IMPROVING DRC-GOR RELATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000796 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CG RW SUBJECT: IMPROVING DRC-GOR RELATIONS REF: KINSHASA 741 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: All indications are that the main focus of the August 6 Kabila-Kagame discussions was development of Lake Kivu methane gas as an energy source. Specific details regarding the meeting, the first bilateral meeting between DRC and Rwandan presidents since 1998, remain sketchy, as the DRC side continued its practice of including only a few senior level ministers in DRC-Rwandan deliberations. We believe that DRC-Rwandan relations are solid, unarguably the best since at least 1994. This rapprochement appears to be based on personal trust between the two presidents, trust stemming from the relatively successful Umoja Wetu military operations, and recognition that each country's economic and security interests are best served by cooperation, not confrontation. This improvement in relations is still fragile, and while both nations have accomplished much on their own, the international community should still stand by, encouraging deeper regional economic integration as a means to cement better relations. End summary. Kagame and Kabila tete-a-tete -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On August 6, DRC President Kabila and Rwandan President Kagame met, the first in-country bilateral meeting between DRC and Rwandan heads of state since 1998, although Kabila and Kagame have met various times on the margins of international events. Atmospherics surrounding the meeting (reftel) were seen as highly positive and a final communique proclaimed that the presidents had discussed "all questions of mutual interest." DRC Minister of Regional and International Cooperation (and Kabila's point man for diplomatic interaction with Rwanda) Raymond Tshibanda announced that the to governments would re-start the DRC-Rwanda Joint Commission, a body that has not met for 21 years. Both sides hailed the imminent exchange of ambassadors. ¶3. (C) Detailed information about the meeting has been scarce both in Goma and in Kinshasa. The two met one-on-one for some 90 minutes, then were joined for 30 minutes by "only a few senior ministers," according to a Goma contact. The number of people with first-hand knowledge of the conversation was, therefore, deliberately limited. Several sources have, however, told us that the primary topic was the commercial development of methane gas in Lake Kivu. Kinshasa newspapers speculated that Kagame had come "to coach" Kabila in advance of the DRC president's meeting with Secretary Clinton on August 10. The close-lipped nature surrounding the summit, and the limited number of participants follows a pattern established in late 2008/early 2009 when the DRC and GOR began talks in the 4 by 4 format, which ultimately led to joint military operations against the FDLR and CNDP leader Nkunda's arrest. Solid relations -------------- ¶4. (C) Following the withdrawal of Rwandan forces and the conclusion of the Umoja Wetu military operation in March, various diplomatic sources voiced concern to us that DRC-GOR relations were moving off-track. These sources pointed to the lack of high-level meetings between senior government officials as proof that relations had soured. Our analysis -- then and now -- is that DRC-Rwandan relations are solid, immeasurably better than anytime since 1994 or earlier. Qimmeasurably better than anytime since 1994 or earlier. Granted, the dynamic is new, even fragile, but the foundation has been laid. While comparisons are risky, the rapprochement is perhaps not unlike the rapprochement between Germany and France after World War II: in both cases leaders recognized that unending conflict had only brought ruin to their countries. ¶5. (C) It took political courage for Kabila to reach out his hand to Kagame. Against his natural tendency to hesitate, Kabila choose an "activist" path. He was roundly criticized by many in DRC political circles, but, in our view, he has ultimately emerged stronger internally because of his decision to cooperate with Kigali. Given the lingering distrust of Rwanda by many in the DRC, Kabila continues to insist on involving a limited circle within his government on DRC-GOR issues. Primary GDRC players include the head of the national police, John Numbi, on security issues; Minister of KINSHASA 00000796 002 OF 002 Regional and International Cooperation Raymond Tshibanda; presidential advisor Augustin Katumba Mwanke; and to a lesser extent, Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexis Thambwe Mwamba. In general, Kabila prefers working with a few select individuals; when dealing with Rwanda, the circle becomes ever smaller. Economic relations underpin improved diplomatic climate -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The fact that an economic topic -- development of methane gas in Lake Kivu -- was front and center during the summit is a positive sign that the inter-state relationship is moving towards a more normal dynamic. There are still crucial issues that could re-emerge and disrupt the rapprochement, e.g., GDRC or GOR support for opposing militias or contentious refugee resettlement questions. However, on the economic front, there seems to be an "understanding" that both nations can prosper from increased state-to-state commerce. In fact, FDLR business interests in the Kivus represented a "middleman" in the business chain. The DRC finally realized that, by eliminating or severely restricting FDLR influence in commercial activities, the DRC could deal directly with Rwanda and retain a bigger cut of the profits. There should be no illusions: corrupt business practices will continue, but these will likely shift to a state-to-state basis, reducing the ability of armed groups to finance their causes through illicit and non-transparent business. The USG, along with its partners, should encourage more transparent regional trade between state actors. Potential pitfalls -------------- ¶7. (C) Despite the positive direction of DRC-Rwandan relations, there are potential pitfalls that could reverse this progress. A sudden deterioration of relations, while obviously the most detrimental, is the least likely scenario, in our opinion. For the first time in years, DRC and Rwandan security and economic interests have coalesced and converged. Another "spoiler" might be the campaign by some to forcefully reinstate a Rwandophone agenda in North Kivu, resulting in resentment from non-Rwandophone ethnic groups, and, in a worse case scenario, ethnic violence. This scenario, while plausible, is also not likely to develop, as long as the policy-makers in Kigali and Kinshasa agree to allow non-Rwandophones some degree of political clout and a modicum of the economic spoils. Some have speculated that a point has already been reached whereby Rwandophone interests control the economic landscape outside of Goma and Bukavu, content to allow Nande and Shi politicians to run the respective provincial capitals. We believe the more likely destabilizing force in DRC-Rwandan relations could be a rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation in the Kivus, broght on by increased FDLR activity, the re-emergence of armed groups, and/or ever-worsening human rights violations by the FARDC. Finally, lurking in the background is the question of Nkunda's fate and the possibility, albeit unlikely, that some kind of rump CNDP force will again take up arms. Way forward -------------- ¶8. (C) When the DRC and Rwanda began the closely-held 4 by 4 talks in December 2008, the international community clamored to be included in the deliberations. Some even went so far as to claim that the two governments' unwillingness to Qas to claim that the two governments' unwillingness to include outsiders was proof that they were working a bad deal under the table. Others opined that, without international supervision, the rapprochement was doomed to failure. However, Kinshasa and Kigali have managed to carry through this remarkable about-face through their own recognition that security and stability in the Kivus served their national security interests. There is still a role for the international community to play, as both sides, particularly the Congolese, need outside moral and material support. However, it appears to us that the rapprochement began with more trust on a personal level between Kagame and Kabila. The relative success of Umoja Wetu demonstrated that this trust has become part of the security equation. Now, both sides have moved their mutual trust towards the economic sphere. It is through intertwined commercial interests in a regionally integrated economic space that the DRC and Rwanda can really solidify, and perhaps make irreversible, their rapprochement. GARVELINK