DRC SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S AUGUST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KINSHASA 000715 SIPDIS FROM THE AMBASSADOR STATE FOR THE SECRETARY ALSO FOR AF A/S CARSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PHUM CG SUBJECT: DRC SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S AUGUST 10/11 VISIT KINSHASA 00000715 001.7 OF 005 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Madam Secretary: Your August 10/11 visit to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) comes at a critical juncture. Effective leadership by President Joseph Kabila will determine whether the DRC,s government (GDRC) can successfully address the country's enormous development and security challenges and fulfill the population's high expectations following historic 2006 elections. If not, the DRC risks sliding backwards. There has been some important progress-- notably towards addressing regional relations and persistent conflict and insecurity in eastern DRC and, most recently, the dismissal of corrupt magistrates and actions against human rights violations by the Congolese military. However, Kabila must demonstrate a much firmer and sustained commitment to good governance and protection of human rights, as well as to combating endemic corruption and reforming key institutions such as the military. The themes presented recently by President Obama in Accra-- the importance of good governance and anti-corruption efforts and the need for Africans to take their future into their own hands -- are particularly relevant to the DRC's current political and social environment. Your visit is an opportunity to highlight our strong partnership with the Congolese people; at the same time, it is essential to stress that our commitment is based on high expectations for greater GDRC progress on human rights, good governance, democratic consolidation, and the ability to deliver basic services. Kabila,s Mixed Record -------------- ¶2. (C) Congolese have become increasingly disenchanted with Kabila and his government due to continuing instability in eastern DRC and the lack of tangible improvements in the lives of average citizens. In response, Kabila has turned inward, becoming increasingly reclusive: he rarely speaks publicly and has at times distanced himself from traditional donor partners. Kabila has also increasingly consolidated power: he trusts few of his ministers, preferring to rely on several close advisors for policy guidance. Kabila and Prime Minister Adolphe Muzito engaged in a very public rift in May*-ostensibly over Muzito,s mismanagement of the economy, but more likely over allegations of widespread corruption by the Prime Minister. Separately, a recent high-profile power struggle between the President and Speaker of the National Assembly Vital Kamerhe, a popular politician formerly close to Kabila and who helped secure Kabila,s 2006 electoral victory in the east, was resolved according to established, democratic procedures, with the Speaker resigning his post while retaining his seat in the National Assembly. With presidential elections slated for 2011 and local elections sliding from 2009 to 2010, Kabila is under significant pressure to show results. A cabinet reshuffle, widely anticipated for September, will change the DRC,s shifting political landscape once again. A key new development this time will be the expected inclusion of armed group members at the ministerial level, including the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), the former rebel group which integrated its forces into the Congolese military in early 2009. ¶3. (C) Kabila,s development strategy is framed by the &Cinq Chantiers8 or five reconstruction pillars: infrastructure, employment, housing, water and electricity, and HEALTH and education. The GDRC has little to show in most of these areas and donors continue to provide the majority of some social services such as health. Kabila has largely focused both his personal attention and political capital on addressing continuing insecurity in eastern DRC. In some respects, there has been important progress. The diplomatic rapprochement between the DRC and Rwanda beginning in late 2008 resulted in a significant shift in the political and military landscape in the Kivus, including the invitation of Rwandan troops onto DRC soil in early 2009 and the "accelerated" integration of the CNDP into the FARDC. Kabila has also taken some positive steps to address the DRC's endemic corruption and most recently, the culture of impunity within the military, although it remains to be seen if these are more than token gestures aimed at appeasing the international outcry over human rights abuses. In mid-July, Kabila dismissed 100 magistrates, including the head of the Supreme Court, for violations including corruption and misappropriation of public funds. We have also seen some actions, though limited, against the widespread impunity for human rights violations by the Congolese military (FARDC). KINSHASA 