SCENESETTER FOR MAY 18-19 VISIT OF U.S. PERMANENT

UNCLAS KINSHASA 000455 SENSITIVE SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION USUN FOR AMBASSADOR SUSAN RICE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC MOPS PHUM PREF CG SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MAY 18-19 VISIT OF U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS AMBASSADOR SUSAN RICE REF: A. KINSHASA 314 ¶B. STATE 35855 AND PREVIOUS ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with the assistance of Great Lakes neighbors and the international community, achieved tangible progress in efforts to resolve persistent conflict and insecurity in its eastern provinces in late 2008 and early 2009. However, despite DRC cooperation with regional and international partners, armed groups, including the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR),continue to terrorize Congolese populations in the east. In all sectors of concern in the DRC, the UN mission to the DRC (MONUC) plays a critical role, from peacekeeping to governance to human rights protection. Tensions between the GDRC and MONUC were palpable earlier in the year when India announced its intention to withdraw its contingent, which makes up approximately 25 percent of MONUC's total complement, because the Congolese had asked that no more Indian troops be assigned to MONUC. Although the Indians recently reversed their position and will remain within MONUC, tensions persist. Your visit will provide a timely opportunity to reinforce to the GDRC themes of continued regional and global cooperation to resolve security and economic challenges, unwavering U.S. and UN Security Council support for MONUC, the need for greater GDRC commitment to Security Sector Reform (SSR),and continued Security Council support for democratic governance, civilian and human rights protection and the fight against impunity. End summary. MONUC Security Operations in the DRC -------------- ¶2. (SBU) MONUC was created by UNSC Resolution 1279 on November 30, 1999 and includes a 17,000 member peacekeeping force, a number recently augmented by 3,000 peacekeepers in December 2008 by the UNSC. MONUC also deploys more than 3000 civilian employees, who provide essential services within democracy and governance programs, electoral support, human rights protection, and judicial reform. UN agencies represented in the DRC include: the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS),the United �A;Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF),the United Nations Development Program (UNDP),the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA),the World Food Program (WFP),and the World Health Organization (WHO). The SRSG for MONUC is UK citizen Alan Doss who previously headed the UN mission in Liberia. The UN has a long history in the Congo, as exemplified by former Nigerian president and UNSG Special Envoy Olesegun Obasanjo, appointed by the UN Secretary General in 2008 to broker talks between the GDRC and the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). Obasanjo had served as a UN peacekeeper 48 years earlier in the first UN mission to the Congo (ONUC) in 1960. ¶3. (SBU) In direct response to insecurity in the eastern DRC, MONUC provides planning and logistical assistance to the Congolese national army (FARDC) and national police (PNC) for operations against illegal armed groups. MONUC support has been coordinated in two operations against sources of insecurity in the eastern DRC: Operation Rudia targeting the LRA in Orientale Province, and Operations Kimia I (2008) and II (2009) against the FDLR in North and South Kivu. ¶4. (SBU) Operation Rudia, a MONUC-FARDC collaboration against the LRA, was followed in December 2008 by Operation Lightning Thunder (OLT),a joint DRC, South Sudanese, and Ugandan effort. Rudia II is now underway with MONUC lending logistical support to the FARDC and a small residual UPDF force. Results have been mixed at best, with the initial OLT attack on LRA headquarters scattering units into remote areas of northeastern DRC. Independent groups of LRA fighters have stepped up retribution attacks following the launch of OLT, most notably, the Christmas Day massacre of hundreds of DRC civilians in the villages of Duru, Doruma, and Faradje. FARDC units continue to pursue bands of LRA fighters with MONUC support. ¶5. (SBU) In 2008, the FARDC, with MONUC support, conducted anti-FDLR operations in North Kivu under Operation Kimia I with negligible success. MONUC is currently planning operations with the FARDC for Operation Kimia II in South Kivu. Following a rapprochement with the GoR in late 2008, Rwandan army (RDF) and FARDC units launched Operation Umoja Wetu (Our Unity) against FDLR forces in North Kivu. Subsequent to its dispersal into remote areas of North Kivu and Maniema province by the RDF-FARDC coalition, the FDLR has re-emerged in some areas and there have been reprisals against civilians it suspects of collaborating with coalition forces. RDF units departed the DRC in late February, leaving the FARDC, with MONUC support, to lead Kimia II. MONUC Democracy and Human Rights Components -------------- ¶6. (SBU) MONUC and UN offices are supporting the electoral process through assistance to the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) as it prepares to revise electoral lists prior to local elections scheduled for 2009 and presidential elections in 2011. MONUC, as does the USG, remains concerned about the human rights record within the DRC, especially offenses committed by security forces. Sexual and gender based violence is a particular concern for the UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO),in addition to child soldiering, child labor, and press freedom. Anti-MONUC Sentiment -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Following armed group activity in which civilians are killed and MONUC units are