Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KINSHASA614
2009-06-29 13:28:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:
EASTERN DRC NOTES - JUNE 29
VZCZCXYZ0004 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHKI #0614/01 1801328 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 291328Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9799 INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS KINSHASA 000614
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG
SUBJECT: EASTERN DRC NOTES - JUNE 29
UNCLAS KINSHASA 000614
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG
SUBJECT: EASTERN DRC NOTES - JUNE 29
1. (U) The information contained in this cable consists principally
of spot reports from various sources. This cable is not exhaustive,
nor can all the information contained therein be confirmed at this
time.
Anti-LRA Operations
--------------
2. (SBU) A UPDF liaison to MONUC reported that LRA forces are
moving west in the far north, possibly heading towards the CAR. The
UPDF has established bases at Duru and Swahili (where the UPDF
initially attacked the main LRA group in December 2008). MONUC
indicated that the UPDF may also be present at Doruma.
3. (SBU) According to a MONUC DDRRR report, UPDF/FARDC forces have
killed a number of high ranking LRA officers in the past few weeks,
surging their forces around Faradje in an attempt to apprehend or
kill an LRA commander, Charles Arop. The number of LRA attacks in
the area has decreased significantly because of the surge. As
pressure mounts in the east, the LRA, including senior leadership,
appear to be moving into Bas Uele and towards the CAR.
Security Situation in Ituri
--------------
4. (SBU) Despite extensive FARDC and MONUC actions under the Iron
Stone Operation, Ituri remains insecure. An estimated 40 militia,
probably FRPI, attacked the town of Ganga on June 23. A 17-year old
FRPI defector told MONUC that there are approximately 50 child
soldiers with the rebels. Most want to surrender, but they
apparently fear FARDC reprisals.
Security Situation in North Kivu
--------------
5. (U) On June 27, FDLR forces attacked the village of Kiseguru, 90
kilometers northeast of Goma, killing two FARDC, injuring one FARDC
and one civilian, looting the village, and burning down 35 houses.
According to local residents, the attackers were "numerous." The
population in the area remains tense, as many of them are recently
returned IDPs. A MONUC patrol responded to the attack.
6. (SBU) FARDC troops clashed with FDLR elements on June 23 near
Kamandi on the shore of Lake Edward, with 7 FDLR killed. According
to MONUC, there are significant numbers of FDLR in the area, where
reprisals against locals have resulted in large population
displacements.
Security Situation in South Kivu
--------------
7. (SBU) A FARDC and FDLR soldier were killed in a clash in Kalehe
in South Kivu. Separately, five FDLR troops were reportedly killed
near Walungu. Reports of FARDC human rights violations in South
Kivu persist, while the FDLR continues to terrorize communities near
Bunyakiri. FARDC troops deployed to Shabunda have reportedly
encountered very few FDLR troops in the far western part of South
Kivu.
Integration
--------------
8. (SBU) The pace of integration in South Kivu has picked up
slightly, with 1,692 militia members having reported to integration
centers. Only 232 weapons have been turned in. DDRRR noted that it
continues to receive ex-CNDP combatants who want to repatriate,
rather than to remain unpaid within the ranks of the FARDC.
9. (SBU) A DDRRR report pointed out that "integrated" members of
ex-armed groups continue to defect from the FARDC, upset at
non-payment of salaries. Insecurity is high in Lubero,
Kanyabayonga, Kirumba, Shabunda, and around Mwenga due to possible
revival of old alliances between FDLR, PARECO, and APCLS. DDRRR
claimed that the FDLR had established a weapons supply route from
Tanzania. DDRRR indicated that the ex-CNDP leadership operates in
an opaque manner, with parallel chains of command within the FARDC.
Tutsi-Hutu Reconciliation
--------------
10. (SBU) Members of PARECO-Hutu recently told us that they had
formed an organization, the Farmers and Herders Cooperative
(Cooperation Agriculteurs et Eleveurs-CAE),to strengthen the
economic and political situation of their bases: ex-members of CNDP
and PARECO-Hutu; and Tutsi herders and Hutu farmers in Masisi and
Rutshuru.
11. (SBU) The CAE leadership claimed that it wanted to overcome
"deep-rooted hostilities between Hutus and Tutsis," adding that the
majority of the region's political and social leaders do not
represent their communities well. The group claimed many Tutsi
members view the organization as a possible counter-weight to what
they perceive as Rwanda-imposed personnel and policies within the
CNDP. The CAE contacts admitted, however, that some CNDP remained
suspicious of the group's Hutu roots. Former North Kivu Governor
Eugene Serufuli has met with the group, but he is apparently focused
on reviving his own "NGO," Tous Pour la Paix et le
Developpement-TPD.
12. (SBU) Comment: While the CAE could become a useful vehicle for
Hutu-Tutsi reconciliation, it could also become a means to promote
"Hutu power," similar to what the TPD did when Serufuli was
governor. Supporters of a Rwandophone agenda may also view the
organization as a way to promote their political and economic
interests, and possibly to lock out non-Rwandophones from the
provinces' power structures. End comment.
