ANNUAL CIWG MEETING - KINSHASA

S E C R E T KINSHASA 000255 NOFORN DEPT FOR DS/ST/CMP AND DS/IP/AF, NAIROBI FOR ESC E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2019 TAGS: ASEC SUBJECT: ANNUAL CIWG MEETING - KINSHASA REF: STATE 021821 Classified By: RSO Christopher Gu for reasons 1.5 (C) and (D). ¶1. (S/NF) The Counter Intelligence Working Group (CIWG) met on 03/13/09. The A/DCM, ORA, DAO, POL, and RSO attended the meeting. ¶2. (S/NF) All CIWG members concurred that the technical and humint capabilities of host country intelligence services are extremely limited. ¶3. (S/NF) Financial and material resources for these types of operations are almost non-existent. The GDRC does have adequate human resources, but most of their operatives are poorly trained and do not possess much in terms of technical equipment. ¶4. (S/NF) The level of training and experience of the local services is at best minimal. There are, however, some older intelligence officers who received extensive training from the U.S. and other countries during the Mobutu era. ¶5. (S/NF) The local services have relationships with the Angolans, South Africans, French, Belgians, U.K., Italians, Germans, and the U.S. The opportunity to conduct joint operations is extremely limited. ¶6. (S/NF) The host country services have no motivation to target the U.S. presence. There is, however, an organizational component that is focused on U.S. assets. The Embassy does share a liaison relationship with local services. ¶7. (S/NF) Post is not aware of any technical or humint operations - offensive or defensive - against the U.S. and believe there is limited motivation or intent of local services to do so. ¶8. (S/NF) Third country intelligence services operate in the DRC, but have not proven to be a significant threat in the recent past. Third country intelligence services can operate freely in the DRC and, depending on the level of sophistication and technological capabilities, could conduct technical operations if they so desired. Criteria countries that have diplomatic representatives in the DRC include Iran, North Korea, and Cuba, however all have an extremely small presence. The Iranian mission consists of four people, the Cuban mission consists of one, and the North Koreans have five people. ¶9. (S/NF) Post is not aware of any operations being conducted by any third country against U.S. interests. Several countries, including France, U.K., Germany, Belgium, South Africa, Russia, and China have intelligence services operating in the DRC. Post believes that if they do target the U.S., it would be an attempt to determine our economic/political goals and strategies. It is also possible that the Chinese, French and Belgians may be conducting limited technical operations such as monitoring our cell phone conversations for economic information and goals. ¶10. (S/NF) Conditions do exist that would facilitate a host government or third country technical attack against the Embassy. The Embassy is in close proximity to several tall apartment and office buildings that could easily be used to launch some sort of technical attack. Housed in these office buildings are the Chinese Embassy and MONUC. In addition, the Embassy also shares a common perimeter wall with the Portuguese Embassy. Members are more concerned with a possible technical operation from a third country than we are from the host government because of the lack of resources, training, and technical capabilities of the local services. Tapping of hard line phones is impossible since phone lines do not exist in the DRC which makes cell phones the only viable means of communication in the DRC. RSO continues to remind our employees in briefings not to discuss sensitive matters on cell phones. RSO believes that Post has adequate physical security measures in place to prevent any type of clandestine or surreptitious entry. LES and other uncleared visitors are always escorted in the CAA. Post One and RSO ensure that procurement procedures for items destined into the CAA follow the strict CAA procurement policy and there have been no reportable incidents since the last CIWG meeting. ¶11. (S/NF) RSO implemented a new and improved LES Counter Intelligence briefing program in 2007. To maximize attendance, RSO offered 10 briefings at three different locations. All LES received a 2 hour briefing outlining CI awareness, prevention, and reporting procedures. Feedback was positive from the Embassy community and RSO will again provide this briefing in 2009. ¶12. (S/NF) Given the host country's lack of resources and a relative lack of motivation from third country intelligence services, CIWG members collectively agree that the SETL technical threat level should remain at medium. ¶13. (S/NF) POC is RSO Christopher K. Gu at 342-81-88-44608 (cell) or 934 ext. 2207 GARVELINK