in the vicinity, civilians sometimes gather to protest what they perceive as MONUC's failure to protect the civilian population. An upsurge in anti- MONUC sentiment, orchestrated by the former ministers of defense and the interior, with support from local politicians, was clearly in evidence in early October 2008 when the FARDC was routed by the CNDP. At that time government leaders, both national and provincial, urged crowds to throw stones at MONUC vehicles and otherwise harass Indian peacekeepers. There have been reports of government officials inciting civilians against MONUC due to a desire to see MONUC depart the DRC and to use MONUC as a scapegoat for the FARDC's ineffectiveness in combating negative forces. GDRC-GoI Dispute -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Tensions between Congolese officials and MONUC's Indian contingent came to a head in 2008 when the Indian officer responsible for liaising with the CNDP was feted by CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda prior to the Indian officer's departure (reftels). Unfortunately for him, the event was recorded by a CNDP defector and publicized. The incident gave ammunition to those Congolese who had accused the Indians of being CNDP sympathizers and informants and thus responsible for the FARDC losses to Nkunda's forces. The Indians tried to make amends by reassuring the GDRC that the officer would be disciplined for poor judgment, but the damage was done. ¶9. (SBU) This incident was one in a series of events contributing to poor relations between the Congolese and Indians assigned to MONUC. Some MONUC Indian troops were implicated in 1997 in sexual abuse cases in the eastern DRC. Indian soldiers have also been accused of selling arms to rebel groups in return for gold and other precious minerals. ¶10. (SBU) Following this rising tide of anti-Indian sentiment, the GDRC intimated in late 2008 that Indian troops were not welcome in the DRC (Note: The GoI provides the majority of MONUC peacekeeping troops and the majority of its rotary wing assets. End note.),and the GoI threatened to withdraw its contingent from MONUC in early 2009. After significant USG diplomatic intervention and a letter from the GDRC to the GoI retracting previous ill-received statements, the GoI reversed its position and rescinded the threat of withdrawal. The effect on the operational capacity of MONUC after the departure of Indian assets would have likely been catastrophic and resulted in a further destabilization of the east. U.S. - DRC Bilateral Relations -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Peace and Stability in the East: The U.S. is engaged diplomatically within the region to promote peace and security. Since November 2007, a USG representative has staffed an embassy office in Goma. The officer reports on political events and represents the USG as part of the International Facilitation that assists in the implementation of the November 2007 GDRC-GoR Nairobi Agreement, the January 2008 Goma Peace Accords, and subsequent agreements between the GDRC and armed groups. The U.S. continues to facilitate the Tripartite Plus forum to address regional security and cooperation issues. Frequent USG diplomatic and congressional travel to the DRC demonstrates the level of commitment and interest the USG maintains in establishing peace and security in the DRC. ¶12. (SBU) Development Assistance: Overall foreign development assistance support from the U.S. is growing. The United States provides over $700 million per year in foreign and peacekeeping assistance to the DRC, of which more than $200 million is in the form of bilateral foreign assistance for development and humanitarian activities, with the remainder largely provided through contributions to multilateral organizations including MONUC. The USG budget for the DRC for development assistance increased in FY 2008 by approximately 25 percent, including supplemental appropriations for HIV/AIDS and security assistance funding. USAID implements programs in the areas of health, education, democracy and governance, economic growth, agriculture, and peace and security. ¶13. (SBU) Security Sector Reform: The Congolese military, which must play a key role in solving the security challenges faced by the DRC, itself faces severe internal and external challenges. The USG and other partners are committed to seeing through progress in this area, though the pace of reform has been slow. The DRC is currently benefiting from a variety of projects through a number of different security assistance funds. U.S. security assistance to the DRC aims first and foremost to develop the FARDC into a professional, well-structured and disciplined fighting force, which respects human rights and has the respect of the trust of the people. While battlefield training is part of this program, it is equally important to focus on projects that provide for internal and long-term capacity reform (e.g. leadership training, command and control, human rights, etc.). ¶14. (SBU) Democracy and Governance: In 2009, USG assistance will focus on improving governance and the rule of law as the DRC implements an ambitious decentralization program and puts in place constitutionally-mandated judicial institutions. Further assistance will encourage civic participation in political processes, including planned 2009 local elections. Uncertain Economic Future -------------- ¶15. (SBU) The DRC has been significantly and negatively impacted by the global financial crisis due to its heavy reliance on natural resources for foreign exchange and limited capacity to protect against external shocks. Reduced demand for and lower prices of minerals have resulted in a significant contraction of the DRC's mining sector, the driver of the DRC's recent economic growth and a major source of formal sector employment and investment. The IMF has revised projected GDP