POTENTIAL RESISTANCE TO THE RWANDOPHONE AGENDA IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000390 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF CG SUBJECT: POTENTIAL RESISTANCE TO THE RWANDOPHONE AGENDA IN NORTH KIVU REF: KINSHASA 388 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d ) ¶1. (C) Summary: Reftel was analysis of key aspects of what appears to be an active policy, closely connected with recent Kinshasa-Kigali rapprochement, to secure Rwandophone dominance in North Kivu, specifically in the "Petit Nord". This message outlines the likely sources of resistance to this agenda. Such resistance may be passive or active, political or violent, and could come from a range of sources. End summary. Sources of Resistance within the Rwandophone Community -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The conception of a homogeneous Rwandophone community, uniting Rwanda and all Hutus and Tutsis in the Petit Nord in a shared agenda, is a simplification. In reality, the Rwandophone policy is likely to meet resistance even from within the Rwandophone community. The Nkunda loyalists, for example, could play the role of spoilers. Most of the CNDP seem to have been coerced or induced by Rwanda into the current political and military arrangement, meaning that many of its former members remain resentful, and some actively are plotting revenge. Some of this resentment is connected with the lot of Nkunda, who commanded genuine loyalty from his military and political cadres alike. On the other hand, some resentment derives from intra-CNDP rivalries between Tutsis from Masisi (i.e. Bosco) and those from Rutshuru (i.e. Nkunda). ¶3. (C) Initially, the threat from the Nkunda loyalists was significant, though it now appears that most of the key players have now been brought on board through a combination of carrots and sticks. However, the risk of active, violent resistance is never far, particularly given that potential troublemakers have thousands of fighters at their command and ready access to heavy weapons. ¶4. (C) Congolese Hutus are another source of potential resistance to the Rwandophone agenda. Many intensely distrust both Tutsis in general and Rwanda in particular. As long as it continues to offer benefits and to wield a big stick, the Rwandophone policy can win, and so far has won, their (at least passive) support. Ultimately however, it is seen by many Hutus as a Rwandan, Tutsi venture -- a political construct capable of seducing Hutu leaders and elites, but which will not in the long-term represent the interests of ordinary Hutus. For example, the Hutu elements of PARECO are already openly complaining about preferential CNDP (Tutsi) treatment, in the form of its agreement with the GDRC, its greater number of command positions in the FARDC, etc. ¶5. (C) Hutus greatly outnumber Tutsis in the Petit Nord and the Rwandophone architects know the Hutus must be placated. However, allowing them to assume the role of senior partner, which they could gradually demand, may be hoping for too much from Rwanda and the Tutsi community, which do not have a track record favoring Hutu empowerment. ¶6. (C) Not all Congolese Tutsis are on board with this plan. For those Tutsis who see themselves as Congolese citizens first, there is little appetite to characterize themselves as "outsiders" by promoting the Rwandophone agenda. Members of this group are genuinely proud of being Congolese and many identify only loosely with Rwanda, resenting its presumption to command their loyalty. Nkunda himself falls partially into this category, as do several prominent Tutsi businessmen, politicians, and intellectuals. Non-Rwandophones in North Kivu -------------- ¶7. (C) The biggest losers from the Rwandophone rise will be the other ethnic groups in North Kivu, such as the Hunde, and especially the Nande. In the medium to long-term, the most serious resistance to the Rwandophone ascendency is likely to come from these groups. Long-standing tensions over land and economic and political control could erupt into violent resistance if the Rwandophones achieve all their objectives, particularly the "decoupage" (splitting North Kivu into two separate provinces, the Petit Nord and the Grand Nord). While unlikely, conflict could even draw in Uganda, the Nande's historical ally. KINSHASA 00000390 002 OF 003 ¶8. (C) Problems along these lines are already beginning to occur. Militarily, non-Rwandophone armed group leaders like LaFontaine (PARECO-Nande) and Janvier (PARECO-Hunde) complain they have not been offered positions in the FARDC. Some, like Ntashibanda (ex-PARECO-Hunde),are openly resisting integration and have allied with the