THE CNDP RIFT: VIEWS OF TWO PROMINENT EASTERNERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000033 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PREF CG SUBJECT: THE CNDP RIFT: VIEWS OF TWO PROMINENT EASTERNERS IN KINSHASA Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In separate meetings with PolCouns and PolOff on January 8 and 9, Eugene Serufuli, former North Kivu Governor, and Enoch Ruberangabo Sebineza, a South Kivu civil society activist and former parliamentarian, discussed the recent CNDP split, as well as the prospects of joint DRC-Rwandan military operations against the FDLR. Serufuli, who has influence within the GDRC, implied that the GDRC preferred to deal with Bosco as its CNDP interlocutor instead of Nkunda. Rwanda, in Serufuli's view, also considered Bosco more willing to address the FDLR problem. Sebineza criticized both Bosco and Nkunda, noting that their dispute was personal and clan-based, not ideologically-driven. Serufuli welcomed the recent warming of relations between the DRC and Rwanda. Sebineza voiced concerns about FDLR reprisals on the local population, if the group is attacked. End Summary. Improving DRC-Rwandan Relations -------------- ¶2. (C) PolCouns and PolOff met January 8 with Eugene Serufuli, former RCD Governor of North Kivu and current head of the Congolese electricity parastatal SNEL to discuss improving relations between the DRC and Rwanda and the festering rift within the CNDP. Serufuli claimed that, at the nadir of relations between Rwanda and the DRC several months ago, he warned President Kabila that the international community had lost faith in the GDRC's regional diplomacy. Serufuli bluntly stated that the mistrust between the two countries "had come from our side," with Kabila eager to restore diplomatic relations with Burundi and Uganda, but much less so with Rwanda. Now, in Serufuli's view, there was a new optimism surrounding DRC-Rwandan relations. CNDP Split: Nkunda as Extremist, Bosco as Conciliator -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Serufuli stressed that the CNDP will cease to be a problem once the DRC and Rwanda reach a resolution of outstanding issues between them. Certain CNDP members, he said, are pleased at the apparent reconciliation between the two countries. He then proceeded to detail the problems associated with Nkunda, who he jokingly characterized as "the devil's emissary on earth." Nkunda was erratic; even Nkunda himself did not clearly know what he wanted. All parties, including Rwanda, were frustrated by Nkunda's unpredictability. Bosco "was right" to take action, in Serufuli's opinion. Serufuli opined that Rwanda would be able to influence Bosco, unlike Nkunda who, according to Serufuli, once hung up on Rwandan CHOD James Kabarebe. He added that 80 percent of CNDP soldiers came from Masisi, and were therefore loyal to Bosco. According to Serufuli, Nkunda, on the contrary, only enjoyed the support of his narrow clan and family circles in the Rutshuru area. Serufuli labeled Nkunda an extremist, claiming that many Hutus supported Bosco. Interestingly, Serufuli maintained that PARECO would gladly decouple itself from the FDLR and join Bosco. ¶4. (C) Serufuli claimed that Bosco, in contrast to Nkunda, was ready to support joint RDF/FARDC operations against the FDLR and would even fully support the Amani process. Serufuli pointed out that because of this rift, the CNDP negotiating team at Nairobi no longer had any legitimacy. When PolCouns pressed Serufuli about the ramifications of Bosco's ICC indictment, he admitted that Bosco "would have to respond to the ICC charges." (Comment: His implication was, however, that the ICC indictment should not disqualify Bosco for some kind of leadership role within the CNDP. End Note). Rwandophones and Nandes -------------- ¶5. (C) Serufuli emphasized that the ultimate question in North Kivu did not center around the GDRC-CNDP conflict or Hutu-Tutsi relations. Rather, the intra-Rwandophone tension between Hutus and Tutsis simply perpetuated Nande control in KINSHASA 00000033 002 OF 003 the province. North Kivu, he opined, might function better split up between a Nande-dominated Grand Nord, with various other ethnicities in the minority, and a Rwandophone-dominated (Hutu/Tutsi) Petit Nord, also with significant minority ethnic groups. Personal, Clan Rivalries Behind Nkunda-Bosco Split -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) During a January 9 meeting with PolCouns and PolOff, Enoch Ruberangabo Sebineza, a former