DRC EXTRADITES SUSPECTED GENOCIDAIRE TO ARUSHA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000849 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CG RW SUBJECT: DRC EXTRADITES SUSPECTED GENOCIDAIRE TO ARUSHA REF: KINSHASA 757 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On September 20, the GDRC extradited Rwandan genocidaire suspect Gregoire Ndahimana to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha. Ndahimana, who surrendered to MONUC's DDRRR on August 11, had been "grabbed up" by the FARDC and sent to Kinshasa. The long delay in extraditing Ndahimana had led to speculation that the GDRC was using him as a bargaining chip to obtain the extradition of former CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda to the DRC. Other sources opined that Ndahimana had maintained close commercial ties with senior GDRC and FARDC officials who did not want these ties revealed at the ICTR. GDRC Spokesman Lambert Mende publicly called on other countries, including Rwanda and European countries, to reciprocate. Failure by the GDRC to turn Ndahimana over to the ICTR would have discouraged FDLR leaders still in the bush from turning themselves in and entering the UN's DDRRR program. It took awhile, but, in the end, the DRC did the right thing. End summary. ¶2. (C) Early in the evening of September 20, the GDRC transferred suspected genocidaire Gregoire Ndahimana to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha. His wife and four children were released to MONUC's DDRRR for repatriation to Rwanda. According to the ICTR charges, Ndahimana, who was the burgomaster (mayor) of Kivumu, supervised the massacre of nearly 2,000 Tutsis who had taken refuge inside a church in Nyange at the beginning of the April 1994 genocide. The ICTR's General Prosecutor charged Ndahimana in August 2001. Ndahimana, his wife, and four children gave themselves up (reftel) to DDRRR on August 11 at Kashuga, North Kivu. (Note: DRC press reports and official GDRC statements claimed that Ndahimana was captured, although MONUC officials claimed this was pure propaganda. End note). A UK diplomat told Polcouns that Norway's Great Lakes Envoy, Arvid Oyen, had been instrumental in working behind the scenes over a long period to persuade Ndahimana to turn himself in. ¶3. (C) A source in MONUC's Joint Monitoring Analysis Cell (intelligence unit) had told us that FARDC officials immediately "grabbed up" Ndahimana from DDRRR officials, once they knew it was, in fact, Ndahimana. Two other MONUC sources in Kinshasa, however, claimed that ICTR officials on the ground voluntarily turned Ndahimana over to the FARDC. (Comment: While there are contradictory versions within MONUC, it is fairly clear that UN officials -- either MONUC or ICTR -- freely transferred Ndahimana to GDRC custody. End comment). The FARDC then transferred Ndahimana and his family members to Kinshasa on August 13. MONUC said that Congolese intelligence (ANR) had been holding Ndahimana at the Makala Prison. ¶4. (C) A relatively long, uneasy period ensued, with many analysts questioning whether the GDRC would transfer Ndahimana. Various theories circulated in Kinshasa as to why Ndahimana had not been extradited immediately: -- Well-known DRC inefficiency (Comment: as time dragged on, this became less likely. End comment.) -- FARDC elements were holding out to claim the Rewards for Justice reward money (Comment: also unlikely, as more and QJustice reward money (Comment: also unlikely, as more and more time went by. End comment.) -- The GDRC hoped to make some kind of a trade for former CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda, under house arrest in Rwanda. -- Ndahimana had close business relations with senior GDRC and FARDC officials. If he were transferred to Arusha, this would give him an international stage to reveal potentially embarrassing commercial ties. (Comment: MONUC told us that it had received credible evidence that Ndahimana had indeed had commercial dealings with powerful Kinshasa figures. Also, until the recent DRC-Rwandan rapprochement, it was common for FDLR figures in Eastern DRC to be in business with GDRC and FARDC officials. End comment.) ¶5. (U) Government Spokesman and Communications Minister Lambert Mende called on other countries, who "had people with Mr. Ndahimana's profile on their territory," to deliver them to justice. Pressed whether he was referring to Nkunda, KINSHASA 00000849 002 OF 002 Mende replied, "that's right. This is a question to which the Rwandan authorities should respond." He added that European countries, where FDLR emigres resided, should also extradite known FDLR genocidaires. ¶6. (C) Comment: Although Ndahimana was turned over to the ICTR in the end, there was real potential for serious consequences if the DRC had not done so. Recently improved relations between Kinshasa and Kigali might have suffered, and the GDRC's fragile international reputation would have taken a hit. If Ndahimana had languished in a Kinshasa prison, this would also have discouraged other FDLR officials from considering the DDRRR option. In the end, the GDRC made the correct decision. We anticipate growing calls from the DRC press and politicians for Rwanda to extradite Nkunda. End comment. GARVELINK