EASTERN DRC NOTES - MARCH 12; INTEGRATION PROCESS FAVORING

UNCLAS KINSHASA 000233 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG SUBJECT: EASTERN DRC NOTES - MARCH 12; INTEGRATION PROCESS FAVORING RWANDOPHONES REF: KINSHASA 222 ¶1. (U) The items contained in this report consist principally of spot information from various sources. This report is not exhaustive, nor can all the information contained therein be confirmed at this time. ¶2. (SBU) Goma sources recently spoke with two well-informed individuals, who maintained that the FARDC integration process is creating a Rwandophone-dominated army in the region (additional information on same topic in reftel). One of these individuals is a senior traditional leader of the Hunde ethnic group; the other is a North Kivu armed group specialist. ¶3. (SBU) Both alleged that the integration process, as put into practice under General Numbi's operational command, is very different from the process that was presented to donors and the public at large. According to the individuals, the process has increasingly consolidated military control of the Petit Nord in the hands of units heavily composed of and commanded by Rwandophones. ¶4. (SBU) There are now reportedly seven integrated brigades in the Petit Nord. The origin of their commanders breaks down as follows: CNDP with 4; PARECO/Mugabo (Hutu wing) with 2; and core FARDC with ¶1. The more strategic axis commanders are apparently all Rwandophones. (Note: In an informal conversation with Facilitation members on March 11, MONUC Political Officer Lajoussi said that MONUC had even more detailed figures, which confirmed the trend. End note). ¶5. (SBU) Both individuals stated that the Mugabo wing of PARECO, though overwhelmingly Hutu, once included members of other ethnic groups. During integration operations, however, non-Hutu personnel were systematically turned away. On the other hand, known FDLR elements within PARECO have knowingly been integrated. ¶6. (SBU) In addition, commissions have gone overwhelmingly to Rwandophones. In the most obvious example, Mugabo himself has been made an axis commander within his old operational area, while his nominal commander within the PARECO structure, La Fontaine (leader of the Nande wing),has been sidelined. Identification and integration operations have been systematically conducted only in areas where there are concentrations of CNDP or the Hutu wing of PARECO. ¶7. (SBU) Integration of members of other armed groups has, according to these contacts, simply been purposely delayed. In a number of cases, these groups have been disbanded: their leaders have transferred to Goma, while their units have been cast adrift. In many cases, this means that these fighters have most likely drifted back into the bush and, perhaps, in some cases into the arms of the FDLR, with whom many of them have maintained longstanding relationships. ¶8. (SBU) Comment: In principle, any armed groups that have not undergone integration will at some point be considered outlaws, subject to military action. Isolated, cut off from their senior commanders, feeling under pressure from a resurgent Rwandophone military presence (in most ways similar to former RCD configurations),these groups could very easily return to guerilla warfare, most likely in local coordination with the FDLR. ¶9. (SBU) Comment continued: The outcome could be a situation in which the non-Rwandophone communities of the Petit Nord (plus many Hutu, not all of them FDLR) would find themselves once again at war with an armed, organized Rwandophone military establishment that has been legitimized as the official, integrated FARDC and that, unlike the former RDC groups, has support from the GDRC. End comment. GARVELINK