parliamentarian, South Kivu civil society activist and member of the Banyamulenge community, and current President of the Congolese steel parastatal Sosider discussed the Nkunda-Bosco split, as well as the FDLR. Sebineza said that, while the division in the CNDP is real, the source is not ideological, but rather related to local rivalries, clan differences, and personal discord between Nkunda and Bosco. According to Sebineza, Bosco also resented Nkunda's apparent unwillingness to publicly demand that the ICC dismiss its indictment of Bosco. Reconciliation between the two would be very difficult, particularly following their public airing of grievances. Contradicting speculation among some of our interlocutors and in the media, however, Sebineza opined that Nkunda would never hand over Bosco to MONUC. There was a certain level of solidarity between the two and Nkunda would undoubtedly lose significant support from the Tutsi community, if he turned Bosco over to international authorities. ¶7. (C) Sebineza recounted a recent event to emphasize that local disputes were at the heart of this split. A group of journalists traveling to meet with Bosco were stopped at a CNDP barrier at Kimoka, the commander of which was Banyamulenge. Bosco dispatched some soldiers to Kimoka, stressing to the South Kivu commander that he should stay clear of this dispute between North Kivu interests. The commander apparently allowed the journalists to pass. ¶8. (C) Rwanda's hand, according to Sebineza, was also behind the split, although he could not explain how Kigali would benefit from the rift. Sebineza implied that, once the GoR had used Bosco to depose Nkunda, Rwanda would then distance itself from Bosco. Rwanda's security and political interests in the Kivus, Sebineza added, went far beyond mere support for an individual. ¶9. (C) The bottom line, in Sebineza's view, is that both Nkunda and Bosco have only created problems for the Tutsi community in the DRC, stirring up hatred on the part of other ethnic communities towards the Tutsis. He underlined that certain influential Masisi politicians and businessmen were also frustrated by the on-going conflict. He stressed that Tutsis cannot adopt an attitude of "defense at all costs," which only radicalized the population; he noted that such radicalization has occurred within his own Banyamulenge community in the High Plateau, where many people view Kabila and the GDRC as their sworn enemy. FDLR Will Carry Out Reprisals, If Attacked -------------- ¶10. (C) Turning to the FDLR, Sebineza said that the GDRC possesses neither the will nor the means to drive the FDLR from the DRC. He warned that, if attacked in a large-scale operation, the FDLR would certainly carry out reprisals against the local population, along the lines of LRA reprisals in northeastern DRC. Sebineza stressed that a precarious, but stable, equilibrium between the FDLR and the Banyamulenge community in South Kivu had developed over the last decade, with neither side provoking the other. He claimed that FDLR forces sometimes even protect Banyamulenge pastures and cattle from the Mai Mai, as well as providing munitions to the Banyamulenge armed group FRF. ¶11. (C) To explain the modus vivendi between the FDLR and the Banyamulenge community, Sebineza offered up several theories: the strength of the FRF; FDLR fear that Rwanda would retaliate if it began targeting Tutsis; and the possibility that anti-Tutsi ideology was becoming less relevant to the group over time. Comment -------------- KINSHASA 00000033 003 OF 003 ¶12. (C) Despite Serufuli's assertion that the vast majority of North Kivu Tutsis support Bosco, from Kinshasa and from various other sources, it remains unclear whether Bosco or Nkunda holds the upper hand. Serufuli's claims that Bosco would address ethnic problems better than Nkunda seems off-base, given Bosco's background and Nkunda's efforts (admittedly opportunistic) to include other ethnic communities in the CNDP. The split might indeed represent some kind of DRC-Rwandan agreement to deal simultaneously with Nkunda (Kabila's nemesis) and the FDLR (the GoR's primary concern). Serufuli, who enjoys a close relationship with Kabila, was clearly selling the GDRC's ideas on how to move forward to solve the conflict in the East. Sebineza's overriding concern is the protection of Banyamulenge interests. His uncompromising anti-CNDP and anti-Rwandan attitude is therefore not surprising. His caution about provoking FDLR reprisals should be viewed in this context. GARVELINK