DIMENSIONS OF THE RWANDOPHONE RISE IN NORTH KIVU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000388 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF CG SUBJECT: DIMENSIONS OF THE RWANDOPHONE RISE IN NORTH KIVU Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: It appears likely that, as previously reported, one of the central dynamics in North Kivu in the coming months will be the rise of "Rwandophone" power. The context of this dynamic is that in late 2008, Presidents Kabila and Kagame probably made a deal whereby Kagame would deactivate the CNDP and Nkunda in exchange for increased Rwandophone influence in North Kivu, i.e., a more Rwanda-friendly power structure in the province (Note: Permission to enter the DRC to attack the FDLR was clearly also a part of this agreement, but not the most important component. End note). Implementation of the key aspects of the Rwandophone agenda began in earnest in January 2009 and has proceeded rapidly, though potential flashpoints and setbacks are emerging (analyzed septel). End summary. Definitions -------------- ¶2. (C) We use the term Rwandophone to refer broadly to the Rwandan Government and those Hutus and Tutsis in the DRC roughly allied to its interests (Note: Of course, by no means are all Congolese Hutus and Tutsis allied to Rwanda. End note). "Petit Nord" is the main area of Rwandophone interest, comprising the North Kivu territories of Nyiragongo, Rutshuru, Masisi and Walikale, plus Goma town and, to a lesser extent, the part of South Kivu on the western shore of Lake Kivu. Military Aspects of the Strategy -------------- ¶3. (C) A key part of the Kabila-Kagame deal was the speedy integration of the CNDP into the FARDC, and with it all other North Kivu armed groups, notably the Hutu wing of PARECO. The result fulfills the strategic priorities of both presidents: for Kagame, the FARDC in the Petit Nord is now dominated by Rwandophones; for Kabila, the CNDP has been (seemingly) quickly dismantled and integrated into the FARDC. Notably, Rwandophones have two of the four Sector Commander/Deputy slots; eight of the ten Axis Commander slots and, in total, hold 24 of the 34 command positions. They have also just added approximately 11,000 of their number to the FARDC rank and file in the Petit Nord. ¶4. (C) On the one hand, this "takeover" has in part officialized the actual military situation from the end of ¶2008. At that time, the CNDP already controlled much of southern Rutshuru and eastern Masisi, while PARECO-Hutu was in control of the Masisi-Chugi axis. However, it also represents a significant expansion of the Rwandophone domain, as their influence now extends west to the resource-rich area of Walikale and north to the strategically critical town of Kanyabayonga, which CNDP tried and failed to capture last year. Additionally, the March 23 GDRC-CNDP agreement commits the GDRC to recognize CNDP officers' ranks. Some CNDP officers have even been promoted. Political Aspects -------------- ¶5. (C) The GDRC-CNDP agreement committed to offering the CNDP a range of political and administrative positions at the territorial, provincial and federal levels. However, consolidated or increased Rwandophone political power is already apparent in two distinct ways. ¶6. (C) The first concerns specific appointments, which includes recognition of positions that the CNDP -- and to a much lesser extent PARECO -- had established de facto by January 2009. Most important here is the retention of all CNDP-appointed administrative staff in Masisi and Rutshuru (other than the territorial administrators and their deputies, who will be given jobs elsewhere); integration of up to 2,000 CNDP and 750 PARECO "police" into the PNC in Masisi and Rutshuru; and retention of CNDP-sanctioned immigration (DGM) and customs (OFIDA) staff at the Bunagana border post. ¶7. (C) Additionally, the post of Provincial Minister for Justice, Human Rights and Community Resettlement in North Kivu has gone to the CNDP (Note: Significantly, the person in this position will oversee resettlement of IDPs and refugees. End note). It is likely that the CNDP will also be given a national-level ministry, probably dealing with local affairs KINSHASA 00000388 002 OF 002 and community reconciliation. ¶8. (C) A major consideration here is the long-standing Rwandophone goal of "decoupage" -- cutting North Kivu in two, so the Petit Nord becomes its own, Rwandophone-dominated, province. There is clearly new political momentum behind the idea. Its principle advocate, former North Kivu Governor Eugene Serufuli, was apparently intimately involved in the Kabila-Kagame deal (Comment: It is possible that Kabila has already promised to deliver decoupage in exchange for the Rwandophones voting for him in 2011. Regardless, the fate of decoupage will be a good indicator of Rwandophone political fortunes. End comment). Economic Aspects -------------- ¶9. (C) We can likely expect a significant rise in Rwandophone economic fortunes on several counts. For example, the Rwandophones' military dominance will allow them to profit from the usual road-based taxing of civilians and commercial vehicles, which continues to be widespread in the Petit Nord, as well as from the taxing and/or control of the Petit Nord's lucrative charcoal and mineral trades (Note: There are already reports of illegal mineral-laden flights from Walikale to Rwanda. End note). Additionally, their political and administrative appointments will deliver the usual flow of siphoned-off cash and ill-gotten contracts. Social Aspects -------------- ¶10. (C) Rwandophones have long demanded the return to the Petit Nord of the Congolese refugees currently in Rwanda and Uganda. UNHCR estimates there are 67,000 Congolese in Uganda (mostly Hutus from Rutshuru) and 55,000 in Rwanda (mostly Tutsis from Masisi). Upon their return, most will reclaim land they either sold or abandoned, in many cases as far back as 15 years ago. If they succeed, it will be a significant victory for the Rwandophones: more land, more economic power, more political and electoral clout, and more cultural dominance in the Petit Nord. ¶11. (C) Comment: The recent Kinshasa-Kigali rapprochement is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for this strategy to take hold in North Kivu. Coupled with Nkunda's departure, it means the sting has, at least temporarily, been drawn from the national and international layers of the conflict. Nevertheless, the longer-standing, underlying local layers remain, and may well be inflamed (septel). The exact extent and form of power the GDRC ultimately allows the Rwandophones to assume in North Kivu is not set in stone. This inevitably has been left to an ongoing, multi-level negotiation process, the outcome of which will depend on Kinshasa's evolving engagement, as well as the evolving cost/benefit analyses of the myriad interests of each side's allies in the Kivus. End comment. GARVELINK