Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KINSHASA519
2009-06-05 09:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

KABILA AND SENIOR GDRC OFFICIALS MEET WITH THE

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS PREF PHUM CG 
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FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9667
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000519 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PREF PHUM CG
SUBJECT: KABILA AND SENIOR GDRC OFFICIALS MEET WITH THE
CNDP AND ARMED GROUPS

REF: KINSHASA 510

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000519 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PREF PHUM CG SUBJECT: KABILA AND SENIOR GDRC OFFICIALS MEET WITH THE CNDP AND ARMED GROUPS REF: KINSHASA 510 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The GDRC, including at the presidential level, has held separate meetings with the CNDP, South Kivu Armed Groups (SKAGs),and the North Kivu Armed Groups. We have received a readout on the first two. The CNDP has officially been recognized as a political party, but there is justified concern that without adequate financing and with on-going disagreement within the CNDP, the movement may eventually dissolve. Our CNDP contact voiced optimism that the new party would receive several ministerial positions, as well as other senior posts, in an anticipated government reshuffle. The SKAGs are reportedly increasingly satisfied with their discussions with the GDRC, but they too want their members appointed to government positions. The composition of the three National Monitoring Committee Sub-committees is at paragraph 12. Even disgruntled groups, e.g. PARECO-Hunde, have a seat at the table, and there are rumors the FRF will soon join the SKAGs delegation. It is difficult to predict which groups will be represented in a new cabinet, which could be announced soon. We believe, however, that the CNDP will likely be included pursuant to assurances Kabila has given Rwandan President Kagame that Tutsis will be represented at senior levels of government. End summary. GDRC-CNDP talks -------------- ¶2. (SBU) We recently met with a long-standing member of the CNDP's political wing to discuss the recent GDRC-CNDP National Monitoring Sub-Committee meetings held in Kinshasa the week of May 25. Our contact said the discussions went well, including several meetings with the head of the GDRC delegation, Minister for Regional and International Cooperation Raymond Tshibanda, and one meeting with President Kabila. The next round of talks is tentatively scheduled for June 15 in Goma. However, a MONUC contact told PolCouns that, if both sides agree to the distribution of government posts before June 15, a follow-up meeting may not be necessary. ¶3. (C) Most significantly, the CNDP is now an officially recognized political party, in contrast to the two Mai Mai groups, which are also aspiring to be recognized. However, our contact underscored that the CNDP did not have any financial su
pport to get its party jump-started. The CNDP's military wing, led by Bosco Ntaganda, keep the money that they raise through illegal taxes, natural resource exploitation, and smuggling to themselves or possibly as a reserve to nurture a rival political grouping. The CNDP "idealists," i.e. those in the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda who strongly supported Nkunda, see no benefit in financing the new CNDP. Our interlocutor summarized the sentiment of this group by saying "where is the interest in supporting a party that is a creature of the GoR and will be under Kabila's ruling coalition?" Kabila has reportedly promised the CNDP money, but our contact opined that Kabila was deliberately withholding funds because he had no desire to allow the CNDP to become a significant political actor. Rwanda, according to our contact, is also reluctant to fund the new CNDP political party. Job-hunting -------------- ¶4. (C) During the GDRC-CNDP Sub-Committee meetings, the CNDP apparently presented the GDRC with a list of its members, to whom it would like the GDRC to give local, provincial, and parastatal positions. A MONUC contact told PolCouns that the CNDP initially demanded the following posts: Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and Ministers of Defense and Interior. Our CNDP contact said that he hoped Kabila and Tshibanda would be savvy enough to reach out to non-Rwandophones. Tshibanda according to our interlocutor, had promised in March that the GDRC would ensure an ethnic and old/new (for the CNDP) balance in its appointments. At the time, Tshibanda hinted that the CNDP would get four ministerial posts: two for Rwandophones, one for a Nande, and one for another non-Rwandophone, probably a Hunde. MONUC Kinshasa told us that, in the end, the CNDP would probably only receive two ministerial portfolios at most. (Comment: The new GDRC will almost certainly include some CNDP ministerial posts, pursuant to assurances Kabila has reportedly given to KINSHASA 00000519 002 OF 003 Rwandan President Kagame that Tutsis will be represented at senior levels of government. End comment.) The new and the old CNDP -------------- ¶5. (C) Our contact lamented that CNDP President Desire Kamanzi has been a disappointment as a leader, adding "he is just not up to the job, not strong enough around the negotiating table with the GDRC." Our contact added that Kamanzi was really "a GoR front-man," so in that respect, it did not matter that he was ineffective. ¶6. (C) Former CNDP official