CIVILIAN PROTECTION AGAINST LRA ATTACKS

UNCLAS KINSHASA 000784 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREF PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS KPKO CG SUBJECT: CIVILIAN PROTECTION AGAINST LRA ATTACKS IN THE DRC REFS: STATE 87508 ¶1. (U) Responses to reftel-specific questions for the DRC are in paragraph two below. Our response has been cleared by USAID/OFDA and DAO representatives at post. ¶2. (SBU) --What are the current MONUC and FARDC response capacities in LRA-affected areas? The FARDC has approximately 6,000 soldiers involved in Operation Rudia II, spread out over an area north of an axis formed by Faradje-Dungu-Ango. They are dismounted infantry operating in battalion- and company-sized units, some reinforced by 30-man UPDF intelligence teams. MONUC has a Moroccan battalion in three company operating bases (COBs) in Haut Uele (Duru, Dungu, Faradje) and two temporary operating bases with Senegalese troops in Bas Uele (Isiro and Dingila). There is also a Bangladeshi engineer company and two helicopters based in Dungu. Other helicopters support Rudia II from the Kivus. MONUC and FARDC response capacities are probably as good as can be expected given their troop numbers and the vast territory in which the LRA is operating. Since the beginning of the year, MONUC has been noticeably more active in efforts to secure major axes and thereby improve security and facilitate commerce. FARDC troops have displayed unusual discipline in dealing with the local populations. Despite these trends, the challenge of providing protection to all civilians in the region at all times remains impossible. As one senior MONUC official commented, "we cannot put a soldier behind every banana tree." --What is the impact of real or perceived MONUC mandate limitations with regard to civilian protection in the areas affected by the LRA? Our understanding is that MONUC presently has a clear mandate to carry out civilian protection. The problem, from our viewpoint, is not that the mandate is lacking; the problem lies in on-going, broadly dispersed insecurity. --Post has provided considerable information to date on shortfalls in NGO/IO humanitarian operations in LRA-affected areas. We would appreciate any further information on shortfalls, and particularly what obstacles are creating these. Once the security situation is addressed, the logistical challenges will become much more manageable. Quite frankly, the biggest shortfall facing the NGO/IO community is the inability to access the majority of the LRA-affected areas because of poor security. Humanitarian organizations therefore continue to operate in a very limited space. If the security situation improves, there is a large potential pool of financial and human resources that could be deployed quickly to the region. --How would any additional humanitarian resources best be used to provide assistance and protection to civilian populations? In our view, additional humanitarian resources in the current environment could even aggravate the security situation, as LRA elements are attracted to humanitarian distribution of foodstuffs, non-food items, and medicine. Humanitarian airdrops are particular magnets for LRA forces. GARVELINK