OPERATION KIMIA II - MORE STICK, LESS CARROT?

UNCLAS KINSHASA 000323 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG SUBJECT: OPERATION KIMIA II - MORE STICK, LESS CARROT? REF: Kinshasa 306 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: MONUC and the FARDC are ramping up preparation for Operation Kimia II with an aggressive campaign to increase steadily pressure on the FDLR. In contrast to Operation Umoja Wetu, the new operation will not include DDRRR outreach efforts to convince Rwandan rebels to return home peacefully. FDLR fighters can still surrender to DDRRR offices, but "the time for negotiations is past," according to sources in MONUC. End Summary. More Push, Less Pull -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Bruno Donat, Head of Office for the DDRRR program in the eastern DRC, recently told International Facilitation members that the Joint Operation Directive for Operation Kimia II against the FDLR limits DDRRR activities. Donat contrasted the directive with Operation Umoja Wetu, in which DDRRR representatives were able to approach FDLR elements in the field with MONUC escort protection in order to encourage them to surrender/repatriate. Noting threats against his personnel (at least two DDRRR staff or support personnel were killed while encouraging FDLR combatants to surrender),Donat concluded that he could not operate outreach programs to the FDLR without protection. He added that the Force Commander had never favored the DDRRR outreach program, but he had been able to convince SRSG Alan Doss to overrule Gaye during Operation Umoja Wetu. Despite appeals from Donat and evidence that the previous outreach had yielded results, Doss declined to overrule Gaye for Operation Kimia II. ¶3. (SBU) In a subsequent conversation with the International Facilitation, including Goma PolOff, Donat said Gaye wants MONUC to adopt a more aggressive stance and avoid sending "confusing" messages to the FDLR. Other MONUC sources confirm that "the time for negotiations is past" and FDLR elements must appreciate that a decision to resist may be fatal. They should be dissuaded from the mistaken belief that they can negotiate their surrender. DDRRR offices will remain open and able to receive FDLR, who wish to surrender, but outreach efforts will no longer be conducted. In Donat's opinion, this approach is a mistake and suggested that donors may want to appeal for a continuation of outreach efforts. He noted, however, that he would soon be returning to his regular UN job (he was seconded to MONUC to fill the gap in the DDRRR office). His successor will be Jean-Marc Tafanie. ¶4. (SBU) Another DDRRR official told us that an FDLR corporal who has been in the DRC since 1994 had surrendered to DDRRR in recent days. In his debrief, he said he made this decision after concluding that the FDLR would not be able to negotiate the terms of its return to Rwanda. Since military victory was not possible, he decided to defect rather than spend the rest of his life in a futile struggle. ¶5. (SBU) Comment: We are not sanguine that Operation Kimia II will succeed in eliminating or even seriously damaging the FDLR, given the relatively light footprint of Operation Kimia I. It may push them deeper into the forest and make their existence less comfortable, but experience shows that most rebels will try to wait out the operation, and afterwards return to previous areas of influence. DDRRR activities during Operation Umoja Wetu demonstrated that sensitization/outreach programs have a role, but the number of FDLR who voluntarily entered DDRRR was small relative to the estimated FDLR presence. ¶6. (SBU) Comment Continued: On the other hand, the new rapprochement between the DRC and Rwanda and the apparent willingness on the part of the GDRC to work against the FDLR may signal preparation of a more robust and effective operation (Note: Press coverage of the recent meeting between the DRC and Rwandan Foreign Ministers -- see reftel -- speculated that the two countries might prepare a second joint operation against the FDLR. End note). In these efforts, DDRRR and MIST deployment will still have an important role, especially in the longer term as MONUC and the FARDC gain a better appreciation of the use of psychological operations. End Comment. GARVELINK