00000715 002.4 OF 005 The FARDC has announced a &zero tolerance8 policy on human rights violations and has censured five officers for human rights violations. The GDRC has also established a special tribunal to prosecute FARDC troops accused of human rights violations, most notably with the participation of the head of the FARDC, General Didier Etumba. While these are positive steps, the GDRC must do much more to eliminate corruption and end impunity for human rights violators. An Uncertain Economic Future -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Congolese have yet to benefit from the country's vast resource wealth: 80 percent of the population lives in poverty. Following several years of stronger growth rates and greater macroeconomic stability, the DRC's economic environment changed dramatically during the course of 2008 as the DRC was significantly and negatively impacted by the global financial crisis due to its heavy reliance on natural resources for foreign exchange and limited capacity to protect against external shocks. The IMF revised projected GDP growth downward for 2009 to 2.7 percent, less than ONE third of the IMF's projections before the global financial crisis. International reserves fell to the lowest level in five years in early 2009 and the exchange rate has depreciated significantly, undermining the purchasing power of ordinary Congolese. At the same time, continuing conflict in the eastern DRC is having an adverse impact on the fiscal balance through public expenditures. To help support the continuation of basic services and augment international reserve levels, the World Bank approved $100 million in emergency assistance under its Fast Track Assistance Program in February and the IMF approved $200 million in emergency assistance under its Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) in March. The EU and African Development Bank have also provided emergency assistance. ¶5. (C) The DRC's long-term economic development will require increased commitment by the GDRC to a) improve public financial management, including better management of the country's vast resource wealth; b) greater diversification of the DRC,s economic base, with a particular focus on increased agricultural production; and c) improvements to the DRC,s dismal investment climate, currently ranked by the World Bank as the worst in the world. Kabila plans to address the DRC,s significant infrastructure development needs through a multi-billion Sino-Congolese minerals-infrastructure agreement signed in early 2008. The original agreement included a $3.2 billion mining project, with proceeds earmarked to repay two $3 billion tranches for infrastructure development. (Note: The second-phase infrastructure projects, valued at $3 billion, have allegedly been removed. End note.) At the same time, the GDRC continues to negotiate a formal IMF agreement (Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, PRGF) that would pave the way for desperately needed debt relief. However, the terms of the Sino-Congolese agreement as currently drafted raise significant concerns regarding debt sustainability. The USG, with G-7 and Paris Club creditors, has taken a firm position that specific provisions in the agreement-- including lifting of sovereign guarantees and addressing loan concessionality-- must be addressed before the Paris Club will provide financial assurances necessary for IMF board approval for a PRGF. There has been some progress towards renegotiation: in early June, the GDRC formally requested that the Chinese lift the mining project's sovereign guarantees. We understand that the Chinese have responded favorably, though it is unclear if all of our concerns have been adequately addressed. The IMF has stressed that the DRC needs both infrastructure development through the Sino-Congolese agreement and debt relief-- the DRC's development needs are simply too large to not include both. DRC,s Continuing Challenges -------------- ¶6. (C) The changing political-military landscape in the Kivus may offer the best chance in years for lasting peace and security in eastern DRC. A key development was Kabila,s bold decision to permit Rwandan armed forces (which had previously twice invaded and occupied large parts of the DRC) to enter its territory to fight the armed group known as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR),a group comprised in part of those complicit in the 1994 genocide and to which Kinshasa had given tacit and direct support at various times over the years. In turn, Rwanda acquiesced to the collapse of the National Congress for the KINSHASA 00000715 003.2 OF 005 Defense of the People (CNDP) rebel group, a Rwandan proxy which had disrupted North Kivu for a number of years. While from a military/security standpoint the joint Congolese-Rwandan operations had limited impact in neutralizing the FDLR, these developments are remarkable when seen against the backdrop of the DRC-Rwandan relationship of less than a year ago, when many observers