PRESIDENT KABILA PROVIDES BRIEFING ON RWANDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 000065

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PHUM KPKO CG
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KABILA PROVIDES BRIEFING ON RWANDAN
FORCES IN DRC

Classified By: Ambassador William Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.


1. (C) Summary: President Kabila met with UNSC Ambassadors
on January 20 to provide an update on events in the Eastern
Congo, particularly the entry of Rwandan Defense Force (RDF)
soldiers into DRC territory earlier that day. Following the
meeting, Kabila and Ambassador met alone briefly. Kabila
announced the beginning of a 15-day operation led by the
FARDC and supported by the RDF against the FDLR. Kabila
acknowledged the risks and uncertainties in undertaking this
operation. He asked for close cooperation with MONUC and for
assistance from the international community to meet
humanitarian needs, to support DRC-Rwandan rapprochement, and
to implement the Actes d,Engagement signed in Goma in
January 2008. Kabila noted in passing that the mini-summit
on the DRC in Addis would not take place. End Summary.


2. (C) On January 20, President Kabila convoked UNSC
Ambassadors, plus the Belgian and South African Ambassadors,
to provide a briefing on the situation in the East. Kabila
seemed relaxed, positive, and determined to resolve the FDLR
and CNDP problems "once and for all." He recapped events of
the last six months, emphasizing that the discussions with
the CNDP and FDLR had yielded little so far and that the
answer now was a military operation. He added that the door
would always be open to consider a political solution.


3. (C) In December, the GDRC and GoR had planned the
military operation, which began early morning January 20. It
had three phases. The first phase, dealing with the CNDP
and, in particular, Bosco, had been completed. (Comment:
Kabila did not make any reference to Nkunda during the
meeting. End Comment.) The second phase, a FARDC deployment
to control the DRC-Rwandan border, was partially completed.
The third phase, military operations against the FDLR, began
January 20. According to Kabila, the operation will last
fifteen days and has two objectives. The first objective is
to disrupt or destroy the FDLR headquarters in Masisi and the
second objective is to eliminate the FDLR units close to the
DRC-Rwandan border, which Rwanda views as a threat. In a
private pull-aside with Kabila, Ambassador expressed some
skepticism that two weeks would be sufficient to deal once
and for all with the FDLR. Kabila acknowledged the point and
said that fighting would likely continue for more than two
weeks, but that Rwanda's participation would end after
fifteen days.


4. (C) Kabila stated that between 200-500 Rwandan troops,
all intelligence officers, were now in the DRC. Their
purpose would be two-fold: to assist with the integration of
CNDP forces into the FARDC and to observe and advise on FARDC
operations against the FDLR. (Comment: We have reports from
various sources in Eastern Congo and Rwanda that the number
of RDF troops in the DRC exceeds 2,000 and that they are
light infantry and not intelligence officers. When
Ambassador mentioned this to Kabila privately, he said he
would verify the numbers. Either Kabila was being very
disingenuous or there is a major disconnect between Rwanda
and the DRC over Rwanda's participation in this operation.
End Comment.)


5. (C) Kabila acknowledged that there were risks in
undertaking this operation. He focused on potential
humanitarian consequences, stressing that he would need help
from the international community in this area. Kabila said
he did not know whether the local populations would side with
the FDLR or the government, or how the FDLR would react. He
said his overriding objective was peace and that sacrifices
were necessary to achieve this goal.


6. (C) Kabila concluded by asking for the support of the
international community first in meeting the humanitarian
needs that will result from this military operation, and also
for continued support from the international community and
facilitation for the Goma peace process, including the
integration/demobilization of the other rebel groups. In
passing, he declared that the mini-summit on the DRC in Addis
was no longer necessary. According to Kabila, the DRC would
continue talks with the CNDP, but probably in Goma.
(Comment: It was unclear as to what role he saw for UN
Special Envoy Obasanjo. End Comment.)
GARVELINK