDLR within FARDC areas of control. -- Quite simply, because MONUC is assisting the FARDC in Kimia II, FDLR trust in DDRRR has declined. -- DDRRR lacks sufficient resources to open additional camps. ¶7. (SBU) Despite these hurdles, DDRRR reported that the FDLR repatriation rate over the past couple of weeks has risen slightly. In August, DDRRR received 114 FDLR combatants and 101 FDLR dependents. Between September 1-15, DDRRR has already received 74 FDLR combatants. In 2008, the monthly average for FDLR combatant QFDLR combatants. In 2008, the monthly average for FDLR combatant repatriations was 50. DDRRR estimates that approximately 10% of the FDLR membership is Congolese. FDLR Recruitment in North Kivu -------------- ¶8. (SBU) FDLR activities continue in North Kivu, with large concentrations around Ntoto. The headquarters of FOCA army commander Mudacamura is reportedly a four-hour walk north of Ntoto. FDLR, who recently surrendered to DDRRR, confirmed that recruitment was on-going. FDLR carry out forced recruitment within the Rwandophone community, but it also accepts volunteers from other ethnic groups, such as PARECO elements that joined earlier this KINSHASA 00000896 002 OF 002 year. The main recruitment center is now at Ngenge in Masisi Territory. The FDLR have also created a special unit charged with "civil resistance." The unit organizes paramilitary groups to assist the FDLR and also forms a pool of future recruits. ¶9. (SBU) RUD, which operates west of Nyamilima in Rutshuru Territory, conducts recruiting in southwest Uganda, according to DDRRR. RUD's numbers, however, have remained relatively static between 300-350 combatants. FDLR Campaign of Terror in South Kivu -------------- ¶10. (SBU) In South Kivu, the FDLR continues its campaign of reprisal attacks, house burnings, and civilian killings, all in increasingly brutal ways. Information, which DDRRR has received, indicate these attacks are part of a well-defined strategy by the FDLR to increase the humanitarian costs of Kimia II, weaken international community support for the operations, and force local communities to cooperate with the FDLR. ¶11. (SBU) FDLR sources along the Lulimba-Kilembwe axis report they will disburse in the face of FARDC advances, as they consider the RDF their enemy, not the FARDC. Other FDLR sources said they planned to move into the forests of Maniema Province. ¶12. (SBU) Several mid-level FDLR commanders have reportedly made contact with DDRRR in Bukavu and Baraka to discuss the possibility of surrendering. FDLR units have moved back into places in South Kivu previously occupied as a result of Kimia II operations, including Kauma, Kachiri, and Karasi, all southwest of Bunyakiri. FDLR Moving to Katanga -------------- ¶13. (SBU) DDRRR will establish a temporary camp in Katanga Province, as it expects increasing numbers of FDLR to enter the northern part of this province. As FARDC operations in southern South Kivu ramp up, DDRRR wants to deploy radio broadcasters in the area to encourage the FDLR to surrender. ¶14. (SBU) Comment: While DDRRR faces many challenges, it is vital to keep this option credible as an end-game for many FDLR combatants, while simultaneously demonstrating that the only other option is a military one. Many FDLR apparently prefer to run and scatter in the hopes of fighting another day. However, the fact that repatriations continue at a steady rate indicates many other FDLR are opting for this path. Most troubling is the FDLR recruitment campaign in North Kivu. Tension remains high between "integrated" CNDP units in the FARDC and the local population. End comment. BROCK