AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH DEPUTY PM MOBUTU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000861 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM CG SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH DEPUTY PM MOBUTU Classified By: William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. Summary: Deputy Prime Minister Joseph Mobutu Nzanga Ngbangawe told the Ambassador on September 21 that there would most likely be a cabinet reshuffle in early October, probably the last before upcoming elections in 2010 (local) and in 2011 (parliamentary and presidential). Muzito, who Mobutu roundly criticized, would probably be replaced. Mobutu characterized the government as "broken down," with all major decisions taken by a shadow cabinet in the presidency. The fate of his party's participation in any future government remained uncertain, according to Mobutu. A reconciliation between President Kabila and former National Assembly President Vital Kamerhe is possible. Mobutu welcomed improved relations with Rwanda, but he criticized Kigali for not being more vocal in encouraging FDLR combatants and their dependents to return to Rwanda. It is questionable whether Mobutu, who is an engaging and thoughtful interlocutor, or his party, UDEMO, will survive any cabinet reshuffle. End summary. ¶2. (C) During a September 21 meeting with Ambassador, Deputy Prime Minister Joseph Mobutu Nzanga Ngbangawe said that there would most likely be a government reshuffle in early October. He noted that, with local elections possible in 2010 and national elections in 2011, this would be an important decision, as President Kabila would most likely not want to change the government too near these elections. The CNDP, as promised, would receive at least one ministerial portfolio and the RCD would also formally become part of the government (Note: Mobutu quipped that "everyone knew" that former South Kivu Governor and current Agriculture Minister Norbert Basengezi was RCD, although RCD leader Azarias Rubwerwa always claimed Basengezi had left the party. End note). There was even some discussion about bringing some opposition parties into a new GDRC, but Mobutu said this would fly in the face of the will of the voters. According to Mobutu, there is also discussion of trimming the 37 ministerial posts (40 if you include the three deputy prime ministers) down to around 25. Mobutu said he supported such a reduction, adding that he would go even further if others agreed. As for the likelihood of 2010 local elections, Mobutu said "it was hard to see how this would happen." Criticism for government, prime minister, and presidency -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Mobutu lambasted the working mechanics of the government. Cabinet meetings are now held every two months, rather than weekly. Internal cohesion within the government was poor, but it was even worse amongst the various parties within the governemnt coalition. Lack of cohesion, Mobutu added, could be very detrimental to Kabila's reelection prospects. Prime Minister Muzito's power has been emasculated, with all major decisions made by a presidential shadow cabinet, according to Mobutu. It was incredible, in Mobutu's opinion, that Muzito had not resigned, working under these conditions. Some have speculated that Muzito wants to run for president in 2011, so he wants to remain in the public eye. ¶4. (C) There is substantial opposition to Muzito, according to Mobutu, even within PALU, primarily because he has promised a lot, but delivered very little. In addition, he Qpromised a lot, but delivered very little. In addition, he was not well respected as Budget Minister. Direct interaction with the president is infrequent; his main mode of communication with Kabila is through the president's chief of staff. Mobutu opined that Muzito would probably be replaced in the government shuffle, but it was still unclear whether another PALU politician or someone from the AMP would get the nod. Mobutu maintained that Kabila was inherently uncomfortable and hesitant about taking such personnel decisions. ¶5. (C) Mobutu speculated that there was a political culture in the presidency, which did not promote collaboration, preferring instead to make key decisions within a small circle. Mobutu maintained that in 2006, during coalition negotiations, Kabila had exhibited extraordinary open-mindedness to the opinions of others. Now, all that had changed. Mobutu said that Kabila had told him in 2006 that he only wanted to serve two terms, a promise Mobutu said he hoped Kabila would keep. ¶6. (C) Kabila, a strong introvert, preferred to take his time before taking major decisions. Mobutu, however, acknowledged that when the president agreed on a course, he KINSHASA 00000861 002 OF 002 would eventually follow through on implementation even if it was delayed or pushed out into the future. Mobutu pointed to a major split between those DRC politicians educated and trained in the West and those who had spent most of their lives in the DRC. This phenomenon crossed political divides. Implying that the presidency preferred the latter group, Mobutu proclaimed that he was more comfortable with those with "an outward vision." UDEMO future uncertain -------------- ¶7. (C) Mobutu stated that UDEMO's future in the government coalition depended on whether Kabila would commit to a more collaborative approach. He acknowledged that some had questioned UDEMO's loyalty to the president when the party's lone member of the National Assembly's Executive Board refused to resign, as instructed by the presidency, during Vital Kamerhe's dispute with Kabila. Mobutu said the refusal was based on procedural concerns, not "out of disrespect for Kabila." (Note and comment: In the reconstituted Executive Bureau, UDEMO did not receive a post. This led many observers to speculate that Kabila would drop UDEMO from any future government coalition. A close advisor to Kamerhe had previously recounted to us how Kamerhe had convinced both Kabila and Mobutu to shed their differences and overcome their fathers' legacies to forge a coalition for the 2006 elections. It does appear that Kabila feels less need to keep UDEMO in the government; in 2006, it was probably a tactic to deprive the MLC of support on its home turf in Equateur Province. End note and comment). Kamerhe's future -------------- ¶8. (C) The political future of Kamerhe, in Mobutu's opinion, remains uncertain. Mobutu regretted the "deep misunderstanding" that developed earlier this year between the two, which led to Kamerhe's resignation. Kamerhe had been one of the key figures around Kabila, someone on whom Kabila could rely. While the proximate cause of the fallout had been Kamerhe's questioning of the DRC-Rwandan joint military operations without informing the legislative branch, there were probably some in the presidency, perhaps even Kabila himself, who viewed Kamerhe as a formidable challenger for the 2011 elections. Mobutu did not exclude a reconciliation between the two. DRC-Rwandan Relations -------------- ¶9. (C) Mobutu welcomed improved relations between the DRC and Rwanda, but he argued strongly for an "inter-Rwandan dialogue," similar to the inter-Congolese dialogue carried through earlier this decade. Claiming that the GoR still skillfully "plays the victim card," Mobutu admitted that such a dialogue might take time to develop. The GoR, in Mobutu's opinion, should be more vocal in stating its willingness to accept back and reintegrate FDLR combatants and their dependents. Instead, Kigali only talks about dealing with the FDLR genocidaires. ¶10. (C) Growing commercial ties between the two countries were encouraging. Joint development of methane gas in Lake Kivu was an example of newfound trust. The Kivus, Mobutu added, were agriculturally fertile regions with enormous potential for cross-border trade. By completing planned road connections between Kisangani and Eastern DRC, there will soon be a commercial connection from Kinshasa to Kisangani (via river traffic) to the Kivus and on to East African ports. Q(via river traffic) to the Kivus and on to East African ports. ¶11. (C) Comment: Mobutu is suave, comfortable with western interlocutors, and he exudes confidence. He is, however, the leader of a political party with very little popular backing. UDEMO's days in government and his days as deputy prime minister are probably numbered. Much of his criticism of Muzito and Kabila is obviously self-serving, but much of it tracks with our analysis as well: a weak cabinet; a small circle of shadow decision-makers in the presidency; and a growng tendency by the PPRD to disdain collaboration with its coalition partners. While his criticism of Rwanda is somewhat knee-jerk and in line with the politics of his father after the genocide, many Congolese share his view that Rwanda is not doing enough to encourage repatriations. End comment. GARVELINK