BROCK
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG
SUBJECT: EASTERN DRC NOTES - JUNE 29
1. (U) The information contained in this cable consists principally
of spot reports from various sources. This cable is not exhaustive,
nor can all the information contained therein be confirmed at this
time.
Anti-LRA Operations
--------------
2. (SBU) A UPDF liaison to MONUC reported that LRA forces are
moving west in the far north, possibly heading towards the CAR. The
UPDF has established bases at Duru and Swahili (where the UPDF
initially attacked the main LRA group in December 2008). MONUC
indicated that the UPDF may also be present at Doruma.
3. (SBU) According to a MONUC DDRRR report, UPDF/FARDC forces have
killed a number of high ranking LRA officers in the past few weeks,
surging their forces around Faradje in an attempt to apprehend or
kill an LRA commander, Charles Arop. The number of LRA attacks in
the area has decreased significantly because of the surge. As
pressure mounts in the east, the LRA, including senior leadership,
appear to be moving into Bas Uele and towards the CAR.
Security Situation in Ituri
--------------
4. (SBU) Despite extensive FARDC and MONUC actions under the Iron
Stone Operation, Ituri remains insecure. An estimated 40 militia,
probably FRPI, attacked the town of Ganga on June 23. A 17-year old
FRPI defector told MONUC that there are approximately 50 child
soldiers with the rebels. Most want to surrender, but they
apparently fear FARDC reprisals.
Security Situation in North Kivu
--------------
5. (U) On June 27, FDLR forces attacked the village of Kiseguru, 90
kilometers northeast of Goma, killing two FARDC, injuring one FARDC
and one civilian, looting the village, and burning down 35 houses.
According to local residents, the attackers were "numerous." The
population in the area remains tense, as many of them are recently
returned IDPs. A MONUC patrol responded to the attack.
6. (SBU) FARDC troops clashed with FDLR elements on June 23 near
Kamandi on the shore of Lake Edward, with 7 FDLR killed. According
to MONUC, there are significant numbers of FDLR in the area, where
reprisals against locals have resulted in large population
displacements.
Security Situation in South Kivu
--------------
7. (SBU) A FARDC and FDLR soldier were killed in a clash in Kalehe
in South Kivu. Separately, five FDLR troops were reportedly killed
near Walungu. Reports of FARDC human rights violations in South
Kivu persist, while the FDLR continues to terrorize communities near
Bunyakiri. FARDC troops deployed to Shabunda have reportedly
encountered very few FDLR troops in the far western part of South
Kivu.
Integration
--------------
8. (SBU) The pace of integration in South Kivu has picked up
slightly, with 1,692 militia members having reported to integration
centers. Only 232 weapons have been turned in. DDRRR noted that it
continues to receive ex-CNDP combatants who want to repatriate,
rather than to remain unpaid within the ranks of the FARDC.
9. (SBU) A DDRRR report pointed out that "integrated" members of
ex-armed groups continue to defect from the FARDC, upset at
non-payment of salaries. Insecurity is high in Lubero,
Kanyabayonga, Kirumba, Shabunda, and around Mwenga due to possible
revival of old alliances between FDLR, PARECO, and APCLS. DDRRR
claimed that the FDLR had established a weapons supply route from
Tanzania. DDRRR indicated that the ex-CNDP leadership operates in
an opaque manner, with parallel chains of command within the FARDC.
Tutsi-Hutu Reconciliation
--------------
10. (SBU) Members of PARECO-Hutu recently told us that they had
formed an organization, the Farmers and Herders Cooperative
(Cooperation Agriculteurs et Eleveurs-CAE),to strengthen the
economic and political situation of their bases: ex-members of CNDP
and PARECO-Hutu; and Tutsi herders and Hutu farmers in Masisi and
Rutshuru.
11. (SBU) The CAE leadership claimed that it wanted to overcome
"deep-rooted hostilities between Hutus and Tutsis," adding that the
majority of the region's political and social leaders do not
represent their communities well. The group claimed many Tutsi
members view the organization as a possible counter-weight to what
they perceive as Rwanda-imposed personnel and policies within the
CNDP. The CAE contacts admitted, however, that some CNDP remained
suspicious of the group's Hutu roots. Former North Kivu Governor
Eugene Serufuli has met with the group, but he is apparently focused
on reviving his own "NGO," Tous Pour la Paix et le
Developpement-TPD.
12. (SBU) Comment: While the CAE could become a useful vehicle for
Hutu-Tutsi reconciliation, it could also become a means to promote
"Hutu power," similar to what the TPD did when Serufuli was
governor. Supporters of a Rwandophone agenda may also view the
organization as a way to promote their political and economic
interests, and possibly to lock out non-Rwandophones from the
provinces' power structures. End comment.
BROCK