URGENT DEMARCHE: THREATENED INDIAN PEACEKEEPER

S E C R E T KINSHASA 000195 SIPDIS FOR IO/PSC (HEATHER VON BEHREN) AND AF/C (CHRISTOPHER LAMORA) E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKO UNSC IN CG SUBJECT: URGENT DEMARCHE: THREATENED INDIAN PEACEKEEPER WITHDRAWAL FROM THE DRC REF: STATE 18863 Classified By: Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reaso ns 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) In response reftel, Ambassador met March 3 with Prime Minister Adolphe Muzito. Meeting with President Joseph Kabila, as instructed reftel, was not possible as Kabila is away from Kinshasa and is not expected to return until next week. ¶2. (S) Prior to meeting with Muzito, Ambassador spoke with SRSG Alan Doss who briefed on the meeting Sunday between Kabila and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. Doss asked Ambassador to emphasize that while progress has been made in persuading the Indians to reconsider their decision to withdraw from MONUC, the DRC still needed to make public statements and reach out to India to reinforce the DRC's support for India's continued participation in MONUC. Doss noted that Kabila had indicated to Ban Ki-Moon that Foreign Minister Alexis Thambwe will soon travel to New Delhi to deliver a letter to the Indian Government requesting that India's MONUC contingent remain in the DRC. ¶3. (SBU) Muzito, who had not been informed of the purpose of the meeting because of security concerns, was surrounded by mostly economic advisors, including Jean-Claude Nachega, an IMF official of Congolese nationality who has been seconded to the Prime Minister's office to work on pressing economic issues. Ambassador was accompanied by the DCM. Ambassador began, noting that the U.S. Government was pleased that there appears to be progress in persuading India to reverse its decision to withdraw its forces from MONUC. He stated that the U.S. viewed India's presence in MONUC, with almost 25% of all troops, as very important for the success of MONUC's mission. He also noted that with 23 of 30 aircraft of MONUC's air wing, it would be difficult for MONUC to maintain logistical support to the Congolese army (FARDC) in its operations against the FDLR and the LRA. ¶4. (SBU) Muzito responded that for some time there had been dissatisfaction with Indian troops because of their inability or unwillingness to protect the local population from the CNDP. He said perhaps the GDRC's analysis had been flawed regarding the Indians' performance but that at no time did the GDRC want all the Indians to leave; instead they should simply redeploy back to India according a pre-established timetable. He acknowledged that the GDRC has asked the SYG to not include Indians in MONUC's augmentation of 3,000 new troops but that this did not mean India was to reduce its current force level. ¶5. (C) Comment: The Prime Minister does not usually deal with foreign policy and was out of his depth. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, Muzito seemed surprised when the Ambassador said the Foreign Minister was to travel to New Delhi. Muzito will, however, inform Kabila of the Ambassador's demarche. We also believe that among the group of advisors attending the meeting was Kabila's representative on Muzito's staff; he will certainly inform the president. At the end of the meeting one of the advisors accompanied the Ambassador to the press gaggle just outside the PM's office and insisted on helping with the press conference, ostensibly to steer questions away from more sensitive issues (in this case the ambassador's discussion with the PM on the ongoing political crisis over the anticipated resignation of the National Assembly president, an issue that will be covered septel). When the Ambassador told the press that the meeting had focused on the economic situation, the advisor left. End comment. GARVELINK