believed the two countries appeared to be headed towards war. The FARDC, with MONUC support, recently launched anti-FDLR operations in South Kivu. Officially, these operations known as Kimia II were launched over two months ago; however, the initial phases involved limited deployments to assume gradual control over communication and transport routes. In the current phase, the FARDC will increase pressure on the FDLR to dislodge them from strategic sites. The FDLR has been active in response to the Kimia I and II operations and incidents of attacks on civilians have increased. Rwandan troops are not officially part of Kimia II operations. ¶7. (C) At the same time, other armed groups, including the Lords Resistance Army (LRA),also continue to terrorize Congolese populations in the east. Follow up efforts to the well-publicized and officially concluded Operation Lightning Thunder - a joint effort between the (FARDC),the Ugandan armed forces (UPDF),and the armed forces of South Sudan to combat the (LRA) - remain in focus. The numbers of Congolese killed, raped, tortured, kidnapped, and forced into slavery by the LRA continues to grow. While this joint operation was successful in diminishing some of the LRA's capability, the group remains intact and viable if not dispersed, and continues to carry out well-publicized attacks against the population. The responsibility now lies with the FARDC, supported by MONUC and remedial Ugandan military elements, to finish the job - but there are serious doubts as to whether these two entities have the capability or will to do so. ¶8. (C) Directly related to success in stabilizing eastern DRC will be more concerted efforts by the GDRC to reform the undisciplined and corrupt FARDC. Although the FDLR is the worst offender, we remain greatly concerned by the violence and human rights abuses that all armed forces and groups, including the FARDC and the Congolese National Police (PNC), perpetrate against civilians. Human rights advocates have extensively documented the involvement of these elements in such abuses. Sexual violence against women and girls in eastern DRC is pervasive. While most of the recorded attacks have been by armed groups and the FARDC, reports of rape by civilians is increasingly prevalent. A general climate of impunity does nothing to discourage these acts. In a 2008 report, the UN Human Rights Integrated Office in the DRC (UNHRO) stated that, despite strengthened laws on sexual violence, "law enforcement personnel and magistrates continue to treat rape and sexual violence in general with a marked lack of seriousness." Consequently, men accused of rape are often granted bail or given relatively light sentences, and out-of-court settlements of sexual violence cases are widespread. In fact, relatively few cases are reported to the police, and fewer still result in prosecution. However, the aforementioned actions of General Etumba may signal a change in the lax attitude towards impunity. ¶9. (C) USAID and the Departments of State and Defense support activities to respond to and prevent sexual and gender-based violence through a variety of interventions in the eastern provinces. Since 2002, USAID has allocated more than $10 million for activities to combat gender-based violence in the Eastern DRC and has assisted more than 100,000 survivors. Programs provide critical care and treatment services to survivors and their family members in North and South Kivu, Maniema, and Ituri District. The Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) has provided training sessions on the investigation of sex crimes to nearly all 350 of the FARDC military magistrates and police investigators with investigatory and adjudicatory roles. International community and USG efforts to build awareness within the DRC government to the seriousness of the SGBV problem are undertaken primarily within the context of development assistance, public diplomacy outreach, and security sector reform (SSR) coordination. However, the will and capacity of the international community to support and work alongside the DRC security services is compromised due to recurrent SGBV perpetrated by the GDRC's own forces. SGBV will stop only when perpetrators are held accountable for their violent crimes. Ending conflict in eastern DRC is only ONE element of efforts to put a stop to SGBV in the country; future anti-SGBV efforts must include a generational approach to changing the attitudes of the DRC population to better KINSHASA 00000715 004.2 OF 005 understand the value and roles of women in society. MONUC,s Key Role -------------- ¶10. (C) The UN mission to the DRC (MONUC) plays a critical role, from peacekeeping to governance to human rights protection. Tensions between the GDRC and MONUC were palpable earlier in the year when India announced its intention to withdraw its contingent, which makes up approximately 25 percent of MONUC's total peacekeeper complement, in response to a thinly veiled Congolese request that no more Indian troops be assigned