Integration in South Kivu Moving Slowly

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000558

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF MASS KPKO CG
SUBJECT: Integration in South Kivu Moving Slowly


1. (SBU) Summary: Integration in South Kivu continues to be
hampered by logistical problems and the FRF's decision not to
participate in the process. MONUC is optimistic (perhaps overly)
that it can overcome the logistical issues and that lead negotiator
Malu Malu will be able to persuade the FRF to join integration.
UNPOL is working with the Congolese National Police to train 3,500
newly integrated police (former CNDP) in North Kivu. In addition,
MONUC hopes, in the next several months, to begin deployment of
1,500 Rapid Intervention Police, primarily in the Kivus, but also in
Haut-Uele. End summary.

Logistical problems
--------------


2. (SBU) Integration of armed groups into the FARDC has been
on-going for two months, but progress has been slow, particularly in
South Kivu, due to logistical issues. At present, there are only
two integration centers open in the province at Luberizi and Kalehe.
Some combatants are reportedly waiting for the other centers,
located closer to their home communities, to open before
integrating. MONUC will soon open a center at Baraka, followed by
Kamombo (Haut-Plateau),Mwenga, and Kindu. IOM, according to MONUC,
can quickly and efficiently build and maintain the centers, but
MONUC can only provide security for three centers at one time, hence
the sequencing (Comment: This does not explain why MONUC has been
slow in opening the third center at Baraka. End comment.)


3. (SBU) The two functioning centers have been full for weeks,
turning away people who arrive. Ex-combatants who qualified for
accelerated integration have already been processed, as have most of
those opting for DDR or community reintegration. However, the vast
majority of those arriving are only eligible for brassage, but since
the brassage centers do not offer food, the ex-combatants are
reluctant to enter the process. Father Apollinaire Malu Malu, the
lead negotiator in the Kiuvs, noted that the Amani program is
responsible for food, but, because the necessary financial controls
are not in place, the funds cannot be transferred (Comment: This is
possible, but it is also possible that Malu Malu is stalling because
there are no funds. End comment.) A proposed solution is to turn
Luberizi into a brassage center, complete with financial controls,
so it can handle all ex-combatants in South Kivu.

FRF still holding out
--------------


4. (SBU) The FRF has still not agreed to intgration, but Malu Malu
is confident the group will eventually sign up. Mai Mai Yakutumba,
probably the most serious South Kivu armed group after the FRF, now
claims it will not integrate until the FRF does and until the GDRC
presents a credible strategy to deal with the FDLR (Comment: If Mai
Mai Yakutumba sticks to this position, the group will ultimately be
reneging on its commitments under the March 23 agreement. Publicly,
the group will most likely get back in line, but, in reality, it is
unlikely that the group will integrate all its troops and weapons
absent FRF participation. End comment.)

Newly integated police
--------------


5. (SBU)UNPOL is developing a plan with General Numbi, hea of the
Congolese National Police to train 3,500 newly integrated police
officers (former CNDP) inNorth Kivu. UNPOL maintains the training
will include "rigorous screning" for human rights violations. The
trainingwill cost $600,000, whch the UK Government may proide.

Rapid Intervention Police
--------------


6. (SBU) MONUC has received fundingfrom the German Government to
support the deployent of 1,500 Rapid Intervention Police (PIR) in
astern DRC. The force will be primarily based in te Kivus, but
some will go to Haut-Uele to reliev FARDC troops, who then should
be able to focus ore on anti-LRA operations. The Rutshuru-Ishasha
axis and the Sake-Masisi axis, with large FDLR prsence, will be the
priority deployments. Operatinal planning has started in Kinshasa,
but actualPIR deployments will most likely be in several monhs.


7. (SBU) Comment: MONUC contnues to be upbeat about South Kivu
integration, but the logistical problems are unlikely to be resolved
quickly or effectively. Integration of the FRF remains critically
important for success. Success will ultimately depend on
engineering a shift in FRF attitudes by playing on a range of hopes,
anxieties and divisions within the movement. If the FRF does not
join up, it is likely that other groups will also opt to hesitate.
Given this dynamic, as well as logistical problems and the
complicating backdrop of Kimia II, there is a genuine risk that the

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process will bog down. End comment.

BROCK