Rene Abandi is apparently back in Gisenyi, having refused an offer of a position in the new CNDP. He is apparently considering opening up a legal practice there. Bertrand Bisimwa is also in Gisenyi, reportedly fearful that if he returned to Goma, erstwhile enemies in the GDRC and new CNDP might try to harm him. Bisimwa, according to our contact, is also uninterested in becoming involved with the new CNDP structure. GDRC-South Kivu Armed Groups talks -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The GDRC negotiating team met with separately with representatives of the South Kivu Armed Groups (SKAGs) and the North Kivu Armed Groups within the National Monitoring Committee framework. SKAG representatives told us that they were generally satisfied with the sessions, although there was some petty bickering that the GDRC had devoted more time and effort to its talks with the CNDP. They did meet Kabila and clearly feel as if the GDRC is according them more attention than previously. ¶8. (C) The SKAGs raised a whole range of issues with the GDRC, including concerns about Operation Kimia II; the GDRC's failure to provide sufficient logistical support to SKAG troops entering integration; and frustration that they were not allowed to integrate following the January 2008 Goma Conference. In an important gesture, the GDRC agreed to include ex-AG representatives on the commission determining ranks for ex-combatants integrating into the FARDC. Both Tshibanda and Kabila reportedly reassured the group that their proposed political parties would be officially recognized "very soon." ¶9. (C) The SKAGs apparently presented a list of 47 of its members to consider as possible ministers, provincial and local government officials, heads of state enterprises, as well as officials in the intelligence, customs, and immigration agencies. The GDRC promised to respond to the proposal by June 15. The SKAGs hope that some of their nominees will be included in the new government, which Kabila may present when he visits Goma on June 30. Composition of the National Monitoring Committee -------------- --- ¶10. (C) The membership of the Monitoring Committee has not changed, despite earlier threats by some Mai Mai participants to withdraw from integration if their demands to include more of their representatives were not met. The Alliance of Patriots for a Free Congo (APCLS),also known as PARECO-Hunde, received a position on the committee, suggesting that some APCLS have indeed opted for real integration, while others ("General" Janvier) remain outside the process (reftel). In addition, there is an open slot on the South Kivu sub-committee, reportedly reserved for an FRF representative. The group, according to some interlocutors, is ready to join the process. A full listing of the committee's members is at paragraph 12. ¶11. (C) Comment: Despite some minor hiccups and a slow start, it is encouraging that a political dialogue between the GDRC and the former armed groups has progressed. The GDRC, with an experienced negotiating team, appears ready to pursue the political integration of the ex-armed groups into Congolese society. For the CNDP, the group has now attained its status as a political party, but uncertainty about financing and on-going tensions between the old and new CNDP raises questions about the group's viability. For the ex-armed groups the most important priority is to land some government positions at the national and local levels. For the GDRC, bringing the groups under a big political tent will reduce the potential that they will return to an armed KINSHASA 00000519 003 OF 003 struggle. However, there are still various issues that could derail the political process: a radicalization of the Rwandophone agenda; re-activation of the military option by disgruntled CNDP cadre; deteriorating human rights situation, which could lead to a vicious circle of reprisals between the FDLR and FARDC; and the possibility that Kimia II completely fails. Despite these potential setbacks, the eastern DRC is unarguably in a better situation today than it was eight months ago. ¶12. (SBU) Following is an updated list of the committee members: GDRC-CNDP Sub-Committee -------------- GDRC -- Minister of Regional and International Cooperation Raymond Tshibanda (President) -- Father Apollinaire Malu Malu -- Manya Moupondo -- North Kivu Governor Julien Paluku -- TBA (Expert) CNDP -- Epsylon Bonane -- Kambasu Ngeve -- Berhe Mapendo -- Jean Munyampenda -- Jean Baptiste Gamominari (Expert) GDRC-North Kivu Armed Groups Sub-Committee -------------- GDRC -- Minister of Regional and International Cooperation Raymond Tshibanda (President) -- Father Apollinaire Malu Malu -- Jean-Bosco Bahala -- Petronille Vaweka -- North Kivu Governor Julien Paluku -- Jean-Marc Banza (Expert) NKAGs -- Firmin Mathe Sikuli (PARECO-Nande) -- Felicien Miganda (Mai Mai Mongol) -- Didier Bitaki (Mai Mai Kifuafua) -- Sendugu Museveni (PARECO-Hutu) -- Hangi Vumiliya (APCLS) -- Isaac Akili Byamungulu (Expert) GDRC-South Kivu Armed Groups Sub-Committee -------------- GDRC -- Minister of Regional and International Cooperation Raymond Tshibanda (President) -- Father Apollinaire Malu Malu -- Manya Moupondo -- Odya Kalinda -- South Kivu Governor Louis-Leonce Muderhwa -- Gyavria Mushizi (Expert) SKAGs -- Jules Ziringabo (Simba-South Kivu) -- Isangye Byaombe (Mai Mai Kapopo) -- Vincent Ngeya (Mai Mai Yakutumba) -- Michee Ngeya (Mai Mai Kiricicho) -- Zebedee Bitha (Mai Mai Shikito) -- TBA (Expert) GARVELINK

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