growth downward for 2009 to 2.7%, less than half of the IMF's projections before the global financial crisis. International reserves have fallen to the lowest level in five years and the exchange rate has depreciated by more than 25 percent over the last four months. At the same time, continuing conflict in the eastern DRC is having an adverse impact on the fiscal balance through public expenditures. To help support the continuation of basic services and augment international reserve levels, the World Bank approved $100 million in emergency assistance under its Fast Track Assistance Program in February and the IMF approved $200 million in emergency assistance under its Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) in March. The EU also plans to provide emergency assistance. Going Forward -------------- ¶16. (SBU) The problems faced by the DRC are overwhelming, but your visit will reinforce the point that the USG and the UNSC stand ready and willing to assist the country with its security, economic, and governmental challenges. At the same time, we have high expectations of the Kabila government and there will be no blank check issued to his regime. We believe that it is particularly important that the following points be reinforced during your visit: 1) those in power must first and foremost truly commit to the creation of a modern state, focused on the rational and just delivery of services to all its citizens (not just individual constituencies),and to address the endemic corruption that renders progress in this area impossible; 2) the appalling human rights record of the government and its security services must be corrected - not by empty rhetoric but with concrete action; and 3) we expect the full engagement of the FARDC to fight the LRA and FDLR, in cooperation with MONUC and keeping in mind first and foremost the need to protect civilians. U.S. Ambassador to the DRC William Garvelink -------------- ¶17. (U) William John Garvelink was nominated as Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of the Congo by President George ¶W. Bush on May 30, 2007, confirmed by the Senate on June 28 and sworn in on October 22, 2007. He arrived at post with Mrs. Linda Garvelink on November 22, 2007. He is a member of the Senior Foreign Service with the rank of Minister Counselor. ¶18. (U) Ambassador Garvelink was appointed to his last position in May 2001. His responsibilities included oversight of USAID's worldwide humanitarian assistance and democracy programs. Offices within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance include the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Office of Transition Initiatives, Office of Food for Peace, Office of Democracy and Governance, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation and the Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation. ¶19. (U) Prior to this appointment, Mr. Garvelink served since 1999 as the USAID Mission Director in Eritrea. He administered a development and relief program valued at more than $55 million. From 1988 to 1999 Mr. Garvelink served in OFDA first as the Assistant Director for response and then as the Deputy Director. While in OFDA, he conducted assessments and directed relief operations in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Near East, Europe, and in the former Soviet Union. Mr. Garvelink led Disaster Assistance Response Teams to Albania, Armenia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, northern Iraq, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, and in Bam, Iran. He chaired the USAID Task Force for the Indian Ocean Tsunami, the USAID Task Force for the Pakistan Earthquake and the USAID Lebanon Task Force. ¶20. (U) Prior to his work in OFDA, Mr. Garvelink served for two years in the Department of State's Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) with responsibilities for southern Africa. He was posted for four years to Bolivia for USAID and served for three years as a staff member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He holds degrees from Calvin College (BA) and the University of Minnesota (MA). DRC Facts For Your Visit -------------- ¶21. (U) Visa Requirements: A valid visa is required of all American passport holders, whether diplomatic, official, or tourist. ¶22. (U) Security: Goma and Kinshasa are critical threat crime cities. All visitors should remain vigilant and cautious during their stay in Goma or Kinshasa. The RSO advises that you exercise caution in all areas, and that you do not travel after nightfall unless accompanied by someone familiar with the security situation in Goma or Kinshasa. TDY personnel should not use any form of local transportation and should refrain from displaying/using a camera in public. ¶23. (U) Currency: The use of dollars in the DRC is legal and acceptable for most transactions. Most personnel use Franc Congolais only for small purchases and tips. Travelers arriving in the DRC with more than $10,000 must fill out a currency declaration. Travelers departing the DRC are not allowed to take out more than $10,000 in cash. -- Although there are some newly-installed ATM machines, the RSO does not yet advocate their use. Few businesses in Goma or Kinshasa accept credit cards and their use outside of major hotels is discouraged. Cashing traveler's checks is generally not advised because banks charge substantial fees for cashing them. ¶24. (U) Medical: Malaria: The DRC is a malaria-affected area. All travelers should consult with medical personnel and take malaria prophylactics as appropriate, before arriving in the DRC. -- Yellow Fever: You must have a valid yellow fever vaccination and your yellow vaccination card when you arrive. You may be charged a fine of $50-$100 without proof of vaccination. ¶25. (U) Power Current: The DRC operates on 220 volt/50 HZ power utilizing a European-style two pin plug. GARVELINK