LRA OPERATION LIGHTNING THUNDER - THE VIEW FROM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000081 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG SUBJECT: LRA OPERATION LIGHTNING THUNDER - THE VIEW FROM KINSHASA REFS: A) Kinshasa 46 B) Kinshasa 20 C) 08 Kinshasa 1146 and Previous ¶1. (SBU) Summary: This cable provides an overview of information with respect to issues surrounding Operation Lightning Thunder against the LRA, since military action began in December 2008. It highlights LRA atrocities committed against the civilian population following and preceding the operation, the attendant humanitarian response, local press coverage, and MONUC's role. End Summary. DRC Extends Invitation to UPDF -------------- ¶2. (U) On January 22, the DRC extended its invitation to the UPDF to remain in the DRC to conduct military operations against the LRA, according to press reports. The extension, which is valid for 21 days, may be extended again, if needed. Humanitarian Overview -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The Head of OCHA for the DRC recently provided post with an internal summary of LRA atrocities against Congolese civilians, which covers a period between mid-September 2008 and mid-January ¶2009. -- Numbers of attacks: The LRA attacked 36 locations during the period; 16 of these attacks have taken place since Christmas 2008. -- Civilian deaths: The total estimated number of civilian deaths is 569 persons. -- Wounded/injured civilians: According to OCHA, the number of wounded/injured civilians has been grossly under-reported, especially in the aftermath of the attacks during and after Christmas 2008 in the Faradje and Doruma areas. In the attacks which have taken place between December 2008 and January 2009, LRA combatants have utilized machetes extensively, due to the loss of weaponry in the wake of UPDF operations. Various sources have confirmed to OCHA cases of decapitation, machete wounds, physical torture and rape. -- Abduction of civilians: The number of abductions reported during this period stands at 427 civilians. However, OCHA believes the actual number must be considerably higher, given that in the run-up to September 2008 approximately 400 civilian abductions had been reported. The attacks of September-October 2008 represented a turning point in the modalities of LRA operations in the DRC. In previous raids (April-May 2008 and the previous 2006-2007 period), civilians were abducted mostly as porters and instances of release were more common. �00A;-- Internal displacement: To date, OCHA estimates that roughly 104,000 persons are displaced in approximately 16-20 different locations in the territory of Haut Uele. ¶4. (SBU) OCHA cautions that, in general, the numbers of civilian casualties and abductions have been extremely difficult to verify as attacks occur in remote locations, which are difficult to access and have extremely poor communications infrastructure. They also note that family separation during displacement and successive displacement renders it difficult to estimate accurately the number of abductions. Separately, UNHCR estimates that the LRA has killed 620 people since September 2008 and that approximately 115,000 people remain displaced. ¶5. (SBU) The Head of OCHA told post that the focus is on health and relief aid distributions, i.e., non-food items. The patterns of recent attacks are a major concern for humanitarian organizations, as they believe aid (especially food aid) may attract LRA combatants in search of sustenance and other goods. Nevertheless, they continue working on strengthening the response and the establishment of "safe aid areas." ¶6. (SBU) Separately, the USAID DART team reported that humanitarian organizations attempting to deliver and distribute aid to IDPs and other vulnerable populations in the province continue to face significant logistical obstacles due to insecurity and poor road conditions. The team also reported that the distribution of non-food items in Dungu by UNICEF and implementing partners remained suspended as of January 14 due to ongoing tensions between IDPs and the local population. At the same time, UNHCR and implementing partners will aim to reach 100,000 IDPs who have not received KINSHASA 00000081 002 OF 003 assistance since September 2008. DRC Press Coverage -------------- ¶7. (U) Local press coverage of Operation Lightning Thunder has focused principally on the modalities of the operation and LRA follow-on atrocities against the civilian population. From our viewpoint, there is very little public attention on the operation. Nevertheless, there have been some articles reflecting discontent. The January 7, 2009 