FDLR. Interestingly, the only North Kivu Mai-Mai group to have put forward significant numbers of fighters for integration (600-800) is the Hutu-dominated Mongol group. In part, this is because the other groups are small. However, they are also non-Rwandophone in composition and are likely to be anxiously withholding fighters and weapons. Politically, tribal leaders have told us they are worried, and stand ready to resist. ¶9. (C) How serious a threat to the Rwandophone policy are these non-Rwandophone sources of resistance? Only the Nande have substantial numbers, but they are not serious fighters. Moreover, the non-Rwandophones are long-standing Kabila loyalists. The GDRC appears to have succeeded in at least securing their passive support for the deal with Kagame (reftel). However, short-term acquiescence by political leaders under presidential pressure to a largely hypothetical plan does not equate to acceptance by whole populations of the loss of political and economic power to their historical rivals. ¶10. (C) The Nande may not be fighters, but they are adept politicians and have enormous economic clout in North Kivu and nationally. If their interests are seriously threatened, they can hire militias and back proxies (or even ally with the FDLR, a group which LaFontaine openly praises). In any case, in North Kivu, one does not need many armed men to cause serious problems. Non-Rwandophones elsewhere in the DRC -------------- ¶11. (C) Many in Kinshasa and elsewhere in the DRC either resent the Rwandophone rise and Kabila's agreement with Kagame that triggered it, and/or see it as a dangerous precedent given other ethnic and separatist tensions around the country. Chief of the General Staff, General Etumba, may fall into this category, as does his deputy during the 2008 operations against the CNDP, Colonel Delphin. However, this group's resistance to the Rwandophone agenda is likely to be political rather than military, indirect and meddlesome rather than confrontational. Potential Flashpoints -------------- ¶12. (C) Strong and effective resistance is most likely to emerge through an alliance of two or more of the various elements outlined above. The threat of active resistance will ultimately wax and wane in response to how sensitively and intelligently the Rwandophone rise is handled by the GDRC and the Rwandophones themselves. So far, both seem to have done a decent job. However, there are also specific flashpoints for which we need to prepare and/or look out. ¶13. (C) The return of refugees will cause serious tensions, both between Tutsis and Hutus, and between Rwandophones and non-Rwandophones. The focus will be land. On one hand, all parties provide a similar, seemingly reassuring, public line: If "real" refugees return to reclaim land that "really" belonged to them, there will not be any problems. Of course, these categories will be interpreted differently by different parties. ¶14. (C) Many of those who will be returnees were only relatively recent arrivals to the DRC in the first place -- those contesting their land claims may assert that ownership has merely reverted to the original, rightful hands. Second, many refugees sold their land in a rush to escape persecution or worse, often at artificially low prices. They may assert their right to reclaim it, or buy it back. The current owners will insist they acquired it legitimately. To make matters worse, objective, legally recognizable land titles, let alone a system to enforce or adjudicate between competing claims, do not exist. ¶15. (C) Appointment of a new Governor or Vice-Governor in North Kivu, who supports the Rwandophone policy, could also be a flashpoint. Rumors about this abound, most of them KINSHASA 00000390 003 OF 003 involving Eugene Serufuli. Additionally, extraditing Nkunda would enrage his loyalists and could trigger armed conflict. An attempt to arrest Bosco Ntaganda, for whom an ICC warrant has been issued, may meet resistance. If Bosco sees this coming, he is likely to return to the bush with upwards of 1,000 CNDP fighters (currently in the FARDC) and heavy weapons. This "resistance" could easily degenerate into isolated banditry, and Bosco might even leave North Kivu. However, it could also trigger the collapse of the integration process. ¶16. (C) Finally, a continuing failure to pay and feed newly integrated FARDC soldiers will pose serious problems. The result for the moment has been looting, banditry, and low levels of desertion. However, if it continues, and particularly if certain groups, such as PARECO-Hutu or Nkunda loyalists, feel they are being deliberately disadvantaged, it could spell a greater degree of trouble. GARVELINK