to MONUC. Although the Indians recently reversed their position and will remain within MONUC, tensions persist. MONUC provides planning and logistical assistance to the Congolese national army (FARDC) and national police (PNC) for operations against illegal armed groups. MONUC support has been coordinated in two operations against sources of insecurity in the eastern DRC: Operation Rudia targeting the LRA in Orientale Province, and Operations Kimia I (2008) and II (2009) against the FDLR in North and South Kivu. MONUC and UN offices are supporting the electoral process through assistance to the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) as it prepares to revise electoral voter lists prior to local elections scheduled for 2009 (but unlikely before 2010) and presidential elections in 2011. US-DRC Bilateral Relationship -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Our bilateral relationship remains strong, but not without challenges. USG engagement focuses on consolidating peace and stability in eastern DRC; advancing democratic values, human rights and good governance; supporting economic empowerment; promoting a professional, disciplined and well-trained military; providing emergency and refugee assistance; and providing support for the provision of key basic services, including HEALTH and education. --Foreign Assistance: Overall foreign development assistance support from the U.S. is growing. The United States provides over $700 million per year in foreign and peacekeeping assistance to the DRC, of which more than $200 million is in the form of bilateral foreign assistance for development and humanitarian activities, with the remainder largely provided through contributions to multilateral organizations including MONUC. The USG budget for the DRC for development assistance increased in FY 2008 by approximately 25 percent, including supplemental appropriations for HIV/AIDS and security assistance funding. USAID implements programs in the areas of health, education, social protection, democracy and governance, economic growth, agriculture, and peace and security. --Peace and Stability in the East: The U.S. is a leader diplomatically within the region to promote peace and security. Since November 2007, a USG representative has staffed an embassy office in Goma. The officer reports on political events and represents the USG as part of the international facilitation (U.S., EU, and MONUC) that assists in the implementation of the November 2007 GDRC-GoR Nairobi Agreement and subsequent agreements between the GDRC and armed groups. The U.S. continues to facilitate the Tripartite Plus forum to address regional security and cooperation issues. Frequent USG diplomatic and congressional travel to the DRC demonstrates the level of commitment and interest the USG maintains in establishing peace and security in the DRC. Your visit will help to reinforce this display of commitment. --Security Sector Reform: The Congolese military, which must play a key role in solving the security challenges faced by the DRC, itself faces severe internal and external challenges. The USG and other partners are committed to seeing through progress in this area, though the pace of reform has been slow. The DRC is currently benefiting from a variety of projects through a number of different security assistance funds. U.S. security assistance to the DRC aims first and foremost to develop the FARDC into a professional, well-structured and disciplined fighting force, which respects human rights and has the respect and the trust of the people. While battlefield training is part of this program, it is equally important to focus on projects that provide for internal and long-term capacity reform (e.g. leadership training, command and control, human rights, etc.). --Democracy and Governance: In 2009, USG assistance will KINSHASA 00000715 005.2 OF 005 focus on improving governance and the rule of law as the DRC implements an ambitious decentralization program and puts in place constitutionally-mandated judicial institutions. Further assistance will encourage civic participation in political processes, including planned 2009 local elections. The Way Forward -------------- ¶13. (C) The DRC,s large population size (65 million) and location in the heart of Africa (including nine international borders) make the DRC key to central Africa's stability and security. The DRC is simply too important to let slide back into chaos. The USG remains firmly committed to supporting the GDRC, but our programs will only succeed with more effective leadership from President Kabila and his government. Your visit will provide a timely opportunity to stress to Kabila themes of continued regional and global cooperation to resolve security and economic challenges, unwavering U.S. support for MONUC's mandate and the need for greater GDRC commitment to Security Sector Reform (SSR), democratic governance, civilian and human rights protection, anti-GBV efforts, and the fight against impunity. GARVELINK