edition of the independent La Reference Plus carried an op-ed from a former member of the DRC parliament, Jeannine Aiwa, entitled "The Government Has Blessed LRA Massacres Since 2005." Aiwa claimed that the LRA entered the DRC in 2004 at the request of the government, following contact with an LRA representative in the United States. According to the author, LRA fighters have remained active in the region due to the complicity of government insiders. Aiwa stressed that the FARDC has been incapable of driving the LRA out of DRC territory. ¶8. (U) Additionally, the January 7, 2009 edition of the independent Le Potentiel contains an article entitled "Mixed Results of Military Operations Against LRA in Dungu." It points out that the presence of the Ugandan army in Orientale Province may signal another foreign occupation of the DRC. Benoit Kinalego, Chairman of the Dungu-based Justice and Peace Diocesan Commission, characterized the LRA attacks as a consequence of a lack of a coherent strategy on the part of the GDRC. Kinshasa authorities, he continued, needed to develop a more consistent approach to the LRA issue, while the government should strengthen the FARDC contingent on the ground (Note: The recent entry of Rwandan soldiers into the DRC to fight the FDLR has, unsurprisingly, also generated a great deal of press coverage which is likely to overshadow reporting on the Ugandan presence. End note). MONUC's Role -------------- ¶9. (SBU) According to a MONUC military source, the organization has principally been providing logistic support to the FARDC in the context of the operation against the LRA. This support includes limited transportation for FARDC soldiers and vehicles to the field, a certain medevac capability, and provision of a certain amount of dry rations, fuel, and water purification capabilities. The MONUC base in Dungu has also been reinforced with one Moroccan battalion, and additional MONUC forces were also reportedly deployed to Faradje. Additionally, UPDF soldiers have also used the MONUC base at Dungu during the operation. Summary of LRA Actions in DRC -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The following points are particular highlights from recent editions of post's daily Eastern DRC Notes cable report. Interested readers may consult these reports for further details on LRA-related issues, to include particular instances of LRA attacks in the DRC from December 2008-January 2009. -- MONUC's Ituri Brigade recently reported that there are 1,200 UPDF soldiers in the DRC and that the UPDF has deployed to South Sudan (ref A). -- MONUC recently reported a total of 38 LRA fighters killed and eight captured. A separate set of 21 LRA combatants have apparently surrendered to "other forces" (undefined, but not UPDF or FARDC) (ref A). -- MONUC and Human Rights Watch provided information that some villages in LRA-afflicted areas have organized self-defense forces in conjunction with the FARDC. These forces have on at least two occasions beaten back the LRA. One incident resulted in three LRA fighters killed and five killed in another (ref A). -- According to MONUC, the UPDF believes that Kony is still in Garamba Park and that the LRA consists of 600 combatants and 200 dependents (Ref B). -- A local NGO leader told Post on December 22 (ref C) that the LRA had "lost lots of human and material resources" during the initial attack. Imam Abd Shakur Shukrani, leader of the Bunia Muslim community, told post that the LRA had been dislodged from many positions from which they had harassed the local population. KINSHASA 00000081 003.2 OF 003 However, he also predicted follow-on LRA reprisals, noting that the remaining LRA elements had dispersed over a large area, with many locals expecting retaliation. Shukrani said that the LRA had distributed pamphlets in which it warned that the group would attack MONUC and exact harsher treatment on the local population. Comment -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The GDRC's decision to allow the UPDF, unarguably a more formidable fighting force than the FARDC, to attack the LRA was courageous. The extreme remoteness of the area has obscured to the average Congolese the extent and development of the operation, as well as the heinous LRA reprisals. Support for Lightning Thunder in the DRC remains ambivalent - there is a recognition that the FARDC needed outside assistance to try to rid the DRC of the LRA scourge. On the other hand, there is a growing, albeit undefined, unease with continued LRA atrocities on DRC soil. In any case, the LRA, in DRC public and governmental opinion, takes a backseat to the ever-changing drama in the Kivus. GARVELINK